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ABSTRACT

In 1993, Dwork and Naor proposed using computational puzzles, a resource burning mechanism, to combat spam email. In the ensuing three decades, resource burning has broadened to
include communication capacity, computer memory, and human effort. It has become a wellestablished tool in distributed security. Due to the cost attached to utilizing resource burning
mechanism, these have not been popularized in domains apart from cryptocurrency.
In this dissertation, we design efficient resource burning based Sybil defense techniques for
permissionless systems. As a first step, we identify existing resource burning mechanisms in
literature in Chapter 2. Additionally, we enumerate numerous open problems in a wide variety
of distributed systems, where resource burning might come in handy.
Next, we develop scalable distributed protocols to reduce the fraction of Sybil participants
in large scale permissionless systems. To this end, we design a family of provably secure
resource burning protocols that have a resource cost which is commensurate with that of the
attacker and the number of honest participants that join the system in Chapter 3.
In practice, we observed that the behavior of the join and departure of non-malicious IDs
does not vary rapidly over a short duration of time. Using this insight, we design an algorithm
that estimates the join rate of non-malicious IDs in the system in Chapter 4. Later, we use this

v

algorithm to determine if the system is under attack.
Our third contribution in this dissertation is a Sybil defense protocol that guarantees an
algorithmic spend rate that is a slow-growing function of the resource cost to the adversary in
Chapter 5. Additionally, we ensure that in the absence of an attack, the algorithmic spending
is commensurate with the join rate of non-malicious IDs.
To test the theory in practice, we simulate the various Sybil defense protocols proposed
throughout this dissertation on several real-world networks. We compare the performance of
our protocols against the state-of-the-art and discuss several heuristics that further improve the
algorithmic spend rate in Chapter 6.
Finally, we present preliminary results for a technique that makes use of our Sybil defense
protocols in designing resource-efficient distributed hash tables with efficient reconfiguration
costs. We conjecture that the number of reconfigurations of non-malicious IDs grows as a
function of the number of joins by the bad IDs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

“Don’t use a lot where a little will do.”
-Proverbs

In 1993, Dwork and Naor proposed using computational puzzles to combat spam email [83].
In the ensuing three decades, resource burning - verifiable consumption of resources - has
become a well-established tool in distributed security. The resource consumed has broadened
to include not just computational power but also communication capacity, computer memory,
and human effort.
Additionally, over the last decade, peer-to-peer systems have witnessed a research renaissance with the phenomenal success of blockchain technology. This technology has found use
in a wide variety of applications ranging from financial services to the healthcare sector. The
most notable of this being cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and many
more.
Unfortunately, due to the permissionless and decentralized nature, peer-to-peer systems
are vulnerable to the Sybil attack. In permissionless systems, any participant—represented
1

by a virtual identifier (ID)—is free to join and depart at will while enjoying a high degree
of anonymity. For example, an ID might be an IP address, a digital wallet, or a username.
First discovered by Douceur in 2002 [80], a Sybil attack entails a malicious entity claiming
a substantially disproportionate fraction of IDs in the system to claim an unfair share of the
system’s resources.
Resource burning is a popular tool to defend against the Sybil attack in cryptocurrencybased permissionless systems. These systems require continuous resource burning to limit the
number of Sybil IDs in the network, thereby maintaining an honest majority necessary for
correctness properties in these systems.
A Barrier to Widespread Use. A major impediment to the widespread use of resource burning techniques is the cost attached to resource burning. In particular, current resource burning
based approaches have significant overhead, given that resource burning challenges must always be solved, even when the system is not under attack. This non-stop resource burning
translates into a substantial energy — and, ultimately, a monetary – cost [66, 86, 219]. For
example, in 2015, the Economist calculated that Bitcoin consumes at least 1.46 terawatt-hours
of electricity per year, or enough to power 135, 000 American homes [86].
Consequently, despite the success with Bitcoin and its analogs, resource burning based
approaches have not found widespread application in mitigating a range of malicious behaviors,
such as Sybil attacks [80], and application-layer distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
These are well-known and enduring security problems for which resource burning seems wellsuited, and yet proposals [50,58,106,130,149,158,187,234,235] built around it have seen only
limited deployment.
The primary motivation of this dissertation is to design efficient resource burning based distributed algorithms that can provably defend against Sybil adversaries. As part of this dissertation, we first describe resource burning as a technique applicable to a wide variety of distributed
systems. Next, we develop scalable distributed protocols to reduce the fraction of Sybil par-

2

ticipants in large-scale permissionless systems. As the first step in this direction, we design a
family of scalable resource burning protocols that have a resource cost that is commensurate
with that of the attacker and the number of non-malicious(good) IDs that join the system.
In practice, we observed that the behavior of the join and departure of good IDs does not
vary rapidly over a short duration of time. Using this insight, we design an algorithm that
estimates the join rate of good IDs in the system. Later, we use this estimate to design a
protocol with an algorithmic cost that is a slow-growing function of the resource cost to the
adversary. Moreover, we ensure that in the absence of an attack, the algorithmic resource cost
is commensurate with the join rate of good IDs. Finally, we apply our protocols to designing
resource-efficient distributed hash tables with efficient reconfiguration costs. We briefly discuss
a reconfiguration protocol and present a preliminary analysis of the same.
Organization of this chapter. We begin with a description of our model in Section 1.1. Next,
we discuss a literature survey for the research presented in this dissertation in Section 1.2.
Finally, we summarize the contributions of this dissertation in Section 1.3.

1.1

Our Model

In this section, we describe our model assumptions that apply to majority of the work in this
dissertation. We outline additional assumptions as required in the corresponding chapter.
Our system consists of virtual identifiers (IDs), and an attacker (or adversary). Each ID is
either good or bad. Each good ID follows our algorithm, and all bad IDs are controlled by the
adversary.
Adversary. Our assumption that a single adversary controls all the bad IDs pessimistically
represents perfect collusion and coordination among the bad IDs. Bad IDs may deviate from
our protocols in an arbitrary manner including sending incorrect or spurious messages. This
type of adversary encapsulates the celebrated Sybil attack [80]. Section 1.2 summarizes the
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extensive prior literature in this area.
We critically assume that the adversary controls up to an κ fraction of the resources in
the network, where κ is a constant that is a parameter of our algorithms. This assumption is
standard in Sybil defense literature [19, 98, 160, 172, 187, 230]. Our algorithms employ public
key cryptography, and we make the usual cryptographic assumptions needed for this. We
assume that the adversary knows all of our algorithms, but does not know the private random
bits of any good ID. Thus, the private key is always kept secret, so the adversary cannot send
information in a way that makes it appear to have originated from another ID; that is, messages
cannot be “spoofed” by the adversary.
RB-challenges. IDs can construct resource burning challenges (RB-challenges) of varying
hardness, whose solutions cannot be stolen or pre-computed. A k-hard challenge for any
integer k ≥ 1 imposes a resource cost of k on the challenge solver.
Our results are agnostic to the type of challenges employed. We discuss more on this in
Chapter 2.
Communication. All communication among good IDs occurs through a broadcast primitive,
denoted by D IFFUSE, which allows a good ID to send a value to all other good IDs within a
known and bounded amount of time, despite the presence of an adversary. Such a primitive
is a standard assumption in popular resource burning schemes [47, 96, 98, 154]; see [161] for
empirical justification. We assume that each message originating at a good ID is signed by the
ID’s private key.
Time is discretized into rounds. As a standard assumption, all IDs are assumed to be
synchronized, but our algorithms can tolerate a small amount of skew. The length of a round is
long enough to diffuse a message as well as solve an RB-challenge of the smallest difficulty (see
Section 3.2 for details). For simplicity, we initially assume that the time to diffuse a message
is small in comparison to the time to solve an RB-challenge. A recent study of the Bitcoin
network shows that the communication latency is 12 seconds in contrast to the 10 minutes
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block interval [70], which motivates our assumption of resource burning latency dominating
the communication latency in our system. However, we later relax this assumption in Section
3.6 to account for a network latency which is upper bounded by ∆ > 1.
We pessimistically assume that the adversary can send messages to any ID at will, and that
it can read the messages diffused by good IDs before sending its own. It has read-only access
to all the messages. This last attribute implies that the adversary cannot tamper with messages
being sent out by the good IDs. Also, the adversary cannot block messages indefinitely but can
insert messages on the communication channels at will.
Joins and Departures. The system is dynamic with IDs joining and departing over time (i.e.,
churn), subject to constraint on fraction of good IDs that can join or depart in any round.
Maintaining performance guarantees amidst churn is often challenging in decentralized systems [24–28]. We pessimistically assume that all join and departure events are scheduled in a
worst-case fashion by the adversary, unless specified otherwise.
Before joining the system, a user generates its own public/private key pair. The public key
is used as the user’s ID. Whenever an ID needs to send any message, this message is digitally
signed using the ID’s private key, and the signed message is sent by D IFFUSE. Later, the ID
can D IFFUSE its public key (i.e., its ID), which allows the intended recipient(s) to verify the
signature.
We assume that all good IDs announce their departure to the network. In practice, this
assumption could be relaxed through the use of heartbeat messages that are periodically sent
out to indicate that an ID is still in the network.
The minimum number of good IDs in the system at any point is assumed to be at least n0 .
Our goal is to provide security and performance guarantees for O(nγ0 ) joins and departures
of IDs, for any desired constant γ ≥ 1. In other words, the guarantees on our system hold with
high probability i.e., with probability at least 1 − n−c
0 for any desired c ≥ 1, over polynomial
number of dynamic events. This implies security despite a system size that may vary wildly
over time, increasing and decreasing polynomially in n0 above a minimum number of n0 good
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IDs.
We impose a loose constraint on the rate of departures: at most an 0 -fraction of good IDs
may depart in any single round, where 0 > 0 is a small, known constant. Note that this
constraint still allows for an amount of dynamism that is linear in the current system size.

1.2

Related Work

In this section, we begin with a literature survey on Sybil defense. Then, we discuss existing resource burning mechanisms and finally, a survey of reconfiguration techniques for Distributed
Hash tables (DHTs).
Sybil Defense. The Sybil attack was identified by Douceur in [80]. There is large body
of literature on mitigating such attacks (for example, see surveys [79, 128, 167, 180]), and
additional work documenting real-world Sybil attacks [177, 223, 232, 245]. Critically, none of
these prior results have the desired property that the resource costs to the good IDs grow as a
function of the cost incurred by the adversary. We note that this concept can be characterized
as a resource-competitive approach [7, 41, 74, 76, 99, 100, 102, 140, 254], but is not critical to
understanding the work in this dissertation, and thus we omit any further discussion on the
same.
Computational puzzles is a popular technique to mitigate Sybil attacks in open systems [21,
50, 141, 149, 196, 220]. Unfortunately, participants must continually issue and solve puzzles
in order to protect against potential attacks; thus the system remains in a “hyper-vigilant”
state, leading to computational waste. We note that obtaining a large numbers of machines
is expensive; computing power costs money, whether obtained via Amazon AWS [14] or a
botnet rental [16]. This premise is borne out by Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, where an
adversary has a strong incentive to wield as much computational power as possible.
A recent alternative to PoW is proof-of-stake (PoS) where security relies on the adversary
holding a minority stake in an abstract finite resource [3]. When making a group decision,
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PoS weights each participant’s vote using its share of the resource; for example, the amount of
cryptocurrency held by the participant. A well-known example is ALGORAND [98], which
employs PoS to form a committee. A hybrid approach using both PoW and PoS has been proposed in the Ethereum system [13]. We note that PoS can only be used in systems where the
“stake” of each participant is globally known. Thus, PoS is typically used only in cryptocurrency applications.
Beyond computational puzzles, several other approaches have been proposed. In a wireless setting with multiple communication channels, Sybil attacks can be mitigated via radioresource testing which relies on the inability of the adversary to listen to many channels simultaneously [101, 103, 170, 180]. However, this approach may fail if the adversary can monitor
most or all of the channels. Furthermore, the same shortcoming exists: the system must constantly perform tests to guarantee security which leads to wasted bandwidth in the absence of
an attack.
There are several results that leverage social networks to yield Sybil resistance [147, 166,
236, 249–251]. However, social-network information may not be available in many settings.
Another idea is to use network measurements to verify the uniqueness of IDs [38, 77, 97, 153,
209, 231], but these techniques rely on accurate measurements of latency, signal strength, or
round-trip times, for example, and this may not always be possible. Containment strategies are
examined in overlays [73, 207], but the extent to which good participants are protected from
the malicious actions of Sybil IDs is limited.
√
Sybil defense when O( n/polyloglog n) IDs may depart and join per time step is examined in [25,26] (and high churn without Byzantine fault tolerance is considered in [24,27,28]).
√
In this challenging model, (roughly) O( n) Sybil IDs can be tolerated.
Resource Burning mechanisms. A number of resource burning mechanisms have been proposed over the last two decade. The most popular of these is computational puzzles, which
provides certain advantages. First, verifying a solution is much easier than solving the puzzle
itself. This places the burden of proof on devices who wish to participate in a protocol rather
7

than on a verifier. In contrast, bandwidth-oriented schemes, such as [230], require verification
that a sufficient number of packets have been received before any service is provided to an ID;
this requires effort by the verifier that is proportional to the number of packets. We discuss
further on this in Chapter 2.
Distributed Hash Tables (DHT). A large body of literature exists on secure Sybil resistant
DHTs. Broadly, we may group these works by whether or not they use groups.
The use of groups for building attack-resistant distributed systems has received significant
attention. Early results addressed scenarios where churn is limited [31, 90, 91, 116,174]. Awerbuch and Scheideler demonstrated security over a polynomial number of join and departure
events [33–35]; however, the system size is assumed to vary by at most a constant factor. The
performance of their approach was studied in [208]. Subsequently, Guerraoui et al. [107] have
provided similar guarantees when the system size can vary polynomially.
Several results have focused on reducing communication costs when the good majority of
all groups is guaranteed via an algorithm like the cuckoo rule [204, 248]. Here too, group
size impacts performance; groups of size 30 incur significant latency in PlanetLab experiments [248]. Additionally, groups have been used to quarantine malicious IDs [142, 200] with
limited churn. Finally, we observe that none of these results explicitly use resource burning,
with the possible exception of [31], where computational puzzles or Turing tests are briefly
discussed as a means for throttling the join rate of Sybil IDs. These prior results assume a
model where the fraction of Sybil IDs is always limited to strictly less than 1/2.
Several distributed constructions exist that guarantee secure routing, but do not explicitly use
groups [90, 203]. In [54, 131, 173], malicious fault are tolerated by routing along multiple
diverse routes. However, it is unclear that these systems can provide security guarantees against
an adversary that adaptively attempts to place bad IDs at targeted locations in the ID space.
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1.3

Summary of Contributions

In this section, we summarize the main results presented in this dissertation.

1.3.1

Resource Burning in Permissionless Systems

In Chapter 2, we present resource burning as a tool to design secure permissionless systems.
We define resource burning as verifiable consumption of resources solely to convey information, and identify various resource burning mechanisms in literature. Then, we present a future
course for application of resource burning techniques to a number of security problems in existing permissionless system in form of four positions. In Section 2.2.5, we define a general model
for resource burning. Finally, we summarize existing works that employ resource burning techniques, and identify open problems in the following areas: Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies,
DHTs, Application-Layer DDoS attacks and Review Spam.

1.3.2

Commensurate Sybil Defense

Sybil attacks are a well known vulnerability in permissionless systems. Current, state-of-theart defenses techniques require continuously resources burning to limit the fraction of Sybil
IDs in the system.
In Chapter 3, we design a family of protocols that maintain the following properties: 1)
the system always consists of a majority of good IDs; and 2) their always exists a committee
that is logarithmic in the system size and consists of a majority of good IDs. Additionally, the
resource cost to the algorithms are commensurate with the cost to the attacker. Specifically,
suppose T is the resource spending rate of the adversary and J is the join rate of good IDs over
the lifetime of the system. Then, the spending rate of the algorithm is O(T + J).
For ease of presentation, we begin by presenting a centralized protocol - CC OM, for a system with a certifying authority in Section 3.3. Then, we present a set of distributed protocol
- DC OM and EC OM in Section 3.4.4 and Section 3.5. Next, we modify our protocols to ac9

commodate for ∆−communication latency in the network in Section 3.6. Finally, we discuss
generalizing our protocols to adjust the fraction of bad IDs in the system.

1.3.3

Estimating Goodness in Permissionless Systems

In a permissionless system, IDs can join and depart at will. It has been observed in real-world
networks that the churn of honest participants does not vary abruptly over time. Using this
insight, can we estimate the join rate of good IDs in a system that maintains a majority of good
IDs at all times?
In Chapter 4, we propose a protocol - G OOD JE ST, which answers the above question in
the affirmative in Section 4.2. We prove that our algorithm estimates the join rate of good IDs
to within a constant factor in Section 4.2.2. This factor depend on the variation in the churn of
good IDs over long periods of time as well as on thhe extent of instantenous change in churn.
Additionally, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm by simulating it on real-world
networks: Bitcoin, BitTorrent, Ethereum and Gnutella, in Section 4.3. Our experimental results demonstrate the robustness of our protocol to resource budget of the adversary, and also,
reinforces our theoretical guarantees.

1.3.4

Asymmetric Sybil Defense

Suppose you had an oracle that told you the join rate of good IDs at a given time step. Then,
hypothetically you could charge a higher resource cost to IDs for joining the system if their
join resulted in increasing the current join rate from what the oracle said. This would lead
to a higher resource cost to the adversary for attacking the system in comparison to what the
adversary would have paid in our protocols from Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5, we propose an asymmetric Sybil defense algorithm - ERGO in Section 5.2.1.
We use our estimate algorithm from Chapter 4 - G OOD JE ST, to estimate the good join rate.
We use this estimate to adapt the entrance resource cost to an ID. This results in the resource
spending rate to the good IDs to grow sub-linearly with the spending rate of the adversary.
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Formally, suppose the good ID join rate over the lifetime of the system is J and the adversarial
p
spend rate is T , then the spending rate to our algorithm is O(J + T (J + 1)).
Additionally, we show that the resource cost to good IDs for any algorithm that requires
periodic system wide tests to maintain an honest majority, has a resource spending rate of
√
Ω(J + T J) in Section 5.3.

1.3.5

Empirical Evaluation

Over the course of this dissertation, we propose numerous resource burning based Sybil defense
techniques. For each of these techniques, we obtain theoretical bounds on the resource cost to
the good IDs while always guaranteeing an honest majority in the system.
In Chapter 6, we conduct empirical studies on the proposed Sybil defense protocols. In
Section 6.3, we simulate our algorithms under a heavy-weight adversarial attack and analyze
the merits of our algorithms. Then, we compare the performance of our protocols with stateof-the-art resource burning based Sybil defense algorithms in Section 6.4. Finally, we simulate
the heuristics proposed in Section 6.5 for E RGO and examine their relative merits.

1.3.6

Towards Efficient and Robust DHTs

Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) are one of the most successful applications of permissionless
system, which provide robust data storage and lookup services. These systems are conducive
to nodes joining and departing at will, and thus are an easy target for Sybil attacks. Specifically,
even with at most a constant fraction of adversarial nodes, the adversary can disrupt the system
by accumulating bad IDs in a specific ID’s neighborhood through targeted joins. Existing
defense techniques require reconfiguration of constantly many nodes in the neighborhood of a
joining/departing node. This is needed to maintain the balanced spread of nodes in the system
as well as an honest majority in the neighborhood of every node in the system.
In Chapter 7, we present our preliminary results for an efficient reconfiguration protocol Lazy Cuckoo Rule(LCR), for a permissionless system with a fixed size but polynomial number
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of join and leave events in Section 7.1. Instead of requiring to reconfigure with every join or
leave event, we establish thresholds on the number of nodes in any neighborhood. Only when
the number of nodes in any neighbourhood crosses beyond the thresholds, do we require to
shuffle this neighborhood. We discuss our empirical results for LCR in Section 7.1.4.

12

Chapter 2
Resource Burning in Permissionless
Systems

“It’s not about money, it’s about sending a message.”
The Joker [181]

Proof-of-work puzzles and CAPTCHAS consume enormous amounts of energy and time.
These techniques are examples of resource burning: verifiable consumption of resources solely
to convey information.
Can these costs be eliminated? It seems unlikely since resource burning shares similarities
with “money burning” and “costly signaling”, which are foundational to game theory, biology,
and economics. Can these costs be reduced? Yes, research shows we can significantly lower
the asymptotic costs of resource burning in many different settings.
In this chapter, we survey the literature on resource burning; take positions based on predictions of how the tool is likely to evolve; and propose several open problems in the distributed
systems domain. We solve some of these problems throughout this dissertation.
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2.1

Introduction

Resource burning is a critical tool for defending permissionless systems. In support of this
claim, we survey an assortment of topics: distributed ledgers, application-layer distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, review spam, and secure distributed hash tables (DHTs).
Using these examples, we highlight how results in these different areas have converged upon
resource burning as a critical ingredient for achieving security; this is summarized in Table 2.1.
As prelude to this survey, we predict how resource-burning may evolve, and how systems
may adapt to this technique. These predictions are distilled in four position statements below.

Position 1: Resource burning is a fundamental tool for defending permissionless
systems.

PoW and CAPTCHAs have been around now for decades, persisting despite concerns over
scalability, resource consumption, security guarantees, and predicted obsolescence (see discussion under Position 2 and Section 2.3). The continued practical success of resource burning aligns with theoretical justification from game-theoretic results on “money-burning” and
“costly signaling”(Section 2.2.1). Given the increasing popularity of permissionless systems,
and the need to defend them, resource burning will likely only increase in prevalence.

Position 2: Resource burning must be optimized.

In May 2020, the annual energy consumption of Bitcoin was 57.92 terawatt-hours of electricity
per year, which is comparable to the annual electricity consumption of Bangladesh; Ethereum
was 7.9 terawatt-hours, comparable to that of Angola [78]. In 2012, humans spent an estimated
150, 000 hours per day solving CAPTCHAS [190,228]. The rise of permissionless systems will
likely only increase these rates of resource burning.
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Domain

Primary
Resource
Consumed

Mechanism

Enabled Functionality

Conjectured Cost

Blockchains

CPU

CPU Puzzles

Distributed Ledger

√
O( T JG + JG )

DHTs

CPU

CPU Puzzles

Decentralized storage and
search

√
Õ( T JG + JG )

DDoS
Attacks

Bandwidth /
CPU

Messages /
CPU Puzzles

Fair allocation of server
resources

No Conjecture

Review
Spam

Human
Time

CAPTCHAS

Trusted consumer
recommendations

Õ(T 2/3 + PG )

Table 2.1: Summary of the domains surveyed, along with the corresponding resources, and core
functionality that is secured by resource burning. We also make conjectures on the algorithmic
spend rate. Here, T is the adversary’s spend rate; JG is the join rate for good IDs; and PG is
the posting rate of good IDs. We elaborate on these notions in Section 2.2.5. The Õ notation
omits polylogarithmic factors.
On the positive side, recent theoretical results suggest that resource burning can be analyzed
and optimized just like any other computational resource [109, 111]. But there is significant
work needed to: (1) develop a theory of resource burning focused on distributed security; and
to (2) translate this theory into practical resource savings.
In this chapter, we discuss current theoretical work on reducing resource-burning rates
across multiple application: blockchains (Section 2.3); DHTs (Section 2.4); application-layer
DDoS attacks (Section 2.5); and review spam (Section 2.6).

Position 3: Reducing from permissionless to permissioned systems is important.

Four decades of research have resulted in efficient and reliable algorithms for permissioned
networks. We should leverage these results when addressing problems in new permissionless
systems. One way to do this is to develop tools, based on resource burning, that bound the fraction of IDs controlled by the adversary (bad IDs) in permissionless systems. In Sections 2.3,
we discuss results on the problem G EN ID, which provides this bound for static, permissionless
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networks; and D EF ID which does so for permissionless networks with churn.
In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we discuss the threats posed by application-layer denial-of-service
(DDoS) attacks and review spam. Neither problem aligns perfectly with a permissionless
model. For example, servers are under administrative control, and online review systems often require credentials for account creation. However, these systems still remain vulnerable to
malicious participants that are difficult to identify, and who monopolize system resources. We
define a hybrid system model as one that contains both permissioned and permissionless properties. We note that any tools designed for permissionless systems will also work for hybrid
systems. However, we would expect to be able to develop more efficient techniques to adapt
tools from permissioned systems to these hybrid systems.

Position 4: Theoretical guarantees should hold independently of the resource
burned. Research should focus on both domain-specific and domain-generic problems.

As theoreticians, we should generalize as much as possible. Algorithms that use resource
burning should require a certain “cost” that specifies the amount of the resource to be consumed, but should allow for that resource to be anything: computation, computer memory,
bandwidth, human effort, or some other resource yet to be defined. As much as possible, theoretical results should be stated in terms of this cost, irrespective of the resource consumed.
This ensures our theoretical results will continue to be relevant, even as underlying technologies providing verifiable resource burning may change.
Additionally, a key research focus should be on problems that generalize across multiple
domains. In this chapter, we describe two examples: G EN ID and D EF ID (Section 2.3.1). Our
remaining three examples are domain-specific. We believe it is important to work on both types
of problems.
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2.2

Background and Preliminaries

Resource burning has found application in various areas of computer security; indeed, its use
was proposed by Douceur [80] as a defense against the Sybil attack [79, 128, 167, 180]. However, resource burning has a broader history, with similar ideas appearing in several other scientific domains.
In Section 2.2.1, we present this background. In Sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3, and 2.2.4, we elaborate on the notion of resource burning. Finally, in Section 2.2.5, we describe a general problem
model that provides a unifying set of assumptions and terminology used throughout this document.

2.2.1

Game Theory, Biology and Economics

Resource burning is analogous to what is referred to as money burning in the game theory literature. To the best of our knowledge, the first significant algorithmic game theory study of money
burning, due to Hartline and Roughgarden, analyzed the use of money burning in mechanism
design [111]. Their main result is a near-optimal mechanism for multi-unit auctions, where
the quantity optimized is social welfare or the sum of utilities of all players. They also give
results showing that, under certain conditions, an auction utilizing money burning can obtain a


1
Ω 1+log(n/k)
fraction of the optimal social welfare, where the auction consists of n bidders
who are bidding for k units. They conclude that “the cost of implementing money-burning ...
is relatively modest, provided an optimal money-burning mechanism is used”.
Money burning is also known as costly signaling in the game theory literature, and it has
two main uses in this context. First, it can signal commitment to a certain action, as is illustrated
in the “lunch” game1 [44,120]. Second, it can signal the “type” of a player, as is in the“college”
game [44]. We present these two games below.
Lunch Game. Two friends want to eat lunch together, but the first friend prefers option A and
1

This is equivalent to what is referred to as the “battle of the sexes” game in [44]
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the second prefers option B. They each obtain payoff of −1 if they choose different locations.
If they both pick option A, they obtain payoffs of 10 and 1 respectively. Conversely, if they
both pick option B, they obtain payoffs of 1 and 10.
Now, if the first friend verifiably burns money equal to 1 unit of utility prior to playing
the game, this signals a commitment to their preferred option, since if they were to choose the
unpreferable option, their utility would now be at most 0. Thus, they would not have played
the game. In this way, a friend who burns money can expect higher utility.
College Game. Each student is one of two types: smart or daft. Each student is considering
college and can choose either the action attend or not attend. A smart student pays a cost of
1 (in terms of time and effort) to attend college, and a daft student pays a cost of 3 to attend
college. We assume that the decision of the student to attend college is publicly known, but
that otherwise, college has no impact: daft students stay daft even after attending.2
An employer wants to hire smart students. If the employer hires a smart student, their
benefit is 2, and if they hire a daft student, their cost is 2. If a student is hired by the employer,
they have a benefit of 2, and if they are not hired, they have a benefit of 0. It is easy to verify
that the following is a Nash equilibrium for this game:
◦ Smart students attend college.
◦ Daft students do not attend college.
◦ The employer hires only students that attend college.
Here, smart students all choose to attend, even though college has no intrinsic benefit. Thus,
the choice to attend college is a costly signal made by the smart students, and college itself is
an example of resource burning.
If the option to attend college were removed from the game, and the fraction of smart
students were less than 1/2, then a Nash equilibrium would be for the employer to never hire.
2

On the positive side, smart students stay smart!
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In this case, the overall social welfare—the sum of expected benefits to all players—would
decrease.
Biology. Costly signaling is a well-known phenomena in biology. A relevant example from
animal behavior is stotting, in which quadrupeds, such as deer and gazelles, repeatedly jump
high into the air. This is often done in view of a predator, suggesting that stotting is a costly
signal to the predator that the prey is too healthy to catch [92]. Other examples occur in
sexual-selection, where the use of plumage, large antlers, and loud cries are a costly signal of
fitness [253].
Economics. In 1912, the economist Thostein Veblen coined the term “conspicuous consumption” to describe costly signaling used by people to advertise both wealth and leisure. For
example, Veblen writes, “The walking stick serves the purpose of an advertisement that the
bearer’s hands are employed otherwise than in useful effort, and it therefore has utility as an
evidence of leisure” [222]. Decades of economic studies suggest that conspicuous consumption
is a critical part of historical and modern economies [162, 189, 199, 202, 218]. For example,
Sundie et al write: “Although showy spending is often perceived as wasteful, frivolous, and
even narcissistic, an evolutionary perspective suggests that blatant displays of resources may
serve an important function, namely, as a communication strategy designed to gain reproductive reward” [218].

2.2.2

What is Resource Burning?

We define resource burning as the verifiable consumption of a resource. In particular, it is
computationally easy to verify both the consumption of the resource, and also the ID that
consumed the resource [11]. Below we describe several resource-burning techniques.
Proof-of-work (PoW). PoW is arguably the current, best-known example of resource burning. Here, the resource is computational power. Proof-of-work has been proposed for spamprevention [83, 146, 152]; blockchains [172]; and defense against Sybil attacks [19, 149].
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CAPTCHAs. A completely automated public Turing test to tell computers and humans apart,
or a CAPTCHA, is a resource-burning tool where the resource is human effort [243]. CAPTCHAs
may be based around text, images, or audio; however, several design and usability issues exist [242].
Proof-of-Space. Proof-of-space requires a prover to demonstrate utilization of a certain amount
of storage space [1,23,81,84]. This approach is foundational for Spacemint cryptocurrency [186].
Like PoW, proof of space demonstrates the consumption of a certain amount of a physical resource, but can require less electrical power. A related proposal is “Proof of SpaceTime” [171], which demands proof of consumption of a certain amount of storage space for a
certain amount of time.
Resource Testing. Resource testing requires a prover to demonstrate utilization of a radio
channel [101, 103, 170]. Resource burning refers to the game-theoretic money burning technique; resource testing refers to that technique specifically applied in the wireless domain.
Consider a wireless setting where each device has a single radio that provides access to one
of several channels. Thus, an adversary representing two bad IDs, but with a single device,
can only listen to one channel at a time. A base station can assign each ID to separate channels; send a random message on one of these channels chosen randomly; and demand that the
message be echoed back by the corresponding ID. Since the adversary can only listen to a one
channel at a time, it will fail this test with probability at least 1/2.

2.2.3

What is not Resource Burning

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) is a defense for permissionless systems, wherein security relies on the
adversary holding a minority stake in an abstract finite resource [3]. It has been proposed
primarily for cryptocurrency systems (Section 2.3). When making a group decision, PoS ensures that each ID has voting weight proportional to the amount of cryptocurrency that ID
holds. Well-known examples of such systems are ALGORAND [98], which employs PoS to
form a committee, and Ouroboros [137], which elects leaders with probability proportional to
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their stake. Hybrid approaches using both PoW and PoS exist, including one proposed for the
Ethereum system [13], and under the name “Proof of Activity” [42]. In contrast to the above
examples, PoS involves a measurement, rather than a consumption of, a resource.
Disadvantages of Proof-of-Stake. Unfortunately, PoS can only be used in systems where the
“stake” of each ID is globally known. Thus, it seems likely to remain relevant primarily in the
domain of cryptocurrencies. Moreover, even within that community, there are concerns about
proof-of-stake. To quote researcher Dahlia Malkhi: “I think proof-of-stake is fundamentally
vulnerable . . . In my opinion, it’s giving power to people who have lots of money” [67].

2.2.4

Resource Burning Does Not Require Waste of the Resource

While resource burning requires verifiable consumption of a resource, it does not necessarily
require waste of that resource. For example, Von Ahn et al. [228] developed the reCAPTCHA
system which channeled human effort from solving CAPTCHAs into the problem of deciphering scanned words that could not be recognized by computer. Their system achieved an
accuracy exceeding professional human transcribers, and was responsible for sucesssfully transcribing hundreds of millions of words from public domain books.
In 2018, Ball et al. developed proof-of-work puzzles whose hardness is based on worst-case
assumptions [37]. These puzzles are based on the Orthogonal Vectors, 3SUM, and All-Pairs
Shortest Path problems, and any problem that reduces to these problems, including deciding
any graph property statable in first-order logic. Hence, their work enables design of PoW
puzzles that can be useful for solving computational problems of practical importance.
In [210], Shoker developed proof-of-work puzzles that solve real-world matrix-based scientific computation problems. He named this technique “Proof of Exercise”.
All algorithms discussed in this chapter are compatible with this type of “useful” resource
burning, where the consumption of the resource solves practical problems. Our only requirement of the resource burning mechanism is that the consumption of the resource be easily
verifiable, which holds true for the above results.
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2.2.5

A General Model

We discuss broad aspects of a general model for permissionless systems. This allows us to
highlight commonalities between different application domains, while retaining the same terminology throughout.
The system consists of virtual identifiers (IDs). An ID is good if it obeys protocol and
belongs to a unique user; otherwise, the ID is bad. Good and bad IDs cannot necessarily be
distinguished a priori.
Communication. Communication is synchronous and occurs either via point-to-point or via
a broadcast primitive. The former is typical for peer-to-peer systems and the general clientserver setting. The latter corresponds to permissionless blockchains, where it is a standard
assumption that a good ID may send a value to all other good IDs within a known and bounded
amount of time, despite an adversary; for examples, see [47, 96, 98, 154] and see [161] for
empirical justification.
Adversary. A single adversary controls all bad IDs; this pessimistically represents perfect
collusion and coordination by malicious users. Bad IDs may arbitrarily deviate from our protocol, including sending incorrect or spurious messages. The adversary can send messages to
any ID at will, and can view any communications sent by good IDs before sending its own. It
knows when good IDs join and depart, but it does not know in advance the private random bits
generated by any good ID.
Often, the adversary is assumed to control only an α-fraction of the network resources, for
α > 0. Generally, in settings where correctness is threatened, α must be a small constant; for
example, often bounded below 1/3 or 1/4. Alternatively, there are settings where α can be any
constant bounded away from 1; typically, this corresponds to problems of performance (rather
than correctness).
Tunable Costs. We measure cost as the amount of resource consumed. Our model is agnostic
with respect to the particular resource used. However, we assume that it is possible to arbitrarily
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tune the cost. In particular, we assume that, for any value x, an ID can be issued a challenge
of difficulty x that will require consumption of x units of whatever resource is used.
Resources such as computation, computer memory, and bandwidth have inherently tunable
costs. For CAPTCHAs, cost could be adjusted in two possible ways. First, by adjusting the
difficulty of the puzzle, by either (1) adjusting the number of alphanumeric digits or the number of images to be classified; or (2) adjusting the difficulty of an individual recognition task
as described in the ScatterType CAPTCHA system [36]. Second, by adjusting the expected
difficulty by adjusting a probability of being required to solve a CAPTCHA.
Joins and Departures. Often, the system is dynamic, with IDs joining or departing over time.
There is no a priori method for determining whether a joining ID is good or bad. Joins and
departures by bad IDs may be scheduled in a worst-case fashion, and pessimistically we often
assume the adversary also has a limited ability to schedule these events for good IDs. We will
generally assume a lower bound on the number of IDs in the system, and that the lifetime of
the system is polynomial in this lower bound.
Key Notation. Through out this work, let T denote the adversarial spending rate, which is
the cost to the adversary over the system lifetime divided by the lifetime of the system. Let the
algorithmic spending rate, A, be the cost to all good IDs over the system lifetime divided by
the lifetime of the system.
In the blockchain and DHT problems, we let JG denote the good ID join rate, which is
the number of good IDs that join during the system lifetime divided by the lifetime of the
system. Finally, for the review spam problem, we let PG denote the good posting rate, which
is the number of posts made by good IDs during the system lifetime divided by lifetime of the
system.

2.2.6

Game Theoretic Analysis

For many of our problems, we can analyze the defense of a system as a two-player zero sum
game [85] as follows. There is an adversary that can choose to attack or not, and an algorithm
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that can choose to defend or not. There is a system invariant, which the algorithm seeks to
protect, that has some value V . There is a function f that gives the cost incurred when the
algorithm chooses to defend as follows: if the adversary spends T to attack, then the algorithm
will spend f (T ) to defend. Thus the payoff matrix for the algorithm is given below.
Adversary
Attack

¬Attack

Defend

T − f (T )

−f (0)

¬Defend

−V

0

Algorithm

Solving this game, we get that in the Nash equilibrium, the algorithm player will defend
with probability p =
player will be

V
T −f (T )+f (0)+V

−V f (0)
T −f (T )+f (0)+V

a value that is Θ



−V f (0)
T +V



. Thus, the expected utility of the game to the algorithm

. In many of our problems, f (T ) = f (0) + o(T ), and so we obtain

. Smaller T optimizes the utility for the adversary, in which case, the

expected utility of the algorithm is Θ(−f (0)).

2.3

Blockchains and Cryptocurrencies

A blockchain is a distributed ledger. In particular, it is a distributed data structure that stores
transactions between IDs in a network. Each transaction represents flow of a resource from
one ID to another. Every transaction added must be legitimate, in the sense that the source ID
owns the resource to be transferred, as indicated by the distributed ledger, at the time of the
transaction. Importantly, transactions can only be added to the blockchain, and once added,
can never be deleted or edited.

2.3.1

G EN ID and D EF ID

Perhaps the current, most frequently-used application of resource-burning is for blockchains.
Permissionless blockchains are vulnerable to Sybil attacks [151]. The next two problems use
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resource burning to defend against this. Recall that the adversary controls an α-fraction of the
resource that is being burned.
The G EN ID Problem. The problem stated below, G EN ID, was first defined and studied by
Aspnes, Jackson, and Krishnamurthy [21]. They proposed a solution with latency of 3 rounds,
and Õ(n2 ) bits sent per good ID, at a burned resource cost of O(1) per good ID.

G EN ID
Model: Initial set of IDs; n of which are good, with the rest are controlled by an adversary.
Goal: All good IDs decide on a set of IDs S such that: (1) all good IDs are in S; and (2)
at most a O(α) fraction of the IDs in S are adversarial.

Several other solutions to G EN ID have been proposed in the literature [8, 19, 119, 135]. The
first of which was proposed by Andrychowicz and Dziembowski, an algorithm with a latency
of Θ(n) rounds; Õ(n2 ) bits sent per good ID; and a burned resource cost of Õ(1) per good
ID [19]. Concurrent to this work, Katz, Miller and Shi [135] proposed another solution with
similar costs. Hao et al. [119] improved on these results via using a randomized leader election

protocol. Their algorithm has, in expectation, a latency of Θ lnlnlnnn rounds; Õ(n) bits sent per

good ID; and a burned resource cost of Θ lnlnlnnn per good ID.
The most recent work in this domain is by Aggarwal et al. [8], which requires in expectation: O(1) latency; O(n) bits sent per good ID; and a burned resource cost of O(1) per good
ID. It is still not known if these costs can be reduced for the general problem, or for an “almosteverywhere” versions of the problem, where all but a o(1) fraction of the IDs must learn S. To
the best of our knowledge, there are no current lower-bounds on the problem.
The D EF ID Problem. The following problem, called D EF ID, considers the G EN ID problem
in the presence of churn.

25

D EF ID
Model: Stream of IDs joining and leaving a network.
Goal: At most an O(α)-fraction of bad IDs in the network at any time.

A first algorithm to solve D EF ID was proposed in by Gupta, Saia and Young in [108]. It
required algorithmic spend rate of O(JG + T ); recall that JG is the join rate of good IDs per
time step, and T is the spend rate of the adversary. Note that this result holds without any
additional assumptions. Gupta, Saia and Young further improved this result in [109, 110] to
√
O(JG + T JG ), subject to two assumptions on the join rate of good IDs, which are found to
be supported by real-world data [109].
Specifically, the assumptions needed are as follows. Define an epoch to be the length of
time it takes for the fraction of good IDs to change by 3/4 fraction. First, the join rate for good
IDs changes by at most a multiplicative factor between any two successive epochs. Second,
in any epoch the actual join rate for good IDs over any “sufficiently large” period of time is
within constant factors of the join rate for good IDs over the entire epoch.
An asymptotically matching lower bound was obtained for a large class of algorithms [109].
An open problem is to generalize this bound to all algorithms.

2.4

Distributed Hash Tables

Distributed hash tables (DHTs) are a popular P2P distributed data structure [4, 134, 148, 159,
198, 215] with several implementations over the years [89, 214, 233]. Generally, the design
entails hashing attributes of a user’s machine to a key value (or ID) in a virtual space; similarly,
for data items. The various DHT constructions differ in their overlay topologies, but typically
IDs need only maintain state on a small number of neighbors, and routing is possible with a
small number of messages, where small means at most logarithmic in the number of IDs in the

26

system.
These systems are vulnerable to attack. A bad ID that participates in routing can drop or
corrupt any message it receives. A good ID can be completely isolated from the rest of the
network if all of its neighbors are bad; this is often referred to as an eclipse attack [114, 211].
Finally, content can be compromised if bad IDs alone are responsible for storing a particular
data item. Generally, the behavior of bad IDs is modeled by Byzantine faults. For almost two
decades, there has been a sustained interest in the design of secure DHTs that can tolerate such
attacks [224].
Byzantine Fault Tolerance in DHTs. A popular approach to tolerating bad IDs depends
makes use of groups: these are small sets of IDs, each of which have a good majority. Intuitively, a group is used in place of an individual peer, and the group members act by using majority action or secure multiparty computation to coordinate actions. For example,
routing can be performed robustly via all-to-all communication between each pair of groups
along the path from source to destination. Examples of group-based DHT constructions include [33–35, 91, 124, 175, 204, 208, 248].
As an alternative to using groups, bad IDs may be tolerated by employing some form of
redundant routing [54, 116, 127, 131, 136, 173]. Several other results do not explicitly apply
to DHTs, although they may be compatible. For example, the challenge of tolerating bad IDs
is exacerbated in highly-dynamic P2P systems, and there is a growing body of work in this
area [24–28, 107]. Self-healing networks are another approach for achieving security, where
bad IDs are identified and evicted [142, 200, 201].
In all of these works, a critical assumption is that the fraction of bad IDs is a small constant. However, given that DHTs are often permissionless, this assumption is easily violated via
a Sybil attack. Thus, while many tools have been developed for securing DHTs against Byzantine faults, additional work is required to limit the fraction of bad IDs in the permissionless
setting.
Sybil Resistance. Several approaches have been proposed for mitigating the Sybil attack. The
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influence of bad IDs can be limited via containment schemes that leverage the network topology in structured overlays [207] and in social networks [12, 147, 166, 236, 249–251]. However,
the information required—particularly social networks—may not always be available.
An alternative defense is to use measurements of communication latency or wireless signal
strength to verify the uniqueness of IDs [38, 77, 97, 153, 231]. However, these techniques are
sensitive to measurement accuracy.
For DHTs, an early result by Danezis et al. [73] gives a heuristic to limit the impact of bad
IDs using bootstrapping information, but unfortunately provides no formal guarantees. Results
that employ resource burning are scarce. The use of computational puzzles in decentralized
systems is explored by Borisov [50] and Tegeler and Fu [220] as a means for identifying and excluding bad IDs from the system. Computational puzzles are also used by Rowaihy et al. [196]
to throttle the rate of bad IDs added to a structured P2P system; however, this does not limit
their number. Arguably the best-known result is the SybilControl scheme by Li et al. [149],
which provides for a DHT construction that limits the number of bad IDs through the use of
computational puzzles. Good IDs periodically challenge their neighbors under the Chord DHT
topology [215, 216], and blacklist those who do not respond with a solution in time. Experimental results indicate that this approach, in conjunction with limited data replication, allows
for almost all searches to succeed.

2.4.1

Why D EF ID is Not Enough

The D EF ID problem (Section 2.3.1) captures many of the challenges required for secure DHTs.
However, current solutions to D EF ID depend heavily on a means to coordinate resource burning. The main approach is to use a committee—a small set of IDs with a good majority—which
issue resource-burning challenges. To apply results on D EF ID to DHTs requires decentralizing
the functionality provided by the committee.
Additionally, while D EF ID always guarantees a minority of bad IDs, this is not enough.
In particular, to ensure reliable routing and protection from eclipse attacks, group-based ap28

proaches demand that all groups have a minority of bad IDs. Fortunately, there are already
clever techniques to spread the bad IDs uniformly across the groups. Informally, when a new
ID joins a group, some IDs in the group are evicted and resettled in random locations, and their
replacements are selected uniformly at random [33–35, 107].
Unfortunately, performing such shuffling for every joining ID, even when there are no bad
IDs in the system, incurs large bandwidth costs. A major open problem is to devise an algorithm that minimizes both bandwidth and resource-burning costs, as a function of adversarial
spend rate.

2.4.2

The Permissionless DHT Problem

Below we give a formal problem statement in this domain. It assumes that the adversary
controls an α < 1/3 fraction of the burnable resource. We now describe some ideas about how
to solve it.
Recall from Section 2.3.1 that D EF ID imposes a cost of O(JG +

√
T JG ) on the good

IDs. Informally, a plausible extension to this result is for each group in the DHT to act as a
committee that runs an algorithm to solve D EF ID. In many group-based constructions, a good
ID belongs to a number of groups that is logarithmic in the system size. Consequently, the
algorithmic spend rate is likely to increase by a logarithmic factor. This yields our conjectured
√
bound of Õ( T JG + JG ). Note that this aligns with Position 2 since costs to the good IDs

A Secure DHT in the Permissionless Setting Model: The adversary has complete
control over the scheduling of joins and departures for bad IDs and limited control for
good IDs. There is no explicit assumption that the good IDs are in the majority at all
times.
Goal: A DHT that enables secure and efficient routing between any two good IDs in the
system.
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are low when the adversary expends little effort (or does not attack at all), and grows slowly
relative to the adversary’s cost when a significant attack occurs. In the absence of a single
committee that can track global information (such as the join rate of IDs), setting the hardness
of challenges is tricky, and new ideas are needed to obtain the conjectured upper bound.
Finally, while we have focused on DHTs, new defenses for them might generalize to providing security in permissionless settings for other structured P2P systems [22, 32, 90, 94, 112,
123, 256].

2.5

Application-Layer DDoS Attacks

A denial-of-service (DoS) attack prevents good IDs from accessing resources of a system. A
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack occurs when multiple bad IDs carry out a coordinated DoS attack. In an application-layer DDoS attacks, an adversary attacks by issuing many
requests for system resources, as opposed to say swamping the network bandwidth. Here, we
discuss defenses against application-layer DDoS attacks based on resource burning.
Filtering Methods. Many DDoS defenses rely on techniques for filtering out malicious traffic,
including IP profiling [156,252]; CAPTCHAs [184,227]; capability-based schemes [17,244]3 ;
and anomaly detection [122]. An extensive survey of defenses can be found in [255]. Unfortunately, these techniques are imperfect, and an adversary may bypass them by issuing traffic
that appears legitimate. This has led to resource-burning defenses against DDoS attacks, which
are sometimes referred to in the literature as currency-based or resource-based schemes [230].
Resource-Burning Approaches. A number of proposed defenses require IDs to solve puzzles
before their requests for service are honored [29, 129, 130, 187]. A challenging aspect of these
proposals is the lack of a theoretically-backed method to tune the puzzle difficulty. To address
this issue, Mankins et al. [157] propose a pricing mechanism to set the difficulty based on the
service-request type; however, the pricing functions are set by the server a priori, and may fail
3

Informally, this refers to a scheme where the source makes a “capability” request and, if approved by the
receiver, will then obtain prioritized service from those routers along the path between the source and the receiver.

30

as the incentives or capabilities of the attacker change over time. A dynamic strategy to determine puzzle difficulty is given by Wang and Reiter [234]. A client requesting service chooses
the puzzle difficulty based on the effort it is willing to expend, while the server prioritizes service according to the difficulty of the puzzles solved. However, this approach may starve IDs
with limited resources, and requires the server to maintain state on the difficulty of the puzzles
solved. Finally, Noureddine et al. [182] employ a game-theoretic model to pre-compute the
difficulty of puzzles assuming all IDs (good and bad) are rational.
An alternative resource—communication capacity—is consumed by the speak-up defense
of Walfish et al. [229]. During an attack, it is common for bad IDs to bombard the server with
requests, using much (or all) of the data rate available to the adversary. Speak-up encourages
good IDs to respond in kind by increasing their respective request rates. A front-end server
known as a “thinner” randomly drops requests in order to impose a manageable service load. If
the aggregate capacity of the good IDs is comparable to that of the bad IDs, then this resourceburning scheme can allow good IDs to obtain a commensurate amount of service.

2.5.1

The Application-Layer DDoS Problem

There are many similarities between the application-layer DDoS attack and the Sybil attack.
The DDoS model is not purely permissionless, since the server is a trusted authority. However,
the attacks involve IDs whose distinctness cannot be ascertained, and where an adversary may
create many bad IDs to facilitate attacks. In this sense, the DDoS model is a hybrid of permissionless and permissioned systems. Thus, it is not surprising that resource burning would be
useful to defend against DDoS attacks.
In this vein, we propose the open problem below.
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Application-Layer DDoS Attacks
Model: There are n good client IDs and a good server. An adversary controls an αfraction of the consumable resource, and can generate any number of bad client IDs.
Client IDs can request service from the server at any time. The server must decide
which requests to service based on its own limited resources.
Goal: The good clients obtain a 1 − O(α) fraction of the service provided by the server.

This shares much in common with D EF ID (Section 2.3.1). Requests from client IDs correspond to join events; satisfying requests corresponds to departures. Here, α need not be
bounded, since we are not making a correctness guarantee analogous to maintaining a good
majority in D EF ID. Rather, our new requirement concerns performance: good IDs receive a
1 − O(α) fraction of service. In this sense, this problem seems strictly easier than D EF ID.
However, a new difficulty is heterogeneity: requests may differ in the amount of effort
required to service them. Thus, enforcing a bound on the fraction of bad requests serviced does
not ensure that the goal of this problem will be met. In light of this issue, it may be helpful
to consider a weighted version of D EF ID, and whether existing solutions can be extended to
this more general setting. While we are optimistic that for large T , o(T ) is possible for this
problem, a tight upper bound is an interesting direction for future work.

2.6

Review Spam

Online user-generated reviews play an important role in influencing the purchasing decisions
of consumers. These systems are subject to manipulation where an adversary employs multiple accounts to create fake reviews that falsely promote or disparage a product [93]; this
malicious behavior is often referred to as review spam, but also goes by other labels such as
astroturfing [221] and opinion spam [121].
Review spam threatens online retailers—such as Amazon or Walmart [57, 93]—and mer32

chants who depend on income from online sales. While online review systems typically have
some form of admission control, such as requiring credentials for the creation of an account,
this can be bypassed. For example, an attacker can hire users that possess a sufficient online
presence in order to engage in review spam [69, 117], and social-media credentials can be
automatically generated [221]; examples of these attacks are described in [121, 155].
In response to this threat, the research community has proposed various strategies for
detecting fraudulent reviews; these employ a range of techniques including machine learning [60, 126], anomaly detection [206, 240, 241], linguistic evaluation [133, 193], graph analysis [10, 43, 117], and many others. A comprehensive overview of these techniques is given
in [115, 239, 247].
Progress in this area offers the ability to classify a review as either spam or legitimate, with
some small error probability; for example, the work in [185] achieve an accuracy of almost
90%. This classification functionality is a promising ingredient for designing more general
tools for mitigating review spam.

2.6.1

The Review Spam Problem

The problem of review spam largely aligns with our general model in Section 2.2.5. While
online systems often require some credentials for creating an account, this admission control
can be circumvented, and the system is effectively permissionless. However, the review spam
model has some novel features. IDs join the system, but they may never formally depart. Even
IDs that are regularly in use may have periods where the corresponding user is offline. Thus,
any attempt to simultaneously challenge all IDs, in order to reveal some as bad, will fail.
On the positive side, as noted above, machine learning can now help. In particular, we may
assume a classifier that correctly classifies reviews as spam or not with some fixed probability
of error. Over a sufficiently large number of reviews, this classifier can be used to obtain a good
approximation of the current fraction of spam reviews, and this information can be used to set
the amount of resource burning required to post a review. Our conjecture of O(T 2/3 + PG ) in
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Table 2.1 follows from a preliminary analysis that leverages a classifier in this way. Informally,
we increase the cost for posting a review when a significant attack is ongoing—that is, many
reviews are diagnosed as spam by the classifier. Otherwise, we reset the cost to the lowest
level.
We formalize the challenge of review spam below.
Review Spam
Model: IDs post reviews online. A classifier labels each post as legitimate or as spam,
with some fixed error probability. Each spam post has unit cost, reflecting its negative
impact on system usability. The algorithm can also set an arbitrary resource-burning
cost for each new post, based on the classification of past posts.
Goal: Minimize costs due to spam posts plus resource-burning costs incurred from
legitimate posts.

2.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we surveyed the literature on resource burning and established it as critical a tool
for securing permissionless systems. We described results from four domains: blockchains,
DHTs, application-layer distributed DDoS attacks, and review spam. We noted shared security
vulnerabilities in both permissionless and hybrid systems, and how resource burning is wellsuited for addressing common threats.
We observed that resource burning costs are prohibitively high for most current systems.
Thus, a high-priority area for theoretical research is the design of resource-burning defenses
that reduce these costs. In particular, whenever possible, good IDs should spend at a rate which
is asymptotically less than the adversary when the system is under attack. In this dissertation,
we address a number of problems defined in this chapter. Specifically, we address the D EF ID
problem in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and attempt to solve it for a DHT in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 3
Commensurate Sybil Defense

“Sometimes good guys gotta do bad things to make the bad guys pay.”
Harvey Spectre, Suits [212]

In permissionless systems, due to the absence of a certifying authority, participants can join and
depart at will. Taking advantage of this, an attacker can add large number of malicious pseudoparticipants (bad IDs) into the system, thereby launching a Sybil attack. The state-of-the-art
defenses techniques require system-wide continuously resources burning to limit the number
of bad IDs in the system. This has lead to limited application of resource burning techniques
as a practical Sybil defense approach.
In light of this, we seek to reduce the cost of resource burning based systems and focus
on the following question: Can we design resource burning based systems where the resource
costs are low in the absence of attack, and grow commensurately with the effort expended by
an attacker?
In this chapter, we design and analyze a family of algorithms that answers this question in
the affirmative. Initially, our result is presented in the context of a centralized system; however,
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later we generalize it to a distributed system.
Organization of this chapter: We begin with a discussion of our contribution in Section 3.1,
which includes a description of our goal, and summarizing our results. Next, we discussion
a general formulation for the RB-challenges used in our algorithms, and provide a concrete
example using computational puzzles in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we describe a centralized
Sybil defense algorithm - CC OM, followed by a decentralized algorithm - DC OM in Section
3.4, and finally an enhanced solution - EC OM, in Section 3.5. Next, we discuss handling
bounded communication latency in Section 3.6 and generalizing the population goal in Section
3.7. Finally, we discuss application of our algorithms in Section 5.4 and end with conclusion
in Section 3.9.

3.1

Our Contribution

In this chapter, we describe a family of Sybil Defense algorithms such that the resource cost to
our algorithms scale linearly with the rate of resource spending by the adversary. To achieve
this cost while guaranteeing an honest majority in the system, maintaining a committee of size
Θ(log n) with a majority of good IDs is critical.
First, we describe an efficient centralized protocol for maintaining a majority of good IDs
in the system. Then, we adapt this for a distributed system with the construction of a scalable honest committee, which takes over the role of a central certifying authority. Finally, we
propose heuristics and reduce the state requirement for estimating joins and departures in the
system. We discuss these goal in detail in Section 3.1.1.
We prove that our algorithms always maintain a majority of good IDs in the system along
with a committee consisting of a majority of good IDs through out the lifetime of the system.
Additionally, we analyze the resource cost to our algorithms which we prove to grow linearly
with the cost to the attacker. We state our results in Section 3.1.2.
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3.1.1

Our Goals.

We define the Defend-ID(DefID) problem, which consists of maintaining the two key security
goals:

Population Goal: Ensure the fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than 1/2.

Achieving this goal will help ensure that system resources – such as jobs executed on a
server, or bandwidth obtained from a wireless access point – consumed by the bad IDs are
(roughly) proportional to the adversary’s fraction of resources in the system. Possible application domains include: content-sharing overlays [89, 214]; and open cloud services [15, 168,
237].
Our next goal concerns a special set of IDs referred to as a committee; we defer the specific
details of the committee’s role until Section 3.4.
Committee Goal: Ensure there always exists a committee that (i) is known to all good
IDs; (ii) is of scalable size i.e., of size Θ(log n0 ); and (iii) contains less than a 1/2
fraction of bad IDs.
Achieving the Committee Goal will ensure that the committee can solve the Byzantine
consensus problem [145]. In this problem, each good ID has an initial input bit. The goal is for
(i) all good IDs to decide on the same bit; and (ii) this bit to equal the input bit of at least one
good ID. Byzantine consensus enables participants in a distributed network to reach agreement
on a decision, even in the presence of a malicious minority. Thus, it is a fundamental building
block for many cryptocurrencies [49, 88, 98, 105]; trustworthy computing [52, 55, 56, 63, 65,
144]; peer-to-peer networks [6, 183]; and databases [169, 191, 257]. Establishing Byzantine
consensus via the use of committees is a common approach; for examples, see [98, 139, 154].
We note that it is possible to reduce the fraction 1/2 in either goals by reducing the value of
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κ, we address this in Section 3.7. Moreover, we expect the Population Goal to be particularly
relevant for small or medium-sized networks, where it is manageable to maintain membership
information. In contrast, the Committee Goal may be more relevant for larger networks to
avoid maintaining large membership lists.

3.1.2

Our Result

We assume that the system lifetime consists of a number of ID joins and departures that is at
most nγ0 , where γ > 1 is some constant, and n0 is the minimum number of good IDs present in
the system at any time.
Let T be the adversarial spending rate, which is computed as the cost to the adversary
for solving RB-challenges over the system lifetime divided by the total duration of the system
lifetime. Let J denote the good ID join rate, which is computed as the total number of good
IDs that join over the system lifetime divided by the total duration of the system lifetime.
Finally, the algorithmic spending rate is computed as the total cost to the good IDs for solving
RB-challenges over the system lifetime divided by the total duration of the system lifetime.
We begin by presenting our results for our centralized algorithm - CC OM (see Section 3.3).

Theorem 3.1. Assume that the adversary holds at most κ = 1/12 fraction of the total
resources of the system. Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0 over the
system lifetime, CC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The population Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).
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Next, we present our results for our decentralized approach - DC OM (see Section 3.4) as:

Theorem 3.2. Assume that the adversary holds at most κ = 1/12 fraction of the total
resources of the system. Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0 over the
system lifetime, DC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The Population Goal is maintained.
• The Committee Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).

Finally, we present an enhanced version of our decentralized protocol - EC OM (see Section
3.5), which has a reduced state requirement and uses a heuristic to reduce the frequency of
purge tests. This results in the following result:

Theorem 3.3. Assume that the adversary holds at most κ = 1/12 fraction of the total
computational power of the system. Then, with error probability polynomially small in
n0 over the system lifetime, EC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The Population Goal is maintained.
• The Committee Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).

There are two important ramifications of our results. First, the good IDs obtain a large, constant
fraction of the system resources. In particular, there is nothing special about a 1/2-fraction and
this can be increased as we decrease the value of κ in our attack model, which we address in
Section 3.7.
Second, the resource cost incurred by the good IDs grows slowly with the cost incurred by
the adversary. When there is no attack on the system, the costs are low and solely a function of
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the number of good IDs; there is no excessive overhead. But as the adversary spends more to
attack the system, the costs required to keep the system secure grow commensurately with the
adversary’s costs.

3.2

Preliminaries

We begin with a general discussion for the entrance puzzles and purge puzzles used in our
algorithms in Section 3.2.1. Then, we discuss the particulars for computational puzzles as a
concrete example for these puzzles in Section 3.2.2.

3.2.1

How RB-Challenges Are Used

Although, each RB-challenge is constructed in the same manner, they are used in two distinct
ways by our algorithm. First, when a new ID wishes to join the system, it must provide a
solution for a 1-difficult RB-Challenge; this is referred to as entrance puzzle.
We note that, in the case of a bad ID, this solution may have been pre-generated by the
adversary. This is not a problem since the purpose of this puzzle is only to force the adversary
to incur a resource cost at some point, and to deter the adversary from reusing puzzle solutions.
Importantly, the entrance puzzle is not used to preserve guarantees on the fraction of good IDs
in the system.
The second way in which RB-challenges are used is through system-wide test, used to limit
the fraction of bad IDs in the system; this is referred to as a purge puzzle. An announcement
is periodically made that all IDs already in the system should solve a 1-difficult puzzle. When
this occurs, a random string r of Θ(log nγ0 ) bits is generated and included as part of the announcement. These random bits ensure that the adversary cannot engage in a pre-computation
attack — where it solves puzzles and stores the solutions far in advance of launching an attack — by keeping the puzzles unpredictable. For ease of exposition, we omit further discussion of this issue and consider the use of these random bits as implicit whenever a purge puzzle
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is issued.
While the same r is used in the puzzle construction for all IDs, we emphasize that a different
puzzle is assigned to each ID. Each participant v uses a public key Kv , generated via public
key encryption, as its ID. The IDs are required to include their public key in the generating the
puzzle solutions, which makes them unique to a specific ID. Again, this is only of importance
to the second way in which puzzles are used. Using the public key in the puzzle construction
also prevents puzzle solutions from being stolen.
Can a message mv from ID Kv be spoofed? This is prevented in the following manner. ID
Kv signs mv with its private key to get signv , and then sends (mv ||signv ||Kv ) via D IFFUSE.
Any other ID can use Kv to check that the message was signed by the ID Kv and thus be
assured that ID Kv is the sender. Protection against spoofing is necessary later in Section 3.4
so that the adversary cannot forge messages originating from IDs in the committee.

3.2.2

Computational Puzzles - An Example

In this section, we discuss a concrete example of resource burning puzzles as proof-of-concept.
Note that computational puzzles are not the only resource burning mechanisms to which our
algorithms are applicable. We discuss several other mechanisms in Section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2.
Assume that all IDs know a hash function h that maps bit strings to real numbers in [0, 1).
We make the standard random oracle assumption about h [40, 53, 143, 172]. This assumption
is that when first computed on an input, x, h(x) is selected independently and uniformly at
random from [0, 1), and that on subsequent computations of h(x) the same output value is
always returned. In practice, h is a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-2 [176], with
inputs and outputs of sufficiently large bit lengths. A puzzle solution is typically a certain type
of input to the hash function that achieves an output that is sufficiently small.
In general, an ID must find an input x such that h(x) is less than some threshold. Decreasing
this threshold value will increase the difficulty, since one must compute the hash function on
more inputs to find an output that is sufficiently small. We note that many other types of
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puzzles exist (for examples, see [125, 132, 192]) and our results are likely compatible with
other designs.
Let µ > 0 denote the number of hash function queries that a good ID can make per
unit time. Additionally, we assume that µ is of some size polynomial in n0 so that log µ =
Θ(log n0 ). It is reasonable to assume large µ since, in practice, the number of evaluations that
can be performed per second is on the order of millions to low billions [45, 46, 113].
For any integer ρ ≥ 1, we define a ρ - difficult puzzle to consist of finding ` = C log µ
solutions, each of difficulty τ = ρ(1 − δ)µ/(C log µ), where δ > 0 is a small constant and C
is a sufficiently large constant depending on δ and µ.
Let X be a random variable giving the expected number of hash evaluations needed to compute ` solutions. Then, X is a negative binomial random variable and we have the following
concentration bound (see, for example, Lemma 2.2 in [34]). For every 0 <  ≤ 1, it holds that:
2 `/(2(1+))

P r(|X − E(X)| ≥ E(X)) ≤ 2e−

Given the above, we can show that every good ID will solve a ρ-difficult puzzle with at
most ρµ hash function evaluations, and that the adversary must compute at least (1 − 2δ)dρµ
hash evaluations to solve every ρ-difficult puzzle. This follows from a union bound over O(nγ0 )
joins and departure events, for C sufficiently large as a function of δ and γ. Note that for
small δ, the difference in computational cost is negligible, and that µ is also unnecessary in
comparing costs. Thus, for ease of exposition, we assume that each ρ - difficult puzzle requires
computational cost ρ to solve.
Finally, the input to a puzzle always incorporates Kv and s, where the solution string s is
selected by v (for good IDs, s will be a random string). For the entrance puzzles, the input to
the puzzle is Kv ||s||T , where T is the timestamp of when the puzzle solution was generated.
In order to be verified, the value T in the solution to an entrance puzzle must be within some
small margin of the current time. In practice, this margin would primarily depend on network
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Symbol
κ
n0
µ
Kv
kv
Scur
S
na
nd
r
Ccur
S0
0
Scur

Used in Model and Algorithm
Description
Fraction of total computational power that the adversary controls
Lower bound on number of good IDs in the system at any time
Number of hash function queries that a good ID can make per
round
Public key of ID v
Private key of ID v
Set of all IDs in the system at current time
Set of all IDs in the system after most recent purge.
Number of joins to the system in the current iteration
Number of departures from the system in the current iteration
Current random seed
Set of IDs in the current committee
Sample set of IDs after the most recent purge
Current sample set of IDs
Table 3.1: A summary of notation for our algorithms.

latency. Moreover, for the purge puzzles, the value r must also be appended to the inputs for
all requested solutions in this round; that is, the input is Kv ||s||r. This prevents an ID Kv
from laying claim to a solution found by ID Kw since the solution is tied to the public key Kw .

3.3

A Centralized Protocol

For simplicity, we begin by describing a centralized version of our algorithm C ENTRALIZED
COM MENSURATE (CC OM ). The pseudocode is provided in Figure 3.1. To this end, we
consider a Certifying Authority (CA), which can communicate directly with all the IDs in
the system. We later remove this assumption in Section 3.4, where we replace the certifying
authority with a committee.
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A LGORITHM 1: C ENTRALIZED C OMMENSURATE (CC OM )
The CA maintains the following:
S
: set of IDs after most recent purge
Scur : current set of IDs
na
: total number of joins to the system
nd
: total number of departures from the system
r
: current random seed
Execute the following steps over the lifetime of the system:
1. Each joining ID, v, generates a public key Kv and private key kv pair; solves an
entrance puzzle using that key and the current timestamp T , and sends the solution
to the CA. Upon verifying the solution, the CA adds v to Scur .
2. If na + nd ≥ |S|/3, then the CA does the following:
(a) Generates and broadcasts a random string, r to be used for the purge puzzle.
(b) S, Scur ← set of IDs that returned a valid solution.
(c) na , nd ← 0

Figure 3.1: Pseudocode for CC OM.

3.3.1

Algorithm Overview

Each ID that wishes to join the system and access its service must solve an entrance puzzle in
order to register with the CA. The only purpose of this puzzle in Step (1) is to force a resource
cost on the adversary, even if this cost was incurred in the distant past.
The CA tracks the current membership of the system using the set Scur . Whenever an ID
registers with the CA, Scur is updated. Similarly, when a good ID informs the CA that it is
departing, Scur is also updated. However, bad IDs may not provide such a notification and,
therefore, Scur is not necessarily accurate at all times.
Figure 3.2 illustrates this purging process; good IDs are blue and bad IDs are red. Let x be
the number of IDs after the most recent purge; at most x/3 of these IDs are bad, since κ = 1/3.
According to Step 2 in CCC OM, the next purge occurs immediately when the number of new
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Figure 3.2: An overview of our approach. The system starts with x = 12 IDs of which 3 are
bad and 9 are good. When the (x/3)th = 4th ID joins, a purge is immediately executed and all
IDs must solve a purge puzzle or be ejected from the system.
IDs entering would become greater than or equal to x/3. At the point when a purge is triggered,
the number of new IDs that have been allowed to enter is less than x/3. Thus, the total number
of bad IDs is less than 23 x, and the total number of good IDs is at least 23 x.
At the beginning of the system, the CA knows the existing membership denoted by S;
assume |S| = n0 initially. When na + nd ≥ |S|/3, it triggers the execution of Step 2
whereby all IDs are issued a purge puzzle and must respond with a valid solution within 1
round. The issuing of these puzzles is performed by the CA by announcing r to all IDs. A
round is of sufficient length such that the time to solve a 1-difficult puzzle dominates the round
trip communication time between the client and CA. Note that a recent study of the bitcoin
network shows that the communication latency is 12 seconds in contrast to the 10 minutes
block interval [70], which motivates our assumption of resource burning latency dominating
the communication latency in our system.
Next, the CA verifies a puzzle solution. As a concrete example, the solutions of the computational puzzles from Section 3.2.2 are valid if (1) all C log µ inputs to h submitted generate an
output that is at most (C log µ)/((1 − δ)µ); and (2) each of these inputs contains the string r as
well as the individual public key of the ID. Those IDs that fail to submit valid puzzle solutions
during Step 2 are removed from the sets S and Scur , and are permanently blacklisted from the
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system. The actions in Step 2 are referred to as a purge test. Over the lifetime of the system, the
execution of CC OM is conceptually broken into sets of consecutive rounds called iterations,
which are delineated by the purge test in Step 2. The process outlined above is repeated where
now the CA knows the existing membership exactly, Scur as well as S, at the beginning of each
iteration.
Initialization. Prior to the first iteration, the CA issues a 1-difficult puzzle to all IDs, and sets
variables by running the bullets under Step 2 of CC OM. Thus, initially S contains at most an
κ fraction of bad IDs.

3.3.2

Proof of Maintenance of the Population Goal

In this section, we analyze the population goal for CC OM. For any iteration i, we let Bi and
Gi respectively denote the number of bad and good IDs in the system at the end of iteration i,
and we let Ni = Bi + Gi .
Lemma 3.1. For all iterations i ≥ 0, Bi < Ni /(12(1 − )).
Proof. Recall that the CA issues all IDs a 1-difficult challenge prior to iteration 0. This ensures
the fraction of bad IDs at the end of iteration 0 is at most κ ≤ 1/12. Thus, our lemma statement
holds for i = 0.
Next, note that in Step 2 ending each iteration i > 0, the server issues a 1-difficult challenge
to all IDs. Let Nis be the number of IDs in the system at the beginning of the purge. Recall
from Section 2.2.5 that at most at most an −fraction of good IDs can depart in a round. Thus,
Ni ≥ Nis − Nis = (1 − )Nis .
Since the adversary holds at most a κ ≤ 1/12 fraction of the resource, the number of bad
IDs in the system at the end of iteration i is at most Nis /12 ≤ Ni /(12(1 − )).



Let nai , gia , bai denote the total, good, and bad IDs that arrive over iteration i. Similarly, let
ndi , gid , bdi denote the total, good, and bad IDs that depart over iteration i.
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Note that the CA will always have an accurate value for all of these variables except for
possibly bdi — recall from Section 1.1 that bad IDs do not need to give notification when
they depart — and, consequently, ndi ; in these two cases, the CA may hold values which are
underestimates of the true values.
Lemma 3.2. The fraction of bad IDs is always at most 1/2.
Proof. Fix some iteration i > 0. Let nai , bai denote the total, and bad IDs that arrive over
iteration i. Let ndi , gid denote the total, and good IDs that depart over iteration i.
Recall that an iteration ends when nai + ndi ≥ |Si−1 |/3 where |Si−1 | = Ni−1 . Thus, at any
point during the iteration, we have:

bai + gid ≤ nai + ndi ≤ Ni−1 /3

(3.1)

We are interested in the maximum value of the ratio of bad IDs to the total IDs at any point
during the iteration. Thus, we pessimistically assume all additions of bad IDs and removals of
good IDs come first in the iteration. This leads us to examine the maximum value of the ratio
over the iteration:
Bi−1 + bai
Ni−1 /(12(1 − )) + bai
≤
Ni−1 + bai − gid
Ni−1 + bai − gid
where the above inequality follows from Lemma 3.1. By Equation 3.1, we have gid ≤ Ni−1 /11−
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bai . Thus, we have:
Ni−1 /(12(1 − )) + bai
Ni−1 /(12(1 − )) + bai
≤
Ni−1 + bai − (Ni−1 /3 − bai )
Ni−1 + bai − gid


1 Ni−1 /(12(1 − )) + bai
=
2
Ni−1 /3 + bai


1 Ni−1 /(12(1 − ))
bai
≤
+
2
Ni−1 /3
Ni−1 /3 + bai


1
1
1
+
≤
2 4(1 − ) Ni−1 /(3bai ) + 1


1
1
1
<
+
2 4(1 − ) 2
< 1/2

The fourth step follows since bai ≤ Ni−1 /(12(1 − )) by Equation 3.1 and the fifth step holds
for  < 1/2.
Finally, we note that this argument is valid even though Scur may not account for bad IDs
that have departed without notifying the CA (recall this is possible as stated in Section 1.1).
Intuitively, this is not a problem since such departures can only lower the fraction of bad IDs
in the system; formally, the critical equation in the above argument is bai + gid ≤ Ni−1 /3, and
this does not depend on bdi .


3.3.3

Proof of Theorem 3.1

Lemma 3.3. For any iteration i ≥ 1, let Ti be the total resource cost incurred by the adversary
in iteration i. Then, the total resource to the good IDs in iteration i is O(Ti + gia + gid ).
Proof. Fix an iteration i ≥ 1. Let Ai denote the total resource cost to the good IDs in this
iteration. Note that the total resource cost to the algorithm consists of the total purge cost paid
by good IDs in the system at the end of this iteration plus the total entrance cost paid by the
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new good IDs that join the system in this iteration. Thus, we have:

Ai = |Gi | + gia
≤ |Si | + gia
4
≤ |Si−1 | + gia
3
≤ 8(gia + gid + 2bai ) + gia
= 9gia + 8gid + 16Ti

In the above, the second inequality holds since |Gi | ≤ |Si | and third inequality hold since
|Si | ≤ 43 |Si−1 |. The fourth inequality holds because bdi ≤ κ|Si−1 | + bai , since |Bi−1 | ≤ κ|Si−1 |;
and also gia + gid + bai + bdi ≥ |Si−1 |/3. Thus we have that gia + gid + 2bai ≥ (1/3 − κ)|Si−1 | >
(1/6)|Si−1 |. Finally, the last inequality holds since bai ≤ Ti .



Finally, we restate and prove Theorem 3.1:
Theorem 3.1. Assume that the adversary holds at most κ = 1/12 fraction of the total resources
of the system. Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0 over the system lifetime,
CC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The population Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).
Proof. We first prove that the population goal holds over the lifetime of the system, followed
by the analysis of cost to the algorithm.
Population goal. By Lemma 3.2, the fraction of bad IDs is less than 1/2 over the O(nγ0 ) join
and leave events; therefore, the Population Goal is met.
Spending rate. Let x be the number of iterations over the lifetime of the system. Then, from
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Lemma 3.3, we can obtain the total resource cost to the algorithm to be:
x
X

A=

Ai

i=1
x
X

≤

16Ti + 9gia + 8gid



i=1

≤ 16

x
X

Ti + 9

i=1

x
X

gia

+8

i=1

x
X

gid

i=1

Note that the number of departing IDs from a system is at most equal to the number of IDs that
join the system over the lifetime of the system. Using this, we obtain the total computational
cost to the algorithm as:

A = 16

x
X

Ti +

i=1

x
X

!
gia

i=1

Let `i denote the length of the ith iteration. Then, we can obtain the average cost to the algorithm
over the lifetime of the system as:
P
P
16 ( xi=1 Ti + xi=1 gia )
Px
Â ≤
`i
 Px i=1 Px a 
Ti
gi
+ Pi=1
≤ 16 Pi=1
x
x
i=1 `i
i=1 `i
= O (T + J)

P
P
P
P
The last step follows since T = ( xi=1 Ti ) / ( xi=1 `i ) and J = ( xi=1 gia ) / ( xi=1 `i ).

3.4



A Distributed Protocol

In this section, we decentralize our protocols from Section 3.3 through the use of a committee
to take up the role of the certifying authority. This gives rise to a number of new challenges
outlined below:
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• First, there is no longer a central authority that can be trusted to conduct resource tests.
Therefore, this test must be done in a distributed fashion.
• Second, while a CA can unilaterally decide whether an ID is good or bad, this determination now needs to be made and agreed upon by the committee members.
• Third, the correctness of the CA is not impacted by joins and departures, which is not the
case with a committee as it can be compromised if the fraction of good IDs becomes too
small.
Our distributed algorithm described in Figure 3.5, overcomes these challenges through the use
of Committee Election protocols, which deals with rebuilding the committee. We describe
two candidate algorithms for committee election - G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION and
C OMPUTATIONAL P UZZLE BASED C OMMITTEE E LECTION.
The former approach, discussed in 3.4.2, is generic with respect to the resource burning
mechanism in the system but has a greater latency due to the random string generation protocol
from [33]. Whereas, the latter approach, discussed in section 3.4.3, relies on the randomness of
the computational puzzles to generate an honest committee. This makes it specific to systems
with computational puzzle based resource burning, but has a latency of a single round.
Note that both these approaches assume that the fraction of resources with the adversary is at
most κ < 1/12. We use this assumption to prove the committee goal in Lemma 3.5 and Lemma
3.4.

3.4.1

Preliminaries

State Machine Replication. Our committee uses State Machine Replication by Abraham et
al. [246] to maintain a list of members in the system, to agree on the join and departure events
as well as the end of an iteration, to issue RB-challenges, and create a new committee. This
protocol enables the committee members to commit a log of the requests made by the IDs, such

51

A LGORITHM 2: G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION
The current committee maintains the following sets:
Scur : current set of IDs in the system
Ccur : set of IDs in the current committee
The IDs in Ccur executes the following using State Machine Replication:
1. Generate a random string r of length C log2 |Scur | using [33].
2. The ith member of Ccur is the ID that corresponds to the ith sub-string of r in the
system.

Figure 3.3: Pseudocode for G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION.
that the following properties hold: 1) honest committee members do not commit to different
values at the same log position, and 2) each ID request is eventually committed by the honest
committee members.
GenID. To initialize our system, we make use of a distributed algorithm called G EN ID. After
running, G EN ID guarantees that (1) all good IDs agree on the same set of IDs; and (2) at most a
κ-fraction of IDs in that set are bad. Additionally, G EN ID ensures that all good IDs agree on a
committee of logarithmic size with a majority of good IDs. There are several implementations
of the G EN ID algorithm [8, 19, 119, 135]. The algorithm in [8], makes use of computational
challenges, and runs in expected O(1) rounds, and, in expectation, requires each good ID to
send O(n) bits, and solve O(1) 1-hard challenges.

3.4.2

Overview of G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION

In DC OM, the current committee elects its successor of size C log |Scur | at the end of an iteration, where Scur is the current system membership. The members of the current committee,
Ccur generate a random string, r of length C log2 |Scur | bits using Awerbuch and Scheideler’s
random number generator protocol from [33]. The ith member of the new committee is then
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the ID selected by the ith sub-string of the string r.
We prove the committee goal for the G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION in Lemma 3.4 below:
Lemma 3.4. For κ < 1/12, G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION always maintains a committee

consisting of an honest majority with probability at least 1 − O n−1
.
0
Proof. Let Si be the set of IDs and Gi be the set of good IDs in the system at the end of iteration
i ≥ 0.
For iteration i = 0, committee goal holds true from the use of G EN ID to initialize the system;
for details, see Lemma 6 of [19]).
Fix an iteration i > 0. Recall that a new committee is elected by the existing committee at
the end of the current iteration by generating a random string r of length C log2 |Si |. The ith
new committee member corresponds to the ith sub-string of r. Thus, C log |Si | IDs are chosen
independently and uniformly at random from the set Si , and for a sufficiently large constant
C > 0 which we define concretely later on in this argument.
Bound on number of good IDs elected to the Committee: Let XG be a random variable which
denotes the number of good IDs elected to the new committee in epoch i. Then:
|Gi |
C log |Si |
|Si |


κ
≥
1−
C log |Si |
1−

E[XG ] =

where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.1. Next, we bound the number of good IDs in
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the committee using Chernoff Bound [165] as:


P r XG < (1 − δ) 1 −

κ
1−



(

δ 2 (1 −
C log |Si |
≤ exp −
κ

= |Si |−(1−  )Cδ

κ
)C
1−

log |Si |

)

2

2 /2

κ
−(1− 1−
)Cδ 2 /2

≤ n0

−(γ+1)

≤ n0

where the first step holds for any constant 0 < δ < 1, the third step holds from the assumption
that the system consists of at least n0 good IDs at any time, and the last step holds for all
C≥

42(γ+1)
,
19δ 2

 < 1/8 and κ < 1/12. For δ = 1/190, we can bound the number of good IDs in
−(γ+1)

the committee to be at least (9/10)C log |Si | with probability at least 1 − O(n0

).

Bound on number of good IDs that depart from the Committee: Let Yg be a random variable
that denotes the number of good IDs that depart from the committee when the number of
departures of good IDs from the system is at most |Scur |/3. Then, since the departures of
good IDs occurs independently and uniformly at random from the system (See Section 1.1),
we obtain:
|Scur |
E[Yg ] ≤
3



C log |Scur |
|Scur |


≤

C
log |Scur |
3

Next, we obtain upper bound on the number of departures of good IDs from the committee
using Chernoff Bound as:


 02

δ C
0 C log |Scur |
P r Yg > (1 + δ )
≤ exp −
log |Scur |
3
6
02

= |Scur |−δ C/6


−(γ+1)
= O n0
where the first step holds for any constant 0 < δ 0 < 1 and the last step holds for all C ≥
−(γ+1)

Thus, for δ 0 = 1/5, with probability 1 − O(n0
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6(γ+1)
.
δ 02

), the minimum number of good IDs in

A LGORITHM 2: C OMPUTATIONAL P UZZLE BASED C OMMITTEE E LECTION
The current committee maintains the following sets:
Scur : current set of IDs in the system
Ccur : set of IDs in the current committee
Each ID in Ccur executes the following for a single round:
1. Upon receiving any (Kw ||sw ) from some ID Kw in Scur , if h(Kw ||sw ||r) is the
1
1
smallest value received in the interval 2(k+1)/d
, 2k/d
for some k ≥ 1, then tentath
tively set Kw to be the k member of the committee.
2. At the end of the round, set the current tentative members of the committee to Ccur .

Figure 3.4: Pseudocode for C OMPUTATIONAL P UZZLE BASED C OMMITTEE E LECTION.
the committee is greater than (9/10)c log |Si | − (4/10)c log |Si | . Next, use a union bound over
nγ0 epochs to show that the committee goal invariant is maintained through out the lifetime of


the system.

3.4.3

Overview of C OMPUTATIONAL P UZZLE BASED C OMMITTEE
E LECTION

The construction of a new committee occurs in Step 2 of DC OM over a single round. There is

1
1
, 2k/d
for k ≥ 1 and where d is a constant we
a sequence of membership intervals 2(k+1)/d
can set subject to d ≥ 20γ (this is required for the proof of Lemma 3.5). For each interval, the
ID that generates the smallest hash function output in the k th interval becomes the k th committee member; this determination is handled by the current committee. In Section 3.4, we prove
that this process results in a committee of size Θ(log n0 ), which is a criterion of the Committee
Goal.
Given that the adversary has a minority of the computational power, we expect the newlyformed committee to have a good majority. Byzantine consensus allows for agreement on the
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members of the new committee, and this is communicated to all good IDs in the network via
D IFFUSE. These two properties satisfy the other two criteria of the Committee Goal; this is
argued formally below.
Over the round during which this construction is taking place, the existing committee still
satisfies the Committee Goal; this is proved in Lemma 3.5. After the round completes, the new
committee members are known to all good IDs in the system. Those committee members that
were present prior to this construction are no longer recognized by the good IDs. Finally, any
messages that are received after this single round are considered late and discarded.
Throughout this section, Ct denotes the membership of committee in round t ≥ 0 of the
current iteration. In particular, C0 denotes the membership of committee upon its creation at
the beginning of the current iteration. We now prove that the committee goal is met over the
duration of any iteration. Additionally, we assume that the number of hash-functions evaluations that a good ID can perform per round, denoted by µ, is n`0 for some constant ` ≥ 1, since
µ is a polynomial in n0 (recall Section 1.1).
The next lemma assumes bounds of κ ≤ 1/6. Although a larger value of κ may be tolerable,
this bound is chosen in order to simplify the analysis and provide a clean presentation.
Lemma 3.5. Let κ ≤ 1/5, d be a sufficiently large constant depending on γ, and n0 be sufficiently large. Then for any fixed iteration, with probability at least 1−Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ), the following
holds: For any round t ≥ 0 in the iteration, Ct has size Θ(log n0 ), contains a majority of good
IDs, and is known to all good IDs.
Proof. Recall that for an ID Kv to become a committee member, it must obtain the smallest

1
1
, 2k/d
for some integer k ≥ 1. For any k ≥ 1,
value (via a hash-function evaluation) in 2(k+1)/d
let the indicator random variable Xv,k = 1 if ID Kv finds a value in the k th membership interval,
although not necessarily the smallest value in this interval; otherwise, Xv,k = 0.
Fix some an iteration i. Let the set of good IDs present at the beginning of that iteration be
denoted by G. These are the good IDs that may become committee members. Let the random
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variable XG,k =

P

Kv,k ∈G

Xv,k which counts the number of values by good IDs that land in the

k th membership interval.
Let the set of all bad IDs present at any point in iteration i be denoted by B. Define
P
th
XB,k =
Kv,k ∈B Xv,k which counts the number of values by bad IDs that land in the k
membership interval.
Expected Value Calculation. Fix some k ≥ 1. We have:
"
#
 ` 
X
µ
n0
E[XG,k ] = E
Xv,k ≥ |G| k/d = Gi−1
2
2k/d
K ∈G
v

Similarly:

"
E[XB,k ] = E

#
X

Xv,k ≤ |B|

Kv ∈B



µ

≤

2k/d

where the last inequality follows from noting that κ =

Gi−1
5

|B|
|B|+|G|



n`0
2k/d



≤ 1/6 implies |B| ≤ |G|/5.

Concentration Bounds on XG,k . For a fixed k ≥ 1, the Xv,k variables are independent over
different values of v. Thus, a Chernoff bound tightly bounds XG,k such that for any δ > 0, we
have:


 2

Gi−1 n`0
δ Gi−1 n`0
P r XG,k < (1 − δ) k/d
≤ exp − (k/d)+1
2
2
Let η = Gi−1 n`0 /(κ(γ + 2) ln n0 ) for a sufficiently large constant κ > 0. For the good IDs, we
consider k over the range from 1 to d lg η. In this range:
δ 2 Gi−1 n`
exp − (k/d)+1 0
2




≤ exp −(δ 2 /2)κ(γ + 2) ln n0

= O 1/nγ+2
0



for κ ≥ 2/δ 2 . Taking a union bound over all d lg η intervals, the following is true with probath
bility at least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ). For all 1 ≤ k ≤ d lg η, the number of good IDs in the k interval

is at least (1 − δ)Gi−1 µ/2k/d .
A similar calculation yields upper bounds on XG,k with the same probabilistic guarantee
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for each interval over this range of k:

P r XG,k

Gi−1 n`
> (1 + δ) k/d 0
2



= O 1/nγ+2
0



Taking a union bound over over all d lg η intervals, the following is true with probability at
least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ): for all 1 ≤ k ≤ d lg η, the number of puzzle solutions from good IDs in
the k th interval is at most (1 + δ 0 )Gi−1 µ/2k/d .
Concentration Bounds on XB,k . Over the range of 1 ≤ k ≤ d lg η, a similar argument proves
that:

(1 − δ)

Gi−1
5



n`0
2k/d




≤ XB,k ≤ (1 + δ)

Gi−1
5



n`0
2k/d



with probability at least 1 − O(1/nγ+2
0 ). A similar union bound shows that the above holds
with probability 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ d lg η.
However, can the adversary obtain values in membership intervals for k > d lg(η)? For
such intervals, we expect only a small number of values and we pessimistically assume that, if
one exists, it belongs to the adversary rather than a good ID.
Each such membership interval has size less than 1/(2j η) for j ≥ 1. We wish to know a
value j such that, with probability 1−O(1/nγ0 ), the adversary does not obtain a puzzle solution
in the corresponding interval, nor in any of the subsequent (smaller) intervals. This will bound
the number of committee members the adversary obtains from the membership intervals for
k > d lg(η). We solve for j in n`0 /(2j η) ≤ 1/nγ+2
which yields:
0

j ≥ (` + γ + 2) lg n0 − lg η
= (γ + 2) lg n0 − lg(Gi−1 ) + lg(κ(γ + 2) ln n0 )

Since Gi−1 ≥ n0 , and for sufficiently large n0 , it follows that lg(Gi−1 ) ≥ lg(κ(γ + 2) ln n0 ).
Therefore, with probability at least 1 − O(1/nγ+2
0 ), the adversary gains at most (γ + 2) lg n0
additional committee members.
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Size of Committee. We note that the same argument used above to bound the number of bad
IDs for membership intervals with k > d lg(η) also applies to good IDs. By this fact, and the
above bounds, with probability at least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ) the following holds:
d lg(η) ≤ |C0 | ≤ d lg(η) + 2(γ + 2) lg(n0 )
By the definition of η, and given that ` and γ are constants, it follows that |C0 | = Θ(log n0 ).
Finally, since the committee size can only decrease, and further it decreases by at most a 1/3factor within an iteration, it follows that |Ct | = Θ(log n0 ) for any round t > 0.
Fraction of Good Committee IDs at the Beginning of iteration. We begin by analyzing the fraction of good IDs in the committee at the beginning of the iteration. Each hash-function evaluation that falls in the k th membership interval has the same probability as any other of being the smallest. Therefore, pulling the above arguments together: with probability at least
1 − Õ(1/nγ+2 ), the probability that a good ID obtains the smallest output in the k th interval for
1 ≤ k ≤ d lg(η) is at least:
5
(1 − δ)Gi−1 n`0 /2k/d
≥ (1 − 0 )
`
`
k/d
k/d
6
(1 + δ)Gi−1 n0 /2 + (1 + δ)(Gi−1 /5)n0 /2
for any 0 > 0 provided that δ is sufficiently small.
To obtain a lower bound on the number of good IDs in C0 , define the indicator random
variable Yk = 1 if some good ID has the smallest output in the k th interval; otherwise, Yk = 0.
Pd lg(η)
Let Y = k=1 Yk . This implies a lower bound on the expected number of good IDs:


d lg(η)
X
E[Y ] = E 
Yk 
k=1
d lg(η)

=

X

E[Yk ]

k=1
d lg(η)

≥

X

(1 − 0 )(5/6)

k=1

= (1 − 0 )(5/6)d lg(η)
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We now make two observations. First, the Yk values are independent, thus using a Chernoff
bound, we can obtain a tight bound on the number of good IDs in C0 :




0
E(Y )
P r (Y < (1 − 2 )(5/6)d lg(η)) = P r Y < 1 −
1 − 0



02
5 d lg η
≤ exp −
2(1 − 0 )
6
0

= O(1/nγ+2
0 )

where the last equality holds for d ≥

(1−0 )12(γ+2)
.
02 5 lg(e)

Second, we derived above that, with probability at least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2 ), |C0 | ≤ d lg(η) +
2(γ + 2) lg n0 . Therefore, using our first observation, with probability at least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2 ),
the fraction of good IDs in C0 is at least:
(1 − 20 )(5/6)d lg(η)
(1 − 20 )(5/6)d lg(η)
≥
≥ 7/10
d lg(η) + 2(γ + 2) lg(n0 )
d lg(η) + 2(γ + 2) lg(η)
where the second inequality holds for any d ≥

21(γ+2)
.
(2−250 )

Therefore, for sufficiently large d, C0

has at least a 7/10-fraction of good IDs.
The existing committee members come to agreement on C0 by executing a Byzantine Consensus protocol that succeeds with probability at least 1−O(1/nγ+2
0 ). Each committee member
propagates its view of C0 to all remaining IDs in the network via D IFFUSE. A good ID not in
the committee will take the majority value of these different views and, since the committee
has a good majority, the majority value will be C0 . Therefore, the newly-formed C0 is known to
all good IDs.
Fraction of Good Committee IDs at Any Point in the iteration. What about the fraction of good
committee IDs over the entire iteration? Over the iteration, at most |C0 |/3 IDs can depart. In
the worst case, these are all good IDs. Let X denote the number of good IDs in C0 , let Y ≥ X
denote the total number of IDs in C0 , and let Z ≤ Y /3 be the number of good IDs that have
left. Then,

X−Z
Y −Z

≥

X−(Y /3)
(2/3)Y

= (3/2)(X/Y ) − (1/2) ≥ (3/2)(7/10) − (1/2) = 11/20. Where
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X/Y ≥ 7/10 holds with probability at least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ) from the argument above. Recall
that at most a constant 0 -fraction of good IDs may depart over the single round in which
the new committee is being formed during Step 2 of DC OM (see our model for joins and
departures described in Section 1.1). By a Chernoff bound, for 0 < 1/20, the fraction of good
IDs that leave the committee is tightly bounded such that the fraction of good IDs remaining
in the committee exceeds 1/2 with probability at least 1 − O(1/nγ+2
0 ) during this final round.
Therefore, for the current iteration, a majority of good IDs exists in Ct until a new committee
has been created.
Conclusion. From our above discussion, w.h.p over all rounds t ≥ 0 in an iteration, Ct has size
Θ(log n0 ), contains an honest majority, and is known to all good IDs in the system.

3.4.4



Overview of DC OM

In the distributed version of our protocol - D ISTRIBUTED C OMMENSURATE (DC OM ), the
CA’s role is taken up by the committee. The committee tracks the membership in the system
using the set Scur . Updates to this set are performed similar to that discussed in Section 3.3
for DC OM, with the addition of the committee needing to agree on the ordering of these events
using State Machine Replication (discussed in Section 3.4.1).
Upon receiving an entrance puzzle solution from a new IDs, the committee members check
its validity. Then, the IDs in the committee solve State Machine Replication in order to agree
on the contents of Scur . Those IDs that fail to submit valid puzzle solutions are denied entrance
into the system. Similarly, Scur is also updated and agreed upon when a good ID informs the
committee that it is departing. Of course, bad IDs may not provide such a notification and,
therefore, Scur is not necessarily accurate at all times.
Note that if we wish to achieve only the Committee Goal, then there is no need for the
committee to verify entrance puzzle solutions or maintain Scur .
At the beginning of the system, the committee knows the existing membership denoted by
S; assume |S| = n0 initially. Similar to CC OM, at some point Step 2 is immediately triggered
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A LGORITHM 3: D ISTRIBUTED C OMMENSURATE (DC OM )
The current committee maintains the following:
S
: set of IDs after most recent purge
Scur : current set of IDs in the system
Ccur : set of IDs in the current committee
na
: total number of joins to the system
d
n
: total number of departures from the system
r
: current random seed
Do the following forever:
1. Each joining ID v, generates a public key Kv and private key kv pair; solves an
entrance puzzle using Kv and the current timestamp T , and broadcasts the solution
via D IFFUSE. Upon, verifying the solution, the current committee adds Kv to Scur
using State Machine Replication.
2. If na + nd ≥ |S|/3, then the current committee does the following:
(a) Generates and broadcasts a random string, r to be used for the purge puzzle.
(b) S, Scur ← set of IDs that returned a valid solution.
(c) Ccur ← G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION
(d) na , nd ← 0

Figure 3.5: Pseudocode for DC OM.
when na + nd ≥ |S|/3. Then, each ID is issued a purge puzzle by the committee via diffusing
a random string r to all IDs. This random string consists of Θ(log |Scur |) bits and is created
via Byzantine consensus on the random bits of the committee members in order to overcome
malicious behavior by bad IDs that are members. Alternatively, a secure multiparty protocol
for generating random values can be used; for example, the result in [213].
How is r sent such that each good ID trusts it came from the committee? Recall that a
participant v that joins the system generates a public key, Kv , and the corresponding private
key, kv ; the public key is used as its ID. If ID Kv is a committee member, it will sign the
random string r using its private key kv to obtain signv . Then, (r||signv ||Kv ) is sent using
D IFFUSE. Any good ID can verify signv via Kv to ensure it returns r. This implicitly occurs
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in Step 2 of Algorithm 3.5, but we omit the details in the pseudocode for simplicity.
Finally, the current committee elects a new committee at the end of the iteration through
C OMMITTEE E LECTION, using the solutions to the purge puzzle.
Initialization. Prior to the first iteration, the system is initialized by solving the GenID problem
as described in Section 3.4.1.

3.4.5

Proof of Theorem 3.2

Our claims are proved to hold with probability at least 1 − Õ(1/nγ+2
0 ), where Õ hides a
poly(log n0 ) factor. Of course, we wish the claims of Theorem 3.2 to hold with probability
at least 1 − 1/nγ+1
such that a union bound over nγ0 joins and departures yields a w.h.p. guar0
antee. By providing this “slack” of an Ω̃(1/n0 )-factor in each of the guarantees of this section,
we demonstrate this is feasible while avoiding an analysis cluttered with specific settings for
the constants used in our arguments.
Next, we restate and prove Theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.2. Assume that the adversary holds at most κ = 1/12 fraction of the total resources
of the system. Then,with error probability polynomially small in n0 over the system lifetime,
DC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The Population Goal is maintained.
• The Committee Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).
Proof. Note that since apart from the committee taking up the role of the CA, DC OM remains
unchanged with respect to the Population Goal, so our proof from Section 3.3.2 holds for
DC OM as well.
By Lemma 3.4, with probability at least 1 − O(n−1
0 ), the committee has a majority of
good IDs, and its members are communicated to all good IDs via D IFFUSE; therefore, the
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Committee Goal is met. Given that the Committee Goal holds, by Lemma 3.2 the fraction of
bad IDs is less than 1/2 over the lifetime of the system; therefore, the Population Goal is met.
The computational cost follows directly from Lemma 3.3.

3.5



Reducing Cost of Tracking Departures

In this section, we present an enhancement to our main result - E NHANCED C OM (EC OM ),
described in Figure 3.6. This altered algorithm allows for a reduction in the amount of state
that needs to be maintained by committee members and reduces frequency of the purge tests.

3.5.1

Algorithm Overview

In order to reduce the frequency of purge tests, we can replace the condition in Step 2 for
ending the iteration with the symmetric difference of the sets S and Scur becoming greater
than or equal to |S/3|. This disregards all those joins and departures by those ID that joined as
well as departed in the same iteration. Note that this does not impact the correctness properties
of the system.
Next, we reduce the state requirements for DC OM. Recall that DC OM implicitly requires
that the committee communicate with each good ID to learn of its departure; recall our assumption in Section 1.1 that good IDs alert the committee of their departure. Additionally, the
committee must also calculate the symmetric difference between two (possibly large sets) Scur
and S in order to purge efficiently. Unfortunately, both this tracking and calculation can be
expensive.
To reduce this cost, we modify DC OM such that the committee tracks the state of O(log n0 )
IDs currently in the system; this set is referred to as a sample set. By tracking how many IDs depart from the (small) sample set, the committee is able to determine the end of an iteration with
less computational cost. We refer to this modified algorithm as E NHANCED DC OM (EC OM).
The number of join and departures experienced by the system is estimated through sample
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A LGORITHM 4: E NHANCED C OM (EC OM )
The current committee maintains the following:
S0
: sample set of IDs after most recent purge
S 0 cur : current sample set of IDs
S
: set of IDs after most recent purge
Scur
: current set of IDs
Ccur
: set of IDs in the current committee
r
: current random seed
Do the following forever:
1. Each joining ID v, generates a public key Kv and private key kv pair; solves an
entrance puzzle using Kv and the current timestamp T , and broadcasts the solution
via D IFFUSE. Upon, verifying the solution, the current committee adds Kv to Scur
using State Machine Replication.
2. If h0 (v) ≤

C log n0
,
|S|

then add v to S 0 cur .

3. Ping all IDs in S 0 ∪ S 0 cur in every round, and remove those IDs that do not respond.
4. If |(S 0 cur ∪ S 0 ) − (S 0 cur ∩ S 0 )| ≥ |S 0 |/4, then the current committee does the
following:
(a) Generate a random string r and broadcast via D IFFUSE.
(b) Sets S and Scur to the set of IDs that return valid solutions.
(c) Sets S 0 and S 0 cur to the set of IDs that return a valid solutions whose value under
n0
.
h0 is at most c log
|S|
(d) Ccur ← G ENERIC C OMMITTEE E LECTION

Figure 3.6: Pseudocode for EC OM.
sets S 0 and S 0 cur , which are generated by the committee using a hash function h0 computed
using secure multi-party computation (MPC) such as in [20, 39, 48, 71, 72, 75, 104]. Note that
h0 is unknown to the IDs and thus, the adversary cannot precompute the sample sets. The
committee adds an ID, say v to the sample set if the hash of its ID h0 (v) ≤

c log n0
,
|S|

for some

constant c > 0. A fresh sample set, S 0 , is generated at the beginning of every iteration. As
new IDs join the system, they are sampled by the committee using h0 and added to the current
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sample set, S 0 cur .
Initially, the committee knows the existing membership denoted by Scur , and so |Scur | =
n0 . The committee generates S 0 and updates the current sample set, S 0 cur as described above.
At any time during the execution, if |(S 0 cur ∪ S 0 ) − (S 0 cur ∩ S 0 )| exceeds S 0 /4, the system
undergoes a purge test (Step 2). As before, the committee broadcasts r to conduct purge puzzle with a round of sufficient length that the resource burning time dominates the round trip
communication time between the client and committee. Those IDs that fail to submit valid
puzzle solutions during Step 2 are de-registered — that is, they are effectively removed from
the system.

3.5.2

Analysis of Estimating the Symmetric Difference

For an iteration i, suppose S is the set of IDs in the system at the beginning of the iteration and
i
Scur is the set of IDs in the system at time t. Let fN
denote the fraction of new IDs that remain

active in the system through iteration i, and let fLi denote the fraction of IDs that leave from
0

i
S in iteration i. Similarly, let fN
denote the fraction of new IDs that remain active in S 0 cur
0

through iteration i, and fLi denote the fraction of IDs that leave from S 0 in iteration i.
0

0

Lemma 3.6. For any iteration i, if fNi + fLi ≤ 14 , then fNi + fLi ≤

1
3

w.h.p.

Proof. The probability that an ID becomes member of the sample set is

c log n0
.
|S|

Fix a time step

during an iteration. Let Scur be the set of IDs in the system at that time step. Then the size of
n0
the sample set will be |Scur | c log
≥ 23 c log n0 in expectation. From Section 4.2.3 on Chernoff
|S|

Bounds of [165], for constants δ =

1
24

and c ≥ 1728γ, the following hold:

0

0

−cδ 2 log n0
2

+e

0

0

−cδ 2 log n0
2

+e

P r(fLi ∈
/ [fLi − δ, fLi + δ]) < e

P r(fNi ∈
/ [fNi − δ, fNi + δ]) < e
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−cδ 2 log n0
3

−cδ 2 log n0
3

0

0

0

0

Thus, w.h.p. fLi ∈ [fLi − δ, fLi + δ] and fNi ∈ [fNi − δ, fNi + δ], using which we get
0

0

fLi + fNi ≤ fLi + fNi + 2δ
0

0

On solving the above inequality using the fact that fNi + fLi ≤ 41 , we get fNi + fLi ≤ 31 .
0

0

Lemma 3.7. For any iteration i, if fNi + fLi ≥ 14 , then fNi + fLi ≥

1
6



w.h.p.
0

0

Proof. Following the same argument as Lemma 3.6, we have fNi ≥ fNi − δ and fLi ≥ fLi − δ.
On summing the two inequalities, we get:
0

0

fNi + fLi ≥ fNi − δ + fLi − δ ≥

1
1
− 2δ ≥
4
6

where the last inequality holds since δ = 1/24.

3.5.3



Proof of Theorem 3.3

Theorem 3.3. Assume that the adversary holds at most κ = 1/6 fraction of the total computational power of the system. Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0 over the
system lifetime, EC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The Population Goal is maintained.
• The Committee Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).
Proof. From Lemma 3.6, when the purge puzzle is triggered in EC OM, the system has seen
at most 1/3 churn. Hence, from Lemma 3.2, the Population Goal is satisfied. Also, since the
sample set enhancements do not change the rules for forming committees, the Committee Goal
is also satisfied.
For calculating the cumulative resource burning to the good IDs, note from Lemma 3.7 that
when the purge puzzle is triggered, the fraction of churn in the system is at least 61 , which is half
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of the triggering fraction in DC OM. Thus, extending the results of Theorem 3.2 by multiplying
the cumulative resource cost by 2, we get that the algorithmic spending rate is O(T + J) for


EC OM.

3.6

Handling Bounded Communication Latency

Previously, all messages were assumed to be delivered with negligible delay when compared
with the time to solve resource burning puzzles. In this section, we relax this assumption to
the following: the adversary may choose to arbitrarily delay messages, subject to the constraint that they are delivered within a constant number of rounds ∆ > 0.

Such a model

of communication delay is often referred to as partial synchrony or ∆-bounded delay in the
literature [82, 188]. We address this issue in the following analysis for each of our algorithms.

3.6.1

In DC OM

In DC OM, messages are exchanged with good IDs every time the committee is constructed.
Thus, we increase the wait time for receiving the solutions to the purge puzzle by 2∆. To
simplify the analysis of a ∆-bounded delay in the network where the adversary holds an κfraction of the system resources, we can instead consider a 0-bounded delay network, but
where the adversary holds an increased fraction of the system resources; this is addressed by
Lemma 3.8.

3.6.2

In EC OM

In EC OM, the purge puzzle is triggered when |(S 0 cur ∪ S 0 ) − (S 0 cur ∩ S 0 )| ≥ |S 0 |/4. Due
to ∆-bounded network latency, the adversary can choose to delay the departure notifications
from the good IDs by ∆ rounds, thereby delaying the detection of the need to purge. This may
jeopardize the Population Goal and we address this issue here.
Recall from Section 1.1 that the maximum fraction of good IDs that can depart in a round
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is 0 . Hence, the maximum fraction of good IDs that can depart in ∆-rounds is ∆0 . In order
to satisfy the Population goal, it is required that purge puzzles be issued when |(S 0 cur ∪ S 0 ) −
(S 0 cur ∩ S 0 )| ≥ |S 0 |(1/4 − 0 ∆). Due to this modification, our resource costs will increase by
at most a constant factor.
Lemma 3.8. A ∆-bounded network latency with an adversary that holds an κ-fraction of
resources of the network is equivalent to a 0-bounded network latency with an adversary that
holds a

2κ∆+κ
-fraction
2κ∆+1

of resources of the network.

Proof. Recall from Section 1.1, the fraction of resources with an adversary is κ-times the total
resources of the network. Given the ∆-bounded delay in the network, suppose the adversary
starts solving puzzles δ rounds ahead of any good ID, and gets the solutions to the committee
members at the very end of a the δ rounds. Then, the adversary has 2∆ + 1 rounds to perform
evaluations. Fix a time step during an iteration. Suppose P is the total resources of the network
at that time step. Then, the number of solutions that an adversary can obtain is P κ(2∆ + 1).
Note that the resources of the good IDs remains the same, which is P (1 − κ) since they
obey the protocol, and we assume that the bounded delay only benefits the adversary. Thus,
the ∆-bounded delay model is equivalent to the 0-bounded delay model with an adversary who
holds a

2κ∆+κ
-fraction
2κ∆+1



of the resources of the network.

Lemma 3.9. Assume a ∆-bounded delay and an adversary that holds an κ-fraction of system
resources, for κ ≤ 1/(10∆ + 6). With probability at least 1 − O(1/nγ+1
0 ), the fraction of good
IDs in the committee exceeds 1/2 for the duration of the iteration.
Proof. From Lemma 3.8, the ∆-bounded delay is equivalent to a 0-bounded delay with an
adversary that holds a

2κ∆+κ
-fraction
2κ∆+1

of resources of the network. By Lemma 3.5, for a 0-

bounded delay model with an adversary that holds an κ0 -fraction of the resources for κ0 ≤ 1/6,
the fraction of good IDs exceeds 7/10. Substituting κ0 =

2κ∆+κ
,
2κ∆+1

the ∆-bounded delay model

with an κ-fraction of resources has at least 7/10-fraction of good IDs, for κ ≤ 1/(10∆+6).
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Hence, we can have the following results for our algorithms in the presence of ∆− delay
in the network:
Corollary 3.1. Assume a ∆-bounded delay and an adversary that holds an κ-fraction of the
system resources, for κ ≤ 1/(10∆ + 6). Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0
over the system lifetime, CC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The population Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).

Corollary 3.2. Assume a ∆-bounded delay and an adversary that holds an κ-fraction of the
system resources, for κ ≤ 1/(10∆ + 6). Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0
over the system lifetime, DC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The Population Goal is maintained.
• The Committee Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).

Corollary 3.3. Assume a ∆-bounded delay and an adversary that holds an κ-fraction of the
system resources, for κ ≤ 1/(10∆ + 6). Then, with error probability polynomially small in n0
over the system lifetime, EC OM ensures the following properties hold:
• The Population Goal is maintained.
• The Committee Goal is maintained.
• The algorithmic spending rate of O(T + J).
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3.7

Generalizing the Population Goal

In this section, we show how to modify our algorithms in order to maintain the fraction of
bad IDs in the system to be less than 2κ at all times for any given κ < 1/4 (i.e., fraction of
resources with the adversary is some value strictly less than 1/6 of the total resources in the
system).
In order to maintain the fraction of bad IDs to be always some fraction less than 3κ, we
propose the following modification to the purge condition for our algorithms (specifically, replace Step 2 in the CC OM, DC OM and EC OM): Instead of nai + ndi ≥ |Si-1 |/3, we have the
condition nai + ndi ≥

2κ
|S |.
1+3κ i-1

We prove the more general Population Goal in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.10. For any κ < 1/6, the fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than 2κ.
Proof. Fix some iteration i ≥ 1. Then, similar to Lemma 3.2, we can calculate the maximum
fraction of bad IDs in iteration i as:
|Bi-1 | + bai
κ|Si-1 |/(1 − ) + bai
<
=
|Si-1 | + bai − gid
|Si-1 | + bai − gid

κ|Si-1 |/(1 − ) + bai

2κ
1+κ
+
|Si-1 | + bai − gid
1+3κ
1+3κ

where the first step holds since |Bi-1 | < κ|Si-1 |/(1 − ) at the end of iteration i − 1 from
Lemma 3.1. Also, in order to handle the variant Population Invariant, we modify our condition
to end an iteration to nai + ndi ≥
bai + gid =

2κ
|S |.
1+3κ i-1

2κ
|S |.
1+3κ i-1

Thus, the above fraction is maximized when

Thus, we have:
κ|Si-1 |/(1 − ) + bai
κ|Si-1 |/(1 − ) + bai
≤
< 2κ
1+κ
1+κ
|S | + 2bai
|S |
1+3κ i-1
1+3κ i-1

where the second inequality holds since the above fraction is maximized when bai = 0 in the
denominator, and the final inequality holds since bai <
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2κ
|S |
1+3κ i-1

and for  < 1/3.



3.8

Application: E LASTICO Committee Election

E LASTICO is a secure protocol [154], which aims to achieve agreement on a set of transactions
in a blockchain i.e., the state of the blockchain. Informally, the core idea is to partition the
system into smaller fragments called committees, where each committee executes a BC protocol to agree upon its set of transactions. Then, the committee that was formed last — referred
to as the final committee — computes the final digest of all transactions in the system; these
transactions having been received from other committees. This final digest is broadcast to all
other participants in the system.
How Our Result Applies. In order to reduce message cost, E LASTICO makes use of a special
committee referred to as the directory committee (DC), which coordinates the formation of
all other committees. We propose the election of the DC using S YBIL C ONTROLwith the last
portion of Line 1 is amended: there is no need for the committee to verify solutions or maintain
Scur (recall Section 3.4.4). This ensures the Committee Goal and our cost results; that is, we
can guarantee that (1) the committee contains a majority of good IDs for a polynomial number
of join and leave events; and (2) resources costs grow commensurately with the costs of the
adversary.

3.9

Conclusion

We have described algorithms to efficiently use resource burning to reduce the fraction of bad
IDs in open systems. Unlike previous work, our algorithms require the good IDs to expend
resources that grow only linearly with the resources expended by the adversary. In particular,
assume the adversary incurs an average spending rate of T per round, and that the average join
rate of good IDs is J per round, over the lifetime of the system. Then, our algorithm requires
O(T + J) resource cost per round.
Additionally, we propose numerous improvements to reduce the state requirements of our
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algorithms. Furthermore, we adapt our algorithms to maintain the population goal and the
committee goal even in the presence of ∆− delay in the network, while maintaining the commensurate cost to the algorithms.
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Chapter 4
Estimating Good Join Rate with
G OOD JE ST

“Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow.
The important thing is not to stop questioning.”
Albert Einstein

In a permissionless system, participants can join and depart at will, which makes it an easy
target for the Sybil attack. Existing techniques have limited Sybil entities in the system through
continuous system-wide resource burning, as discussed in the previous chapters. We proposed
an efficient resource-burning Sybil defense technique in Chapter 3, which looked at the number
of joins and departures experienced by the system to decide the need for resource burning,
while always maintaining a majority of honest participants.
Suppose we had an oracle that could predict the join rate of good IDs in our system. Then,
it would be possible to determine if our system was under attack, and thus only deploy defense
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mechanism when required. But designing such an oracle is an open problem.
To this end, we aim to estimate the join rate of good IDs in a permissionless systems and
ask the following question: Can we design an algorithm that estimates the join rate of good
IDs to within a constant factor even in the presence of exponential churn?
In this chapter, we design and analyse such an algorithm - G OOD JE ST, which estimates
the join rate of good IDs for any system that is capable of maintaining a constant fraction of
bad IDs. Specifically, it can be used in permissioned systems, where this is guaranteed by an
admission-control mechanism; and also in permissionless systems, where this is enforced by
some decentralized algorithm. In Chapter 5, we present such an approach for permissionless
systems.
Organization of the Chapter. We begin with a discussion of our contribution in Section 4.1,
consisting of definition of parameters on churn and a summary of our results. Next, we describe
our algorithm - G OOD JE ST in Section 4.2, and analyze the properties of the estimate generated
in Section 4.2.2. We discuss our empirical results in Section 4.3. Finally, we conclude with a
discussion of application and future work in Section 4.4.

4.1

Our Contribution

In this section, we first describe two churn parameters - α and β−smoothness in Section 4.1.1.
Note that our estimate is a function of these parameters. Next, we outline our results for the
estimate join rate of good IDs using G OOD JE ST in Section 4.1.2.

4.1.1

Our Model

We assume that the following invariant is always maintained for our system:
Population Invariant: The system always contains less than a 1/6 fraction of bad IDs.
The population invariant can be maintained through any Sybil defense technique that gives the
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Figure 4.1: Illustration for Smoothness Parameter definition.

corresponding guarantees for a permissionlesss system. We described one such technique in
Chapter 3.
To define our parameters on churn of good IDs, we make use of a disjoint period of time
called an epoch; roughly, this is the duration of time until the system membership of good IDs
changes by a constant fraction. We highlight that an epoch exists for any dynamic system,
which makes the analysis based on this definition broadly applicable.
Let Gt be the set of good IDs at time t. Then we have the following definition:
Definition 4.1. For all i ≥ 1, epoch i begins at time t = 0 if i = 1, or at time t when epoch
i − 1 ends otherwise. Then, epoch i ends at the smallest t0 > t such that |Gt0 ⊕ Gt | ≥ 34 |Gt |.
Let ρj be the join rate of good IDs (or, more simply, the good join rate) in epoch j; that is, the
number of good IDs that join in epoch j divided by the number of seconds in epoch j.
Definition 4.2. For any α ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ β ≤

p n0
120

− 1, we define the following notion of

smoothness. For any epoch j > 1:
• α-smoothness: (1/α)ρj ≤ ρj+1 ≤ α ρj .
• β-smoothness: For any duration of ` seconds in the epoch, the number of good IDs that join
is at least b`ρj /βc and at most dβ`ρj e. Also, the number of good IDs that depart during this
duration is at most dβ`ρj e.
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Note that we use the bound on α−smoothness parameter in proof of Theoorem 4.1 to
prove that the estimate obtained for a given interval is a good estimate for the next interval.
Additionally, β−smoothness is used in the proof of Lemma 4.5, where we obtain a lower
bound on the number of good IDs that join over an interval.
High Churn. We emphasize that Definition 4.2 captures a compelling notion of high churn.
First, the notion of α-smoothness captures any good join rate between consecutive epochs,
since there always exists a parameter α that satisfies the definition. Therefore, the good join
rate may change rapidly under this smoothness definition. For example, suppose that the ρj increases by even a small constant factor of, say, α = 2 over consecutive values j; this can occur
if the same number of good IDs join in each epoch, but over half the time of the previous epoch.
In this case, the good join rate exhibits exponential increase over these epochs. Similarly, the
good join rate may decrease exponentially. Second, while ρj is the good join rate over the
entire epoch j, β-smoothness allows for large deviations within that epoch. In particular, the
number of good join events within any duration in an epoch may differ by roughly the square
root of the current system size.

4.1.2

Our Result

We define the notion of an interval as duration of time such that the system membership has
changed by a constant factor with respect to the system size at a given point in time. Let Sτ be
the set of IDs in the system at time τ .
Definition 4.3. For all i ≥ 1, interval i begins at time t = 0 if i = 1, or at time t when interval
i − 1 ends otherwise. Then, interval i ends at the smallest t0 > t such that |St0 ⊕ St | ≥ 85 |St0 |.
We define the good join rate for an interval as the number of good IDs that join over this
interval divided by the duration of this interval in seconds, and the estimated good join rate
for an interval as the estimate of the join rate of good IDs over this interval obtained using
G OOD JE ST. Then, we have the following result:
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G
Theorem 4.1. For any i > 1, fix intervals i − 1 and i, with good join rates of Ji−1
and
G
JiG respectively. Let J˜i−1
be the output of G OOD JE ST at the end of interval i − 1. Then:


G
≤ 100α3 β 4 JiG
1/ 334α3 β 2 JiG ≤ J˜i−1

Additionally, since we estimate the good join rate at end of an interval, it could be of use in
the next interval. To this end, we have the following result:

Theorem 4.2. Assume the fraction of bad ID is always less than 1/6. Fix any time step
t. Let ρ be the good join rate in the epoch containing t, and let J˜G be the estimate from
G OOD JE ST at time t. Then:
1/(418α4 β 3 )ρ ≤ J˜G ≤ 267α4 β 5 ρ

Used in Model and Algorithm
Symbol
n0
Gτ
ρj
α
β
JiG
Sτ
J˜G

Description
Lower bound on number of good IDs in the system at any time
Set of good IDs in the system at time τ
Good join rate over epoch j
Smoothness parameter for inter-epoch good join rate variation
Smoothness parameter for intra-epoch good join rate variation
Good join rate over interval i
Set of all IDs in the system at time τ
Estimated good join rate
Table 4.1: A summary of notation for this chapter.
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4.2

The G OOD JE ST Protocol

We present the pseudocode of our protocol - G OOD JE ST in Figure 4.2. An overview of our approach is discussed in Section 4.2.1, and followed by the analysis of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem
4.2 in Section 4.2.2.

4.2.1

Overview of the protocol

G OOD JE ST starts out with a value for J˜G equal to the number of IDs at system initialization
divided by the total time taken for initialization, where initialization consists of running the
G EN ID protocol. The value t is set to the system start time. Throughout the protocol, t will
equal the last time that J˜G was updated, and t0 will be the current time. The execution of
G OOD JE ST divides time into consecutive, disjoint intervals.
Figure 4.3 illustrates our protocol; good IDs are blue and bad IDs are red. Let x be the
number of IDs in the system at the end of the last update to J˜G . The interval ends when
|St0 − St | ≥ 58 |St0 |, at which point we set J˜G ← |St0 |/(t0 − t). Note that since the join and
departure events are serialized thus, over an interval |St0 − St | ≤ 85 |St0 | + 1. Recall from our
model in Section 4.1.1 that at any time, the fraction of bad IDs is strictly less than 1/6. Thus,
during the interval, at least

11x
24

number of good IDs should have departed from the set St or

G OOD JE ST
In the following, t0 is the current time and Sx is the set of IDs in the system at time x.
t ← time at system initialization, i.e. when G EN ID ends.
J˜G ← |St | divided by time required for initialization, i.e. time required by G EN ID.
Repeat forever: whenever |St0 ⊕ St | ≥ 58 |St0 |, do
1. J˜G ← |St0 |/(t0 − t).
2. t ← t0 .

Figure 4.2: Pseudocode for G OOD JE ST.
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Figure 4.3: An overview of our approach. The system always consist of an honest majority.
At the end of the interval, since the system membership has changed by at least a total of 5/8fraction, implying at least 11/24-fraction of good joins due to the population invariant of at
most 1/6 fraction of bad in the system, hence we can estimate good join rate over this interval.
at least joined and remained until t0 . Using this insight, we obtain an estimate for the good
join rate over the interval, which is within a constant factor depending on the αβ−smoothness
parameters for a system.
Note that this estimate can be obtained by a certifying authority such as the server or a
committee by keeping track of the system membership. We do not go into the details of how a
committee would maintain or estimate the change in membership, but leave it as future work.

4.2.2

Analysis

Recall that G OOD JE ST imposes a division of time into intervals (Section 4.2). We say that an
interval intersects an epoch if there is a point in time belonging to both the interval and the
epoch.
In this section, for any time t, let St and Gt (Bt ) denote the set of all IDs and set of
good(bad) IDs, respectively, in the system at time t. The following proofs hold with high
probability in n0 over all intervals, assuming the Population invariant always holds.
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Figure 4.4: Illustration for an interval intersecting epochs.
Lemma 4.1. An interval intersects at most two epochs.
Proof. Assume that some interval starts at time t0 and intersects at least three epochs; we
will derive a contradiction. Given this assumption, there must be at least one epoch entirely
contained within the interval. Consider the earliest such epoch, and let it start at time t1 ≥ t0
and end at time t2 > t1 . Observe that:
3
|St2 ⊕ St0 | ≥ |Gt2 ⊕ Gt1 | ≥ |Gt2 | ≥
4

  
 
3
5
5
|St2 | =
|St2 |
4
6
8

In the above, step one holds since |St2 ⊕ St0 | ≥ |Gt2 ⊕ Gt1 |; step two holds by the definition
of an epoch; and the second to last step holds by the Population Invariant.
But the above inequalities show that |St2 ⊕ St0 | ≥ 58 |St2 |. Therefore, the interval ends by
time t2 , and there can be no third epoch intersecting the interval; this contradiction completes


the argument.
Lemma 4.2. Fix an interval that starts at time t and ends at time t0 . Then, |St0 | ≥
Proof. By the definition of an interval, we know that:



5
5
|St0 ⊕ St | ≤
|St0 ≤ |St0 | + 1
8
8
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6
|S |.
13 t

Note that |St0 ⊕ St | ≥ |St − St0 |, which implies:
5
|St − St0 | ≤ |St0 | + 1
8

(4.1)

Moreover, |St − St0 | ≥ |St | − |St0 |. Rearranging, we get:

|St0 | ≥ |St | − |St − St0 |


5
|St0 | + 1
≥ |St | −
8
where the second step follows from inequality 4.1. Finally, isolating |St0 | in the last inequality,
we get:
8
(|St | − 1)
13 

8 3
|St |
≥
13 4
6
≥ |St |
13

|St0 | ≥

where the second inequality holds for n0 ≥ 4.



The aim of the next set of lemmas is to derive upper and lower bounds on the number of
good IDs that can join over an interval as a function of the the system size, and α and β. These
lemmas all hold with high probability in n0 over all intervals.
In each lemma, we fix an interval that starts at time t and ends at time t0 . We let a be the
number of good IDs joining during this interval and d be the number of good IDs that depart
during the interval.
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Lemma 4.3. a ≤ 23|St | + 4.
Proof. First, note that:



5
|St0 | = |St0 ⊕ St |
8
= |St0 − St | + |St − St0 |
≥ |St0 − St |
≥ |Gt0 − Gt |

In the above, the first step holds by the definition of an interval and the fact that all join and
leave events occur at unique times. The last step holds since sets of good and bad IDs are
disjoint. Thus, we have



5
3
|Gt0 − Gt | ≤
|St0 | ≤ |Gt0 | + 1
8
4
In the above, the second step holds by the population invariant, since

|Gt0 |
|St0 |

>

5
6

implies that

|St0 | < 56 |Gt0 |. Then:



5
5
3
|St0 | ≤ |St0 | + 1 < |Gt0 | + 1
8
8
4

This gives our first key inequality:
3
|Gt0 − Gt | < |Gt0 | + 1
4

(4.2)

Recall that d is the number of good IDs that have departed in the interval. Let the random
variable X be the number of IDs in Gt that have departed during the interval. By Equation 4.2,
E(X) ≥

9
d,
40

for |Gt0 |/40 ≥ 1, or n0 ≥ 40. Additionally, X stochastically dominates a simpler

random variable that counts the number of successes when there are d independent trials, each
succeeding with probability

9
.
40

Hence, by Chernoff bounds, when d ≥ |Gt |, X ≥ 51 d, with

probability of failure that is O(e−cn0 ), for some constant c > 0. For any fixed λ, this probability
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is at most n−λ−1
for n0 sufficiently large. Hence, by a union bound, X ≥ 51 d over all intervals,
0
with probability of failure at most 1/n0 .
Clearly, X ≤ |Gt |. So by the above, we have that, with high probability, 15 d ≤ |Gt |, which
gives:
d ≤ 5|Gt |

(4.3)

Finally, recall that a is the number of good IDs added during the interval. Since the number
of new good IDs in St0 is at least a − d, then |Gt0 − Gt | ≥ a − d. Thus:
a ≤ |Gt0 − Gt | + d


3
|Gt0 | + 1 + 5|Gt |
≤
4
3
≤ (|Gt | + a) + 1 + 5|Gt |
4
3
23
≤ |Gt | + a + 1
4
4

In the above, the second step follows by applying inequalities 4.2 and 4.3, and the third step
by noting that |G0t | ≤ |Gt | + a. Finally, the lemma follows by isolating a in the last inequality,
to get a ≤ 23|Gt | + 4 ≤ 23|St | + 4



Lemma 4.4. d ≤ β 2 (a + 2) + 2.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, an interval intersects at most two epochs. If two epochs are intersected,
let ρ, ρ0 be the good join rates over the two epochs intersected, and `, `0 be the lengths of the
intersection. If a single epoch is intersected, let ρ and ρ0 both equal the good join rate over
that epoch, and let `, `0 both be half the length of the intersection of the interval and the epoch.
Then, in every case, from β−smoothness, we have:
  0 0
ρ`
ρ`
ρ` + ρ0 `0
a≥
+
≥
−2
β
β
β
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For which:

ρ` + ρ0 `0 ≤ β(a + 2)

(4.4)

Similarly, we can bound the number of departures using β−smoothness:

d ≤ dβρ`e + dβρ0 `0 e ≤ β(ρ` + ρ0 `0 ) + 2 ≤ β 2 (a + 2) + 2

where the last step follows from inequality 4.4.
Lemma 4.5. a ≥



1
12(1+β 2 )





|St0 | − 2 ≥ 8.

Proof. Recall that d is the number of good IDs that depart and a is the number of good IDs
that join during the interval. Then:

|Gt0 ⊕ Gt | = |Gt0 − Gt | + |Gt − Gt0 |
≤a+d
≤ a + β 2 (a + 2) + 2
≤ (1 + β 2 )(a + 2)

(4.5)

where the second to last step follows from Lemma 4.4.
Next, since the sets of good and bad IDs are disjoint, we have |St0 ⊕ St | = |Gt0 ⊕ Gt | +
|Bt0 ⊕ Bt |.
Rearranging, we get:

|Gt0 ⊕ Gt | = |St0 ⊕ St | − |Bt0 ⊕ Bt |
5
≥ |St0 | − |Bt0 ⊕ Bt |
8
5
= |St0 | − (|Bt0 − Bt | + |Bt − Bt0 |)
8
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|St0 | |St |
5
−
≥ |St0 | −
8
6
6

|St0 | 13 |St0 |
5
−
≥ |St0 | −
8
6
6
6


5 1 13
≥
− −
|St0 |
8 6 36
|St0 |
≥
12

(4.6)

The second step follows from the definition of an interval. The third step by definition of
symmetric difference. The fourth step follows from the population invariant: |Bt0 − Bt | ≤
and |Bt − Bt0 | ≤

|St |
.
6

|St0 |
6

The fifth step follows from Lemma 4.2.

Finally, combining Inequality 4.5 and Inequality 4.6, we get:

(1 + β 2 )(a + 2) ≥

|St0 |
12

On isolating a in the above, we get:

a≥

Finally, substituting β ≤

a≥

p n0
120

1
12(1 + β 2 )


|St0 | − 2

− 1 from Definition 4.2, we get:

1
n0
− 1))
12(1 + ( 120




|St0 | − 2 ≥

10
n0

where the second inequality holds since |St0 | ≥ n0 .


n0 − 2 = 8



Lemma 4.6. Fix an interval. Let J G be the join rate of good IDs over this interval, and let
J˜G = |St0 |/(t0 − t). Then:
(1/100)J G ≤ J˜G ≤ 30β 2 J G
Proof. Recall that a is the number of good IDs that join and d is the number of good IDs that
depart over the interval.
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Lower bound: We have that:
|St0 |
J˜G = 0
t −t
(6/13)|St |
≥
t0 −t

6/13 a − 4
≥ 0
t −t
23


1 a−4
≥
50 t0 − t


1 a − a/2
≥
50
t0 − t
JG
≥
100
The second step follows from Lemma 4.2; the third from Lemma 4.3; and the fifth from
Lemma 4.5 (specifically that a ≥ 8). Finally, the last step follows since, by definition,
J G = a/(t0 − t).
Upper bound: Similarly:
|St0 |
J˜G = 0
t −t
12(1 + β 2 )(a + 2)
≤
(t0 − t)


2
a
2
≤ 12(1 + β ) 0
+
t − t t0 − t


a
a
2
+
≤ 12(1 + β ) 0
t − t 4(t0 − t)


5a
2
≤ 12(1 + β )
4(t0 − t)
 G
5J
≤ 12(1 + β 2 )
4
≤ 15(1 + β 2 )J G
≤ 30β 2 J G

In the above, the second step follows from Lemma 4.2; the fourth step holds from Lemma 4.2,
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specifically that a ≥ 8; the fifth step from Lemma 4.5 (specifically that a ≥ 8); and the seventh
holds since J G = a/(t0 − t). The last step holds since β ≥ 1 from Definition 4.2.



Lemma 4.7. Fix an interval and consider any epoch that intersects this interval. Let J G be the
join rate of good IDs over the interval, and ρ be the join rate over the entire epoch. Then:
4
4
ρ ≤ J G ≤ (1 + α)βρ
5αβ
3
Proof. Fix an interval that starts at time t and ends at time t0 . By Lemma 4.1, we know the
interval intersects at most two epochs. Let ρ and ρ0 be the join rate of good IDs over the two
epochs intersecting the interval over say lengths ` and `0 , respectively. If only a single epoch is
intersected, let ρ0 and `0 both be 0. Then, by β-smoothness (Defn 4.2), we have:

G

J ≥
≥
≥
≥

   0 0 
ρ`
ρ`
1
+
0
t −t
β
β
 
   0 
1
`
`
ρ
2
ρ 0
+
−
0
β
t −t
α t −t
`


0
G 0
ρ `+`
(J (t − t)/4)
−
0
βα t − t
t0 − t
JG
ρ
−
αβ
4

The second step follows from α-smoothness (Definition 4.2), and the third step follows from
Lemma 4.5, specifically that a ≥ 8. Isolating J G in the last inequality, we get the lower bound.
Next, we prove the upper bound. Again, using β-smoothness, we have:
1
(dβρ`e + dβρ0 `0 e)
− t


 0 
`
`
2
≤β ρ 0
+ αρ 0
+ 0
t −t
t −t
t −t
 

 0 
`
`
(J G (t0 − t)/4)
≤β ρ 0
+ αρ 0
+
t −t
t −t
(t0 − t)
JG
≤ (1 + α)βρ +
4

JG ≤

t0
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The second inequality follows from the α-smoothness, and the third inequality follows from
Lemma 4.5, specifically that a ≥ 8. Isolating J G in the last inequality, we obtain the upper


bound.

G
Theorem 4.1. For any i > 1, fix intervals i − 1 and i, with good join rates of Ji−1
and JiG
G
respectively. Let J˜i−1
be the output of G OOD JE ST at the end of interval i − 1. Then:


G
≤ 100α3 β 4 JiG
1/ 334α3 β 2 JiG ≤ J˜i−1

Proof. By Lemma 4.1, intervals i and i − 1 will intersect at most 4 epochs. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be
the join rate of good IDs over the two epochs intersecting interval i − 1. If there is only one
epoch intersected, let ρ2 = ρ1 . Let ρ3 be the good join rate over the first epoch that interval i
intersects.
Lower Bound. Applying Lemma 4.7 to interval i − 1, we have:

G
Ji−1
≥

4
ρ2
5αβ

(4.7)

Figure 4.5: Illustration for Theorem 4.1. Note that an epoch need not always end at the same
time as an interval. Here, we consider the worst case where both the intervals intersect two
distinct epochs each.
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Applying Lemma 4.7 to interval i, we have:
4
(1 + α) βρ3
3
4
≤ (1 + α) βαρ2
3


4
5αβ G
≤ (1 + α)αβ
J
3
4 i−1
5
G
= (1 + α)α2 β 2 Ji−1
3
10
G
≤ α3 β 2 Ji−1
3

10 3 2 
G
˜
≤ α β 100Ji−1
3
≤ 334α3 β 2 J˜G

JiG ≤

i−1

The second step follow from α-smoothness, the third step follows by isolating ρ2 in Inequality
4.7, the fifth step holds since α ≥ 1 from α-smoothness, the sixth step follows from Lemma
4.6.
G
in the last step of the above equation, we obtain the lower bound of our
Finally, isolating J˜i−1

lemma statement.
Upper Bound. Similarly, by Lemma 4.7, the good-ID join rate in interval i − 1 is:

G
Ji−1
≤

4
(1 + α) βρ2
3

and for interval i is:
4
ρ3
5αβ
4
≥
ρ2
5βα2


4
3
G
≥
J
5βα2 4(1 + α)β i−1

JiG ≥
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(4.8)

3
G
Ji−1
2
2
5(1 + α)α β
3
G
≥
Ji−1
3
2
10α β
!
G
J˜i−1
3
≥
10α3 β 2 30β 2
≥

=

G
J˜i−1
100α3 β 4

The second step follows from the α-smoothness, the third step follows from inequality 4.8, and
the fifth step holds since α ≥ 1 from the α-smoothness. The sixth step follows from Lemma
4.6.
G
in the last step of the above equation, we obtain the lower bound.
Finally, isolating J˜i−1



Next, we prove restate and prove Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 4.2. Assume the fraction of bad ID is always less than 1/6. Fix any time step t. Let
ρ be the good join rate in the epoch containing t, and let J˜G be the estimate from G OOD JE ST
at time t. Then:
1/(418α4 β 3 )ρ ≤ J˜G ≤ 267α4 β 5 ρ
Proof. Let i ≥ 1 be the iteration number intersecting time step t. Then J˜G in the theorem
G
. Let Ji
statement is the estimate calculated in iteration i − 1; henceforth we refer to it as J˜i−1

be the good join rate over the interval i.
Upper Bound. By Theorem 4.1, we have:
G
J˜i−1
≤ 100α3 β 4 Ji


4
3 4
≤ 100α β
(1 + α)β ρ
3


8
3 4
≤ 100α β
αβ ρ
3

≤ 267α4 β 5 ρ
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The second step follows from Lemma 4.7, and the third step holds since α ≥ 1.
Lower Bound. Similarly, from Theorem 4.1, we have:
Ji
334α3 β 2



1
4
≥
ρ
334α3 β 2
5αβ
ρ
≥
418α4 β 3

G
J˜i−1
≥



The second step follows from Lemma 4.7.

4.3

Empirical Evalution of G OOD JE ST

In this section, we first present an empirical study of the churn in real-world peer-to-peer systems, followed by evaluation of the performance of G OOD JE ST for estimation of good join
rate. All our experiments were written in MATLAB.
Data Sets. Our experiments use data from the following networks:
1. Bitcoin: This dataset records the join and departure events of IDs in the Bitcoin network,
timestamped to the second, over roughly 7 days [178].
2. BitTorrent Debian: This dataset simulates the join and departure events for the BitTorrent
network to obtain a Debian ISO image. We use the Weibull distribution with shape and
scale parameters of 0.38 and 42.4, respectively, from [217].
3. BitTorrent FlatOut: This dataset simulates the join and departure events for the BitTorrent network to obtain obtain a demo of the game Flatout. We use the Weibull distribution
with shape and scale parameters of 0.34 and 21.3, respectively, from [217].
4. BitTorrent RedHat: This dataset simulates the join and departure events for the BitTorrent network to obtain a RedHat ISO image. We use the Weibull distribution with shape
and scale parameters of 0.59 and 41.0, respectively, from [217].
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5. Ethereum: This dataset simulates join and departure events of IDs for the Ethereum
network. Based on a study in [138], we use the Weibull distribution with shape parameter
of 0.52 and scale parameter of 9.8.
6. Gnutella: This dataset simulates join and departure events for the Gnutella network.
Based on a study in [197], we use an exponential distribution with mean of 2.3 hours for
session time, and Poisson distribution with mean of 1 ID per second for the arrival rate.

4.3.1

Evaluating Smoothness Parameters

To evaluate the α, β−smoothness parameters from Section 4.1.1, we performed empirical studies on the join rate of IDs over the real-world data sets mentioned earlier. Recall from Section
4.1.1, we define ρi to be the join of good IDs in epoch i. Since we are interested in only the
join rate of good IDs, we assume all IDs that ever join the system during our simulations in
this section are good.
Experimental Setup. For the Bitcoin network, the system initially consists of 9212 IDs,
and the join and departure events are based off the dataset from [179]. For the remaining networks, we initialize them with 10000 IDs each, and simulate the join and departure events over
100,000 timesteps. We verified our observations over 20 independent runs for these networks.
In order to evaluate the α−smoothness, for each epoch i ≥ 2, the join rate of epoch i,
ρi , was compared to that join rate of the previous epoch, ρi−1 . This was done for each of the
networks, the results are plotted in Figure 4.6(a) for the Bitcoin network, Figure 4.7(a), (c) and
(e) for BitTorrent Debian, BitTorrent RedHat and BitTorrent FlatOut networks, respectively,
and Figure 4.8 (a) and (c) for Ethereum and Gnutella networks, respectively.
Next, we evaluate the β−smoothness for each of the networks. In particular, we test for
each epoch i ≥ 1, that the join rate between two successive joins by good IDs is within some
constant of ρi . This implies that the number of joins in any duration in the epoch is bounded by
a constant as described in Section 4.1.1. To do so, we measured the minimum and maximum
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Figure 4.6: α, β−Smoothness Parameter Evaluation for Bitcoin.

Network
Bitcoin Network
BitTorrent Debian
BitTorrent FlatOut
BitTorrent RedHat
Ethereum Network
Gnutella Network

1/α
0.1
0.2
0.1
0.125
0.5
0.5

α
10
5
10
8
2
2

1/β
0.0005
0.125
0.067
0.067
0.4
0.1

β
30
8
15
15
2
4

Table 4.2: Summary of α, β−Smoothness Evaluation
join rate for epoch i, denoted by ρmin
and ρmax
, respectively, and compared these values against
i
i
ρi .
The result are plotted in Figure 4.6 (b) for the Bitcoin network, Figure 4.7(b), (d) and (f)
for BitTorrent Debian, BitTorrent RedHat and BitTorrent FlatOut Networks, respectively, and
Figure 4.8 (b) and (d) for Ethereum and Gnutella networks, respectively. Table 4.2 lists the
values of constants attached to our assumptions.
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Figure 4.7: α, β−Smoothness Evaluation for BitTorrent: (a) and( b) Debian, (c) and (d)
FlatOut, (e) and (f) RedHat.
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Figure 4.8: α, β−Smoothness Evaluation for: (a) and (b) Ethereum Network, (c) and (d)
Gnutella Network.

4.3.2

Evaluating performance of G OOD JE ST

To evaluate the performance of G OOD JE ST, we conducted empirical studies on the data sets
discussed at the beginning of Section 4.3. Recall from Section 4.1.2, we define ρi as the good
join rate over interval i. We are interested in comparing the estimated join rate obtained using
G OOD JE ST over an interval with the actual join rate of good IDs over that interval.
To this end, we conduct two set of experiments. In the first set, we compare the estimated
join rate for an interval i with the good join rate over interval i + 1. The second set of experiments measures the ratio of the estimated good join rate in interval i to the good join rate in
interval i + 1 for various values of the population invariant. Let J˜iG denote the estimated good
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of J̃G
i and ρi+1 for Bitcoin Network.
join rate at the end of interval i, and ρi denote the good join rate over interval i.
Note that we always maintain the population invariant in our system using ERGO (See
Chapter 5). We do not go into the details of this aspect as it is orthogonal to the empirical study
of G OOD JE ST.
Comparing J̃G
i and ρi+1 : Our basic experimental setup is the same as in Section 4.3.1 for the
various data sets. Along with the churn based on the data sets for the various systems, we add
bad IDs at a constant join rate to simulate three specific scenarios, where we vary the resource
budget of the adversary per unit time, T = 1, 10 and 100. We maintain the fraction of bad IDs
in the system to always less than 1/6.
We report our results in Figure 4.9, Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 for the Bitcoin network,
BitTorrent networks, and Ethereum and Gnutella networks, respectively. Over the three scenarios our estimate of the good join rate, J˜iG differs from the good join rate, ρi+1 by at most a
multiplicative factor of 2.32 as can be seen in Figure 4.9(c) for the Bitcoin network. Similarly,
for the BitTorrent Debian, FlatOut and RedHat networks the estimate was at most a multiplicative factor of 1.45, 1.63 and 1.41, respectively of the good join rate over all simulations. Finally,
for the Ethereum and Gnutella networks, this factor was at most 1.35 and 1.69, respectively.
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of J̃G
i and ρi+1 for BitTorrent networks.
Effect of fraction of bad IDs on J̃G
i /ρi+1 : Our experimental setup is the same as that from
previous setup from this section with the following alterations. We simulate three scenarios
based on three distinct adversary resource budgets, T = 0, 1/100 and 10000 and vary the
fraction of bad IDs in the system at any time to be ∈ {1/1500, 1/375, 1/94, 1/24, 1/6}. We
measure the

J˜iG
ρi+1

for all intervals i ≥ 1 over the entire simulation, and plot the average ratio

along with error bars for each of the six systems.
We report our results in Figure 4.12. These plots demonstrate the robustness of our estimate
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of J̃G
i and ρi+1 for Ethereum and Gnutella Network.
to adversarial budget. In the absence of an attack i.e., T = 0, our estimate is within a constant
factor in the range (0.08, 1.2). This variation can be attributed the α, β− smoothness of churn.
Moreover, even when the adversarial budget per unit time is quite high, our estimate is off by
a constant factor in the range (0.08, 4) over all the systems at any time.

4.3.3

Comparison with Theoretical Results

We summarize our empirical results in Table 4.3, and compare them against the asymptotic
guarantees from our Theoretical results from Theorem 4.2.
We use the α and β-smoothness parameters for the six networks from Table 4.2. Note that
for each parameter, we take the minimum from the recorded values. For the empirical results,
we record the maximum value of J˜iG /ρi+1 over all intervals i ≥ 1 for a system as J˜G /ρ from
Section 4.3.2 (See Figure 4.12).
For each of the six network, it is evident from Table 4.3 that our theoretical bounds on the
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Network
Bitcoin Network
BitTorrent Debian
BitTorrent RedHat
BitTorrent FlatOut
Ethereum Network
Gnutella Network

α
10
5
8
10
2
2

β
30
8
15
15
2
4

α4 β 5
243 × 109
2.04 × 107
3.11 × 109
7.6 × 109
512
16384

1/α4 β 3
3.7 × 10−9
3.46 × 10−6
7.8 × 10−8
1.9 × 10−8
0.0078125
0.00098

J˜G /ρ
2.32
1.45
1.63
1.41
1.35
1.69

Table 4.3: Comparison between Empirical and Theoretical results.

estimated good join rate with respect to the good join rate hold in practice over real. Note that
we look at the asymptotic functions for the theoretical results, which are pessimistic at best and
so, we have the huge gap between the theoretical and empirical results.

4.4

Conclusion

In this Chapter, we proposed a protocol - G OOD JE ST that estimates the join rate of good IDs
in a distributed system, given that the fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than
1/6. We obtained theoretical bounds on the quality of the estimate thus obtained, as well as
empirically verified them through simulations on popular real-world systems.
A concrete direction for future work is to employ this protocol in Sybil Defense mechanism to detect an attack. In Chapter 3, we presented a resource burning based Sybil Defense
Technique that has a resource cost that grows linearly with the resource cost to the attacker.
This technique was based on the need to solve system wide resource burning challenges when
the system membership has seen sufficient turn over.
Armed with the constant factor estimate of good join rate through G OOD JE ST, what if we
could thrawt the attack by requiring the adversary to incur a higher resource cost for adding
bad IDs? We discuss one such approach in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 5
E RGO: An Asymmetric Sybil Defense

“If you can not win,
make the enemy pay a steep price for victory.”
Carlson Gracie

Resource burning is a popular Sybil Defense mechanism against a resource-bounded adversary
as discussed in Chapter 3. Unfortunately, these mechanisms require the honest participants to
expend as much resources as the attacker.
In this chapter, we present an algorithm - ERGO, where the honest participants incur a
resource cost that grows sub-linearly (hence, asymmetric) with the resource cost to the attacker.
In particular, suppose J G is the join rate of the good IDs over the lifetime of the system and
T is the average resource cost to the adversary per unit time, then the average resource cost to
√
the good IDs is O(J G + T J G ). This cost closely hinges the accuracy of the estimated good
join rate obtained using G OOD JE ST from Chapter 4, and is guaranteed even under high churn
subject to the constraints on churn of good IDs from Section 4.1.1.
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Organization of this chapter. We begin with a description of our contribution in Section 5.1.
Next, we describe our algorithm in Section 5.2 and prove the asymmetric resource costs for our
algorthm. Then, we prove a lower bound on resource cost for a class of algorithms that require
periodic system wide tests. Finally, we discuss a number of applications of Sybil Defense
algorithms proposed in this dissertation in Section 5.4.

5.1

Our Contribution

We define two possibly unknown parameters α, β ≥ 1 that characterize the join rate of good
IDs for a system (see Section 4.1.1 for details).
Let J G denote the good spend rate, which is the cost over all good IDs per second, where
this cost is due to resource burning. Similarly, let T denote the adversary’s spend rate; that is,
the cost over all bad IDs per second. Recall from Section 2.2.5 that our system always consists
of at least n0 good IDs. Then, our resource burning based Sybil defense algorithm, E RGO,
leverages G OOD JE ST from Chapter 4 to provide the following guarantees with probability
1 − O(1/n0 ):

Theorem 5.1. For κ ≤ 1/18, E RGO ensures that the good spend rate is


p
O α11/2 β 7 T (J + 1) + α11 β 14 J and maintains the following invariants:
• Population Goal: The fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than 1/6.
• Committee Goal: There is always a committee, of size logarithmic in the current
system size, known to all good IDs, that contains less than a 1/2-fraction of bad IDs.

Additionally, we obtain a lower bound for a class of algorithms that require periodic system
wide resource burning in order to maintain a constant fraction of bad IDs. We state this result
below:
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Theorem 5.2. Suppose an algorithm satisfies conditions B1-B3, then there exists an
√
adversarial strategy that forces the algorithm to spend at a rate of Ω( T J G + J G ),
where J G is the good ID join rate, and T is the algorithmic spending rate, both taken
over the iteration.

5.2

ERGO - A Sybil Defense using G OOD JE ST

In this section, we describe an asymmetric Sybil defense algorithm - E RGO, for permissionless
system with high churn. We begin with the algorithm overview in Section 5.2.1. Next, we
develop intuition for why this method yields the asymmetric property, and how it relies on a
robust estimate of the good join rate obtained using G OOD JE ST.
Table 5.1: A summary of additional notation used for E RGO.
Used in Model and Algorithm
Symbol
n0
S0
J˜G
Si
JG
T
α, β
TI
JI

Description
lower bound on number of good Ids in the system at any time
Set of IDs in the system returned by G EN ID
Current estimate of the good join rate
Set of IDs in the system at the end of iteration i
Average good join rate over the lifetime of the system
Adversarial spend rate over the lifetime of the system
Smoothness parameters on the join and departure of good IDs
Cost to the adversary for solving puzzles whose solutions are used in any
iteration of I divided by total length of those iterations.
Number of good IDs that join over the iterations in I divided by total length
of those iterations.
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5.2.1

Overview of ERGO

We describe E RGO while referencing its pseudocode in Figure 5.1. Execution occurs over
disjoint periods of time called iterations, and each iteration i ≥ 1 consists of Steps 1 and 2.
The server initializes the system with an honest majority by issuing every ID a 1-difficult
challenge.
In Step 1, each joining ID must solve a challenge of difficulty 1 plus the number of IDs that
have joined within the last 1/J˜G seconds, where J˜G is the current estimate of the join rate of
good IDs obtained using G OOD JE ST. This challenge difficulty approximates the ratio of the
total join rate over the good join rate, which motivates the name E NTIRE

BY

R ATE

OF

G OOD.

This algorithm always ensures provable bounds on the good spend as a function of both good
churn and the adversary’s spend rate (see Section 5.2.3).

E NTIRE BY R ATE OF G OOD (E RGO)
The committee runs the following code via State Machine Replication. It sends out
all RB-challenges and information via D IFFUSE.
S0 ← set of IDs returned by G EN ID.
J˜G is maintained by running G OOD JE ST in parallel to the following code.
For each iteration i = 1, . . ., do:
1. Each joining ID is assigned a RB-challenge of difficulty equal to 1 plus the number of IDs that have joined in the last 1/J˜G seconds of the current iteration.
2. When number of joining and departing IDs in this iteration exceeds |Si−1 |/11,
Purge:
(a) Issue all IDs a RB-challenge of difficulty 1.
(b) Si ← set of IDs solving this challenge within 1 round.
(c) Select a new committee of size C log n0 from Si and Diffuses its members.
Figure 5.1: Pseudocode for E RGO.
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Figure 5.2: Illustration for an E RGO iteration. Here, na denotes the number of Ids that join and
nd denotes the number of good IDs that depart over the current iteration.

Step 1 lasts until the earliest point in time when the number of IDs that join and depart in
iteration i is at least (1/11)|Si−1 |. When Step 1 ends, the server performs a purge by issuing a
challenge of difficulty 1 to all the IDs in the system, in Step 2(a). In Step 2(b), each ID must
solve the challenge within 1 round or be removed from the system. No IDs are allowed to join
during a purge.
When Step 1 ends, a purge is performed by the committee by issuing an RB-Challenge of
difficulty 1 via D IFFUSE in Step 2(a). In Step 2(b), each ID must respond with a valid solution
within 1 round. The committee removes unresponsive or late-responding IDs from its whitelist,
which is maintained using State Machine Replication.
The current committee then elects a new committee as discussed in Section 3.4.1. The
committee uses D IFFUSE to inform Si that the selected IDs are the new committee for iteration
i + 1. All messages from committee members are verified via public key digital signatures.
This only requires that all IDs know the digital signatures of the good committee members,
which make up more than half of the committee. This information is diffused in Step 2(c); we
omit this detail in Figure 5.1 for ease of presentation.
Initialization. The system is initialized with an honest majority and a committee consisting
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of an honest majority of size C log n0 by solving the G EN ID problem as described in Section 3.4.1.

5.2.2

Developing Intuition for the Asymmetric Property

Initially, the asymmetric result may be surprising, and so we offer intuition for this. Consider
iteration i. In the absence of an attack, the entrance cost should be proportional to the good join
rate. This is indeed the case since the puzzle difficulty is O(1) corresponding to the number of
(good) IDs that join within the last 1/J˜iG ≈ 1/JiG seconds.
In contrast, if there is a large attack, then the entrance-cost function imposes a significant
cost on the adversary. Consider the case where a batch of many bad IDs is rapidly injected
into the system. This drives up the entrance cost since the number of IDs joining within 1/J˜iG
seconds increases.
More precisely, assume the adversary’s spending rate is T = ξJiall , where ξ is the average
entrance cost, and Jiall is the join rate for all IDs. For the good IDs, the spending rate due to
the entrance cost is ξJi . Additionally, the spending rate to good IDs due to the purge cost is
roughly Jiall , since the number of good IDs in the system is at most 11 times the number of
join and departures from the system in this iteration. Setting the entrance cost and purge cost
to good IDs to be equal, and solving for ξ, we get ξ to be roughly Jiall /Ji ; in other words, the
number of IDs that have joined over the last 1/Ji seconds. This is the entrance cost function
that best balances entrance and purge costs, and so is used in E RGO.
Next, we look at the asymmetric resource cost property. Spending rate of good IDs due to
the entrance costs and purge costs is:
q
p
p
ξJi + Ji ≤ 2Ji = 2 (Jiall )2 = 2 Jiall ξJi = 2 Ji T ,
all

all

where the first inequality holds by our setting of ξ, the third step since Jiall = ξJi , and the final
step since T = ξJiall . This informal analysis shows how knowledge of the good join rate can be
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Figure 5.3: Relation between Iteration, Interval, Epoch and sub-interval.
used to reduce the algorithmic spend rate.

5.2.3

Proof of Theorem 5.1

Here, we prove that the fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than 1/6.
For any iteration i, we let Bi and Gi respectively denote the number of bad and good IDs
in the system at the end of iteration i, and we let Ni = Bi + Gi .
Lemma 5.1. For all iterations i ≥ 0, Bi ≤ Ni /(18(1 − )).
Proof. Recall that the server issues all IDs a 1-difficult challenge prior to iteration 0. This
ensures the fraction of bad IDs at the end of iteration 0 is at most κ ≤ 1/18. Thus, our lemma
statement holds for i = 0.
Next, note that in Step 2 ending each iteration i > 0, the server issues a 1-difficult challenge
to all IDs. Let Nis be the number of IDs in the system at the beginning of the purge. Recall
from Section 2.2.5 that at most at most an −fraction of good IDs can depart in a round. Thus,
Ni ≥ Nis − Nis = (1 − )Nis .
Since the adversary holds at most a κ ≤ 1/18 fraction of the resource, the number of bad
IDs in the system at the end of iteration i is at most Nis /18 ≤ Ni /(18(1 − )).



Lemma 5.2. The fraction of bad IDs is always less than 1/6.
Proof. Fix some iteration i > 0. Let nai , bai denote the total, and bad IDs that arrive over
iteration i. Let ndi , gid denote the total, and good IDs that depart over iteration i.
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Recall that an iteration ends when nai + ndi ≥ |Si−1 |/11 where |Si−1 | = Ni−1 . Thus, at any
point during the iteration, we have:

bai + gid ≤ nai + ndi
≤ Ni−1 /11

(5.1)

We are interested in the maximum value of the ratio of bad IDs to the total IDs at any point
during the iteration. Thus, we pessimistically assume all additions of bad IDs and removals of
good IDs come first in the iteration. This leads us to examine the maximum value of the ratio
over the iteration:
Ni−1 /(18(1 − )) + bai
Bi−1 + bai
≤
Ni−1 + bai − gid
Ni−1 + bai − gid
where the above inequality follows from Lemma 5.1. By Equation 5.1, we have gid ≤ Ni−1 /11−
bai . Thus, we have:
Ni−1 /(18(1 − )) + bai
Ni−1 /(18(1 − )) + bai
≤
Ni−1 + bai − (Ni−1 /11 − bai )
Ni−1 + bai − gid


1 Ni−1 /(3(1 − )) + 6bai
=
6
10Ni−1 /11 + 2bai


6bai
1 Ni−1 /(3(1 − ))
+
≤
6
(10/11)Ni−1
(10/11)Ni−1


1
11
(6/11)Ni−1
≤
+
6 30(1 − ) (10/11)Ni−1


1
11
(6/11)Ni−1
<
+
6 30(11/12) (10/11)Ni−1
= 1/6

The fourth step follows since bai ≤ Ni−1 /11 by Equation 5.1 and the fifth step holds for  <
1/12.



In the remainder of this section, we prove our resource costs. For analysis, we partition
˜ sub-intervals of length at most 1/J,
˜ where J˜ is the estimate
every interval of length ` into d`Je
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of the good join rate used in the interval. Then we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 5.3. Fix a sub-interval j. Let Tj be the total spending of the adversary in sub-interval
p
j. Then, the number of bad IDs that join in this sub-interval is at most 2Tj .
Proof. Fix a sub-interval j. Let bj be the number of bad IDs joining in the sub-interval. Then,
pessimistically assuming all bad IDs join before any good IDs in a sub-interval, and using the
entrance difficulty setting from Step 1 of our algorithm, we get:

Tj ≥

bj
X

i≥

i=1

b2j
2


On solving the above, we obtain the result.
Lemma 5.4. An iteration intersects at most two intervals.

Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume an iteration starts at time t0 and intersects three
or more intervals. Then, there will be at least one interval that is completely contained within
the iteration. Let the first such interval start at time t1 ≥ t0 and end at time t2 > t1 . Let na (nd )
be the number of IDs that join (depart) during this interval. Then:
5
5
n + n ≥ |St1 ⊕ St2 | ≥ |St2 | ≥
8
8
a

d




10
25
|St0 | = |St0 |
11
44

The second step follows from the definition of an interval. The third step holds since during
an iteration, at most |St0 |/11 IDs can depart, and so the system size at time t2 is at least

10
|S |.
11 t0

But the number of joins and departures during the iteration is at most |St0 |/11 by the definition of an iteration. Thus, there is a contradiction, and so there can be at most two intervals


intersecting the iteration.

Lemma 5.5. Fix an iteration. Let L be the length, and J be the good join rate in this iteration.
Then, the number of sub-intervals in the iteration is at most 100α3 β 6 (J L + 10).
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Proof. From Lemma 5.4, an iteration intersects at most two intervals. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let ti
denote time at which the ith interval intersects the iteration for the first time; JiG be the good
join rate in the ith overlapping interval and J˜iG be the estimated good join rate set at the end of
interval i. If there is only one interval intersected, let J1G = J2G , J˜1G = J˜2G and t1 = t2 .
By Lemma 4.1, an interval intersects at most two epochs. So, let ρ1 and ρ2 be the join rate
of good IDs over the two epochs that intersect with interval 1, and let `1 and `2 , respectively be
the lengths of their intersection, with `2 = 0 if there is only one such epoch. Similarly, let ρ3
and ρ4 be the join rate of good IDs over the two epochs that intersect with interval 2, and let `3
and `4 , respectively be the lengths of their intersection, with `4 = 0 if there is only one such
epoch. Then, from the β−smoothness property, we have:

JL ≥


4 
X
ρk `k
k=1

β

≥

4 
X
ρk `k
k=1


4
1X
−1 =
ρk `k − 4
β
β k=1

(5.2)

Next, let t0 denote the time at the start of the iteration. Then, the number of sub-intervals in the
iteration is:
2
X

d(ti − ti−1 )J˜i−1 e ≤ 100α3 β 4

i=1

2
X

(ti − ti−1 )JiG + 1



i=1

!

≤ 100α3 β 4

4
X
dβρk `k e
2+

< 100α3 β 4

4
X
2+
(βρk `k + 1)

k=1

≤ 100α3 β 4

k=1
4
X

2β +

= 100α3 β 5 2 +

!
(βρk `k + β)

k=1
4
X

ρk `k + 4

k=1

≤ 100α3 β 5 (β(J L + 4) + 6)
≤ 100α3 β 6 (J L + 10)
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!

!

In the above, the first step follows from Theorem 4.1; the second step follows from β-smoothness;
the fourth step holds since β ≥ 1; the sixth step from inequality 5.2 by isolating the value of
P4

k=1 ρk `k ; and the last step holds since β ≥ 1.
Lemma 5.6. The number of good IDs that join over any sub-interval is at most 418α4 β 4 + 1.
Proof. Let J˜G be the estimate of the good join rate in the interval containing the sub-interval,
and let ρ be the good join rate over the epoch that contains the sub-interval. Then, by βsmoothness, the number of good IDs that join over the sub-interval is at most:
 

  
 
1
1
1
4 3
≤ βρ
+ 1 ≤ βρ 418α β
+ 1 ≤ 418α4 β 4 + 1
βρ
G
G
˜
˜
ρ
J
J


In the above, the third step follows from Theorem 4.2.

In the remainder of the proofs, we make use of the following algebraic fact that follows
from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality [118]:
Lemma 5.7. Suppose that u and v are x-dimensional vectors in Euclidean space. For all
x ≥ 1:
x
X
√

v
uX
x
X
u x
t
uj vj ≤
uj
vj
j=1

j=1

j=1

Proof. Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have:
n
X
√
uj vj

!2
≤

j=1

n
X
j=1

uj

n
X

vj

j=1

Taking the square-root of both sides, we obtain the desired result.



Lemma 5.8. Fix an iteration. Let L be the length of this iteration, J be the join rate of good
IDs in the iteration, and T be the total resource cost to the adversary during the iteration.
Then, the total entrance cost to good IDs during the iteration is:


p
O α11/2 β 7 (J L + 1)T + α11 β 14 J L .
112

Proof. Fix a sub-interval j of the iteration. Let gj (bj ) be the number of good (bad) IDs that join
in sub-interval j, and Tj be the resource cost to the adversary in sub-interval j. Pessimistically
assuming all good IDs enter at the end of the sub-interval, the total entrance cost to good IDs
in sub-interval j is at most:
gj
X

(bj + k) ≤ gj


p
2Tj + gj

k=1

p

4 4
≤ (418α β + 1)
2Tj + 418α β + 1
4 4

The first step follows from Lemma 5.3, and the second step follows from Lemma 5.6.
Suppose the iteration consists of t sub-intervals. Then, the total entrance cost to the good IDs
in the iteration is:
t 
X

418α4 β 4 + 1


 p
2Tj + (418α4 β 4 + 1)

j=1

=

t
p
X
2Tj + (418α4 β 4 + 1)2 t
418α β + 1
4 4

j=1

√

≤ (418α4 β 4 + 1) 2tT + (418α4 β 4 + 1)2 t
p
≤ (418α4 β 4 + 1) (200α3 β 6 (J L + 10)) T +
(418α4 β 4 + 1)2 (100α3 β 6 (J L + 10))


p
= O α11/2 β 7 (J L + 1)T + α11 β 14 J L

The second step follows from Lemma 5.7 and by noting that

Pt

j=1

Tj = T . The third step

follows from using Lemma 5.5 to upperbound t.



Lemma 5.9. Fix an iteration. Suppose L is the length of the iteration, D is the rate of departure
over this iteration, J is the join rate of good IDs over the iteration, and T is the total resource
cost to the adversary during the iteration. Then, the total spending to good IDs in this iteration
is:


p
O DL + α11/2 β 7 (J L + 1)T + α11 β 14 J L .
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Proof. Fix an iteration i. Let Si−1 be the set of IDs in the system at beginning of iteration i
and Gi be the set of good IDs at the end of iteration i. Let t be the number of sub-intervals in
the iteration; g and b be the number of good and bad IDs that join in the iteration; and d be the
total number of IDs that depart in the iteration. For any sub-interval j of the iteration, let Tj be
the resource cost to the adversary in that sub-interval.
Each good ID solves a challenge of difficulty 1 at the end of the iteration. Hence the
resource cost to good IDs due to the purge at the end of the iteration is at most:
12
|Si−1 |
11
12
≤
(11 (d + b + g))
11
!
t
X
p
2Tj + J L
≤ 12 DL +

|Gi | ≤

j=1

v

u
t
u X
≤ 12 DL + t2t
Tj + J L


j=1



≤ 12 DL +

p


200α3 β 6 (J L + 10)T + J L

In the above, the first step follows since over an iteration the number of good IDs in the system
can increase by at most |Si−1 |/11. The second step follows since the number of ID joins and
deletions in an iteration, i.e. d + b + g is at least |Si−1 |/11 (Step 2 of E RGO). The third step
follows by upper bounding b using Lemma 5.3 to bound the number of bad IDs joining over all
sub-intervals; and noting that g = J L and b = DL. The fourth step follows from Lemma 5.7.
P
The last step follows from Lemma 5.5 and substituting tj=1 Tj = T .
Finally, using Lemma 5.8, for some constant c > 1 we have that the entrance costs plus the
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purge cost paid by all good IDs is:


p
c α11/2 β 7 (J L + 1)T + α11 β 14 J L


p
+12 DL + 200α3 β 6 (J L + 10)T + J L


p
= O DL + α11/2 β 7 (J L + 1)T + α11 β 14 J L



Hence, proved.

Consider a long-lived system which undergoes an attack over some limited number of consecutive iterations. A guarantee over this period of attack, rather than over the lifetime of the
system, may be of value to practitioners. We provide this in Lemma 5.10 below as prelude to
the proof to Theorem 2.
Let I be any subset of contiguous iterations containing all iterations numbered between x
and y inclusive, for any x and y, 1 ≤ x ≤ y. Let δ(I) be |Sx − Sy |; and let ∆(I) be δ(I)
divided by the length of I. Let TI be the adversarial spend rates over I; and let JI be the good
join rate over I. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5.10. For any subset of contiguous iterations, I, starting after iteration 1, the good
spend rate over I is:


p
O ∆(I) + α11/2 β 7 (JI + 1)TI + α11 β 14 JI .

Proof. For all iterations i ∈ I, let Li be the length of iteration i, Ji be the good join rate
in iteration i, Di be the good departure rate in iteration i, and Ti be the adversarial resource
spending rate in iteration i. Then, by Lemma 5.9, for some constant c, we have the total
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spending of the good IDs over all iterations in I is at most:

X 
p
c Di Li + α11/2 β 7 (Ji Li + 1)Ti Li + α11 β 14 Ji Li
i∈I

!
≤c

X
i∈I

Xp
X
Di Li + α11/2 β 7
(Ji Li + 1)Ti Li + α11 β 14
Ji Li
i∈I

i∈I

where the above inequality follows from Lemma 5.7. Dividing this inequality by

P

i∈I

Li , we

get:
s P
P
P
P
D
L
Ti Li
i
i
i∈I
i∈I 1
i∈I Ji Li
11/2 7
P
Pi∈I
c P
+ cα β
+P
i∈I Li
i∈I Li
i∈I Li
i∈I Li
P
Ji Li
+cα11 β 14 Pi∈I
i∈I Li


p
= O ∆(I) + α11/2 β 7 (JI + 1)TI + α11 β 14 JI


This shows that the spending rate for the algorithm remains small, even when focusing on just
a subset of iterations. To understand why this is important, consider a long-lived system which
suffers a single, significant attack for a small number of iterations, after which there are no
more attacks. The cost of any defense may be small when amortized over the lifetime of the
system, but this does not give a useful guarantee on performance during the time of attack.
In the next lemma, we prove the committee invariant.
Lemma 5.11. For any iteration i > 0 and C ≥ 3300(γ + 1), with high probability, E RGO
maintains a committee of size at least (7/9)(C log |Si |), which consists of an honest majority.
Proof. For iteration i = 0, committee goal holds true from the use of G EN ID to initialize the
system (recall from Section 5.2.1); for details, see Lemma 6 of [18]).
Fix an iteration i > 0. Recall that a new committee is elected by the existing committee at
the end of an iteration by selecting C log |Si | IDs independently and uniformly at random from
the set Si , for a sufficiently large constant C > 0, defined concretely later in this proof. Let XG
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(XB ) be random variables for the number of good (bad) IDs, respectively elected to the new
committee at the end of iteration i. Then:
|Gi |
C log |Si |
|Si |


|Bi |
= 1−
C log |Si |
|Si |


1
≥ 1−
C log |Si |
18(1 − )


1
C log |Si |
≥ 1−
18(11/12)
31
= C log |Si |
33

E[XG ] =

(5.3)

In the above, the third step follows from Lemma 5.1 and fourth step holds for  < 1/12.
Similarly, the expected number of bad IDs elected into the committee is:

E[XB ] =

|Bi |
1
C log |Si | ≤
C log |Si |
|Si |
18(1 − )

(5.4)

Next, by Chernoff bounds [165], for any constant 0 < δ < 1:




31δ 2 C log |Si |
31
P r XG ≤ (1 − δ) C log |Si | ≤ exp −
33
66
= |Si |−

31Cδ 2
66

−(γ+1)

≤ n0

The last step holds for all C ≥

66(γ+1)
.
31δ 2

For δ = 13/310, we obtain that the number of good

IDs in the committee is at least (9/10)C log |Si | w.h.p.

117

Again:



2
2δ 2 C log |Si |
P r XB ≥ (1 + δ) C log |Si | ≤ exp −
33
99


= |Si |−

2Cδ 2
99

−(γ+1)

≤ n0

The last step holds for all C ≥

99(γ+1)
.
2δ 2

For δ = 13/20, we obtain that the number of bad IDs

in the committee is at most (1/10)C log |Si | w.h.p.
Next, let Yg be the number of good IDs that depart from the committee during iteration i.
Note that the number of good departures in iteration i is at most |Si−1 |/11. Then, since each
departing good ID is selected independently and uniformly at random (See Section 2.2.5), we
obtain:


|Si−1 | C log |Si |
E[Yg ] ≤
11
|Si |


11|Si |/10 C log |Si |
≤
11
|Si |
C
=
log |Si |
10

(5.5)

In the above, the second step holds since over an iteration at most |Si−1 |/11 IDs can depart, so
|Si | ≥ |Si−1 | − |Si−1 |/11 = 10|Si−1 |/11.
Again, using Chernoff bounds, we have:

 02

δ C
C
log |Si |
P r Yg ≥ (1 + δ ) log |Si | ≤ exp −
10
30


0

= |Si |−δ

02 C/30

−(γ+1)

≤ n0

where the first step holds for any constant 0 < δ 0 < 1 and the last step holds for all C ≥
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30(γ+1)
.
δ 02

Thus, for δ 0 = 1/9, the minimum number of good IDs in the committee is greater than

(9/10)C log |Si | − (1/9)C log |Si | = (71/90)C log |Si | w.h.p.
Note that the number of IDs in the committee is minimized when all the bad IDs in the
committee depart along with the departures by the good IDs. Thus, at any time during the
iteration, the committee consists of at least:

C log |Si | − (1/10)C log |Si | − (1/9)C log |Si |
=(71/90)C log |Si | > (7/9)C log |Si |

Next, we bound the fraction of good IDs in the committee at any time during the iteration.
Note that this is minimized if only good IDs depart from the committee. Then, the fraction of
good IDs in the committee is at least
7
(71/90)C log |Si |
>
C log |Si | − (1/9)C log |Si |
8
Finally, we use a union bound over nγ0 iterations to show that the committee invariant is
maintained through out the lifetime of the system, with high probability.



We restate and prove Theorem 5.1.

p
Theorem 5.1. For κ ≤ 1/18, E RGO has a good spend rate of O α β T (J + 1) + J and


6 4

maintains the following in variants:
• Population Goal: The fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than 1/6.
• Committee Goal: There is always a committee, of size logarithmic in the current system
size, known to all good IDs, that contains less than a 1/2-fraction of bad IDs.
Proof. The resource cost bound follows immediately from Lemma 5.10 by noting that ∆(I) =
0 when I is all iterations, since the system is initially empty. The population invariant follows
from Lemma 5.2 and the committee invariant follows from 5.11, which completes the proof.
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5.3

Lower Bound

In this section, we provide a lower bound that applies to the class of algorithms which have the
attributes B1 − B3 described below.
• B1. Each new ID must pay an entrance fee in order to join the system and this is defined
by a cost function f , which takes as inputs the good join rate and the adversarial join
rate.
• B2. The algorithm executes over iterations, delineated by when the condition nai + ndi ≥
δ |Si | holds, for any fixed positive δ.
• B3. At the end of each iteration, each ID must pay Ω(1) to remain in the system.
We emphasize that B1 captures any cost function where the cost during an iteration depends only on the good join rate and the bad join rate. Our analysis of GMC OM makes this
assumption since its cost function depends on estimates of the good join rate and the total, i.e.
the good-ID join rate plus the bad-ID join rate. With regard to B2 and B3, recall that we wish
to preserve the population invariant (i.e., a majority of good IDs). It is hard to imagine an
algorithm that preserves this invariant without a computational test being imposed on all IDs
whenever the system membership changes significantly.

Figure 5.4: Illustration for lower bound attributes B1-B3.
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5.3.1

Proof of Theorem 5.2

Restating in terms of the conditions above, we have the following result.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose an algorithm satisfies conditions B1-B3, then there exists an adversar√
ial strategy that forces the algorithm to spend at a rate of Ω( T J + J), where J is the good
ID join rate, and T is the algorithmic spending rate, both taken over the iteration.
Proof. Fix an iteration i. Let n be the number of IDs in the system at the start of iteration i.
The adversarial will have bad IDs join uniformly at the maximum rate possible, and then have
the bad IDs drop out during the purge. In particular, let T̂ be the rate at which bad IDs join,
and let f (T̂ , J) be the algorithm’s entrance cost function based on T̂ and J; we pessimistically
assume that the algorithm knows both T̂ and J exactly. Then T̂ = T /f (T̂ , J).
We first calculate the algorithmic spending rate due to purge puzzle costs in iteration i.
Since the iteration ends after Θ(n) join events (B2), and since each purge puzzle has a cost
of Ω(1) (B3), the rate of spending on purge puzzles is asymptotically at least equal to the rate
at which good and bad IDs join the system. Thus, the spending rate due to purge puzzles is
Ω(J + T̂ ).
We now have two cases:
Case 1: f (T̂ , J ) ≤ T̂ /J . In this case, we have:

T̂ ≥ Jf (T̂ , J) = JT /T̂

where the above equality holds since f (T̂ , J) = T /T̂ . Solving for T̂ we get:

T̂ ≥

√
TJ

Since the algorithmic spending rate due to purge costs is Ω(T̂ + J), the total algorithmic
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spending rate is:

Ω(T̂ + J) = Ω

√

T J +J

Case 2: f (T̂ , J ) > T̂ /J . In this case, we have:

T̂ < J f (T̂ , J) = JT /T̂

where the above equality follows since f (T̂ , J) = T /T̂ . Solving for T̂ , we get:
√
T̂ <

T J.

The spending rate for the algorithm due to entrance costs is Ω(J f (T̂ , J)). Adding in the
spending rate for purge costs of Ω(J + T̂ ), we get that the total spend rate of the algorithm is:

Ω(J f (T̂ , J) + (J + T̂ )) = Ω(J T /T̂ + (J + T̂ ))
√

= Ω
T J +J



Hence, proved.

5.4

Applications

In this section, we discuss applications of our Sybil defense protocols.

5.4.1

Scalable Byzantine Consensus

The problem of Byzantine Consensus (BC) was introduced by Lamport, Shostak and Pease
[145]; this problem is also referred to as Byzantine Agreement. There are n IDs, of which
some hidden subset are bad. These bad IDs may deviate from a prescribed algorithm in an
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arbitrary way. The remaining IDs are good, and will follow our algorithm faithfully. Each
good ID has an initial input bit. The goal is for (1) all good IDs to decide on the same bit; and
(2) this bit to equal the input bit of at least one good ID.
Byzantine consensus enables the creation of a reliable system from unreliable components. Therefore, it is not surprising that BC is used in areas as diverse as: maintaining
blockchains [49, 61, 88, 105]; trustworthy computing [52, 55, 56, 63, 65, 144]; P2P networks [6,
183]; and databases [169, 191, 257]
A major shortcoming of current algorithms for BC is that they do not scale. For example, Rhea et al. write: “Unfortunately, Byzantine agreement requires a number of messages
quadratic in the number of participants, so it is infeasible for use in synchronizing a large number of replicas” [194] (see also [68], [62]). This quadratic message cost hinders deployment in
modern systems where the number of participants can be large.
Recent results reduce the total number of messages to Õ(n) [51]. However, this algorithm
is not load balanced i.e., some nodes pay a higher communication cost.
How Our Result Applies. Our result allows us to reduce the communication cost for BC.
The bad IDs are again incarnated as a single adversary with equivalent resources. Each good
participant has a single ID, while the adversary is not constrained in its creation of IDs.
The members of the committee execute any BC algorithm that requires a quadratic number of messages; this implies a message cost of O(log2 n) generated by the committee. The
committee then diffuses the signed consensus value to all other IDs. On receiving these agreed
upon values from their committee members, the non-committee members take the majority of
these verified consensus values. Since committee has a majority of good members, this results
in all IDs holding the correct consensus value.
In this way, we are able to solve traditional BC with Õ(n) number of messages in total.
Additionally, we can solve a dynamic version of BC, where IDs are joining and leaving, and
can do so with resource cost to the good IDs that is commensurate with the cost incurred by
the adversary.
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5.5

Conclusion

In this Chapter, we presented an asymmetric resource burning based Sybil defense protocol E RGO. This protocol has resource burning rate to good IDs that grows slowly with the join rate
of good IDs and the resource cost to the attacker. Additionally, we discussed a matching lower
bound for the class of algorithms that require periodic system wide resource burning to limit
the fraction of bad IDs in the system. Finally, we presented applications of our protocol in to
solve popular distributed system problems.
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Chapter 6
Empirical Evaluation

“It doesn’t matter how beautiful your theory is,
it doesn’t matter how smart you are.
If it doesn’t agree with experiment, it’s wrong.”
-Richard P. Feynman

Over the course of this dissertation, we have presented numerous resource burning based Sybil
defense protocols for permissionless systems. We have obtained asymptotic guarantees on the
resource cost to the honest participants as a function of the cost to the attacker and the join rate
of IDs, while maintaining a constant fraction of bad ID in the system. Specifically, let J G be
the join rate of the good IDs and T be the resource spending rate of the adversary. Then, the
resource spending rate of the protocols from Chapter 3 is O(T + J G ), and those from Chapter
√
5 is O( T J G + J G ).
In this Chapter, we evaluate the performance of our protocols over six real-world networks,
namely: Bitcoin, BitTorrent Debian, BitTorrent FlatOut, BitTorrent RedHat, Ethereum and
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Gnutella. We simulate our algorithms each of these networks and observe the resource cost to
the good IDs as a function of the cost to the attacker.
Organization of the chapter. We begin with a description of the various datasets used in our
experiments in Section 6.1. Next, we simulate C OM and E RGO on our datasets to study the
resource cost in the absence of an attack in Section 6.2, and in case of a bursty attack in Section
6.3. Next, we compare the performance of our algorithms with two state-of-the-art protocols,
namely: SybilControl and REMP, in Section 6.4. Finally, we propose a number of heuritics for
E RGO in Section 6.5 and compare their merits.

6.1

Datasets & Experimental Setup

Our experiments use data from the following networks:
1. Bitcoin: This dataset records the join and departure events of IDs in the Bitcoin network,
timestamped to the second, over roughly 7 days [178].
2. BitTorrent Debian: This dataset simulates the join and departure events for the BitTorrent
network to obtain a Debian ISO image. We use the Weibull distribution with shape and
scale parameters of 0.38 and 42.4, respectively, from [217].
3. BitTorrent FlatOut: This dataset simulates the join and departure events for the BitTorrent network to obtain obtain a demo of the game Flatout. We use the Weibull distribution
with shape and scale parameters of 0.34 and 21.3, respectively, from [217].
4. BitTorrent RedHat: This dataset simulates the join and departure events for the BitTorrent network to obtain a RedHat ISO image. We use the Weibull distribution with shape
and scale parameters of 0.59 and 41.0, respectively, from [217].
5. Ethereum: This dataset simulates join and departure events of IDs for the Ethereum
network. Based on a study in [138], we use the Weibull distribution with shape parameter
of 0.52 and scale parameter of 9.8.
126

6. Gnutella: This dataset simulates join and departure events for the Gnutella network.
Based on a study in [197], we use an exponential distribution with mean of 2.3 hours for
session time, and Poisson distribution with mean of 1 ID per second for the arrival rate.
General Experimental Setup. We measure the spend rate for an algorithm, focusing solely
on the cost of solving the RB-challenges. Throughout, we assume a cost of k for solving a
RB-challenge of difficulty k.
For the Bitcoin network, the system initially consists of 9212 IDs, and the join and departure events are based off the dataset from [179]. For the remaining networks, we initialize them
with 10000 IDs each, and simulate the join and departure events over 100,000 time steps.

6.2

In the absence of an Attack

We simulate our algorithms on the Bitcoin network as described in Section 6.1 and observe the
resource consumption in the absence of an attack. We plot the resource cost as separated into
the entrance cost and the purge cost for the network for each time step.
We present our results in Figure 6.1 for the Bitcoin network. Our results show a higher
resource cost for the entrance puzzles to good IDs for E RGO in comparison to C OM. This can
be attributed to the variation in the join rate of good IDs from one epoch to the next, thereby
resulting in increased entrance cost.
Additionally, these results point to the purge costs to be the dominant resource cost in our
algorithms. We use this insight to design heuristics in Section 6.5.

6.3

In the presence of an Attack

Similar to the previous section, we simulate our algorithms on the Bitcoin network. We simulate a “bursty” attack on the system: We assign the adversary a resource budget of 10000 for
each time step starting t = 10, 000 until t = 15, 000. Note that the bad IDs only need to solve
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Figure 6.1: Cumulative Resource Cost to good IDs over time in the absence of an attack for
Bitcoin network
the entrance puzzles to trigger a purge, and so do not solve the purge puzzle. We measure the
resource cost to the good IDs as well as the adversary at each time step. Then, we compare
their cost at each time step.
We plot our results in Figure 6.2. Our results show that in the case of a “bursty” attack, the
resource cost to good IDs grows slowly for E RGO in comparison to C OM. This is due to the
the entrance cost function used in E RGO, which charges the adversary higher entrance cost for
injecting large number of IDs over short duration of time.
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Figure 6.2: Cumulative Resource Cost over time in the presence of a bursty attack.
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6.4

Comparison with State-of-the-Art

We compare the performance of our algorithm against two resource burning based Sybil defense algorithms: S YBIL C ONTROL [149] and REMP (a name that uses the authors’ initials) [195], summarized below.
S YBIL C ONTROL. Each ID solves a RB-challenge to join. Additionally, each ID tests its
neighbors with a RB-challenge every 5 seconds, removing from its list of neighbors those
IDs that fail to provide a solution within a fixed time period. These tests are not coordinated
between IDs.
REMP. Each ID solves a RB-challenge to join. Additionally, each ID must solve RB-challengess
every W seconds. We use Equation (4) from [195] to compute the value of spending rate per
ID as:
n
Tmax
L
=
=
W
Nattacker
κN

(6.1)

where L is the cost to an ID per W seconds, n is the number of IDs that the adversary can
add to the system and Nattacker is the total number of attackers in the system. Suppose N is
the system size, then Nattacker is κN since the adversary has an κ fraction of resources of the
network in our model. Suppose Tmax is the maximum number of attackers (bad IDs) that can
join in W seconds, then to guarantee that the fraction of bad IDs is less than half, n = Tmax .
Substituting these values in Equation 6.1, we can compute total algorithmic spending rate as:

AREM P = (1 − κ)N ×

L
(1 − κ)Tmax
=
W
κ

(6.2)

Setup. We set κ = 1/18, and let T range over [20 , 220 ], where for each value of T , the system is
simulated for 10, 000 seconds. We also simulate the case T = 0. We assume that the adversary
only solves RB-challenges to add IDs to the system. For REMP, we consider two values of
Tmax , 104 and 107 . Setting Tmax = 107 ensures correctness for all values of T considered, and
Tmax = 104 ensures correctness for T ≤ 104 .
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Results. Figure 6.3 illustrates our results; we omit error bars since they are negligible. The
x-axis is the adversarial spending rate, T ; and the y-axis is the algorithmic spending rate, A.
We cut off the plots for REMP-104 and S YBIL C ONTROL, when they can no longer ensure that
the fraction of bad IDs is less than 1/2. We also note that REMP-107 only ensures a minority
of bad IDs for up to T = 107 .
E RGO always has spend rate as low as the other algorithms for T ≥ 100, and significantly
less than the other algorithms for large T , with improvements that grow to about 2 orders
of magnitude. In Section 6.5, our heuristics close this gap, allowing E RGO to outperform all
√
algorithms for all T ≥ 0. The spend rate for E RGO is linear in T , agreeing with our analytical
results. We emphasize that the benefits of E RGO are consistent over four disparate networks.
These results illustrate the value of G OOD JE ST.
Finally, we note that E RGO guarantees a fraction of bad IDs no more than 1/6 for all values
of T . In contrast, S YBIL C ONTROL and REMP guarantee a fraction of bad IDs less than 1/2
for the values of T plotted.

6.5

Heuristics for ERGO

Next, we present heuristics to improve the performance of E RGO. To determine effective
heuristics, we focus on two separate costs to good IDs: cost to join the system and purge cost.
In Section 6.2, we studied compared the purge cost against the entrance cost in the absence of
an attack for various network. We found that the purge cost dominates and, therefore, we focus
on reducing the purge frequency. We present a number of heuristics below.

6.5.1

Proposed Heuristics

Heuristic 1: Aligning Intervals and Iterations
In Chapter 4, we proposed an algorithm - G OOD JE ST, which estimates the join rate of good
IDs over disjoint periods referred to as intervals. We designed G OOD JE ST to be run in parallel
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and independent of any Sybil defense technique, subject to the constraint that the fraction of
bad IDs in the system is always less than a constant. Instead, suppose we update our estimate
at the end of an iteration once the end of an interval has been detected. We expect the estimate
to be of higher accuracy since the fraction of bad IDs at this point is reduced to the fraction of
resources with the adversary. Hence, the adversary would be able to join lesser number of IDs
in comparison to the original E RGO given the same resource budget, thereby delaying the need
to purge.
Heuristic 2: Symmetric Difference based Iterations
We use the symmetric difference to determine when to do a purge. Specifically, for iteration
i, if |(Scur ∪ Si−1 ) − (Scur ∩ Si−1 )| ≥ |Si−1 |/11, then a purge is executed. This ensures that
the fraction of bad IDs can increase by no more than in our original specification. But at the
same time, it decreases the purge frequency: for example, in the case when some ID joins and
departs repeatedly. This is due to the fact that IDs that join an well as depart during the same
iteration do not contribute to the overall membership change at the end of the iteration.
Heuristic 3: G OOD JE ST based Iterations
We use the estimated good-ID join rate, obtained via G OOD JE ST, to bound the maximum
number of bad IDs that can have joined during an iteration. This allows us to upper-bound the
fraction of bad IDs in the system and to purge only when the population invariant is at risk.
Heuristic 4: In Combination with SybilFuse
Recent works have explored the possibility of identifying bad IDs based on the network topology [95, 163]. In our experiments, we focus on SybilFuse [95], which has the probability of
correctly classifying an ID as either good or bad as 0.92 and 0.98 based on the empirical results
from [95], Section IV-B, last paragraph. We assume these values hold and use SybilFuse to
diagnose whether a joining ID is good or bad; in the latter case, the ID is refused entry.
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6.5.2

Comparison with E RGO

We evaluate the performance of these heuristics against E RGO. The experimental setup is
the same as Section 6.4. We define ERGO-HC1 using both Heuristic 1 and Heuristic 2, and
ERGO-HC2 using Heuristic 1, Heuristic 2 and Heuristic 3. We define ERGO-SF(92) and
ERGO-SF(98) to be E RGO using Heuristics 1, Heuristic 2, Heuristic 3 and also Heuristic 4,
with the accuracy parameter of Heuristic 4 as 0.98 and 0.92, respectively.
Note that we did evaluate the performance of Heuristic 1 separately but it did not produce
significant improvement in the performance. So, to simplify the presentation, we do not include
it in our plots. We would like to point out that this indifference shows the independence of our
estimate algorithm from the underlying Sybil defense mechanism used.
Figure 6.4 illustrates our results. The first combined heuristic, ERGO-CH1 does not result
in significant improvement in the resource cost to good IDs in comparison to ERGO algorithm
in all the four networks. But ERGO-CH2 performs significantly better for the Ethereum network when the adversary orchestrates a slow attack on the system. This can be attributed to
the fact that the good ID churn does not vary by more than a factor of 2 within an interval. So,
our estimated good join rate is very close to the true join rate. This results in the good IDs
not being forced to pay a higher entrance cost when the adversarial spend rate is low. Finally,
ERGO-SF(92) and ERGO-SF(98) reduce costs significantly during adversarial attack, with improvements of up to three orders of magnitude during the most significant attack tested. Again,
these improvements are consistent across 4 different types of data sets.

6.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we empirically evaluated the performance of our proposed algorithms on the
following networks: Bitcoin, BitTorrent - Debian, FlatOut and Redhat, Ethereum and Gnutella.
First, we studied the resource cost to the good IDs in the absence of an attack for DC OM
and E RGO. Then, we presented this cost for a specific adversarial strategy. Next, we presented
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a comparison with two state-of-the-art algorithms - S YBIL C ONTROL and REMP. Finally, we
proposed a number of heuristics for E RGO and evaluated their relative merits.
Our empirical studies show that our algorithms outperform the state-of-the-art by at least
four orders of magnitude. Additionally, our approach always guarantee a majority of honest
IDs in the system, which is not necessarily true for the state-of-the-art algorithms, as an be seen
in Figure 6.3. Moreover, our heuristics further improved the performance of E RGO, specially
when deployed in conjunction with the SybilFuse.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion & Future Work

“And to make and end is to make a beginning.”
T.S. Elliot [87]

Over the course of this dissertation, we proposed numerous Sybil defense techniques for permissionless systems. We began with defining the concept “Resource Burning”, identified existing resource burning mechanism in literature and discussed their wide applicability in securing
permissionless systems in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, we proposed a family of resource burning Sybil defense techniques, which
have a resource cost that grows linearly with the join rate of honest participants and the resource
cost to the attacker. Specifically, suppose J G is the join rate of honest participants over the
lifetime of the system and T is the resource spending rate of the adversary over the lifetime of
the system. Then, our techniques always guarantee an honest majority in the system such that
the total rate of resource spending to the honest participants is O(J G + T ).
In Chapter 4, we proposed an algorithm - G OOD JE ST, which estimates the join rate of
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good IDs given that the fraction of bad IDs in the system is always less than a constant. This
algorithm is independent of the underlying Sybil defense mechanism, and could be used in any
permissioned as well as permissionless system.
In Chapter 5, we presented an asymmetric Sybil defense technique - E RGO. This tech√
niques enforces a resource spend rate of O(J G + T J G ) on the honest participants in the
network. A crucial ingredient to this algorithm is G OOD JE ST, which enables the asymmetric
cost. Additionally, we proved a lower bound on the resource cost for the class of algorithms
that require system wide resource burning to always maintain an honest majority.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we presented our empirical results for various Sybil defense techniques proposed in this dissertation as well as compare them with the state-of-the-art. Additionally, we proposed numerous heuristics for E RGO and evaluated their merits.
In the remainder of this chapter, we present our preliminary results for efficient reconfiguration
for Sybil resistant DHTs as well as discuss a number of key open problems related to the work
done in this dissertation.

7.1

Towards Efficient and Robust DHTs

Over the last two decades, the problem of maintaining a resilient Distributed Hash Table
(DHT) has been revisited numerous times. DHTs are decentralized systems that enable efficient lookup of data stored on IDs. The main concept involves mapping IDs and data items to
locations on a virtual space. Each IDs maintains links to other IDs, called its neighbourhood,
in the form of an overlay network.
A key advantage associated with DHTs is that they are easy to update as IDs enter and leave
the system in a scalable manner. But, this also makes them vulnerable to join-leave attacks in
the presence of adversarial IDs. The adversary can insert IDs strategically to disrupt the overlay
network, even with constant fraction of IDs under its control. Such and attack is called join and
leave attack. Previous approaches by Awerbuch and Scheideler [30,34,35] have addressed this
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by requiring to modify the overlay — referred to as shuffle — at each join/leave event, even
in the absence of join and leave attack. Then, key question is: Can we design an efficient
reconfiguration technique for DHTs to defend against join and leave attacks?
In this section, we present preliminary results for a novel technique that answers this question in the affirmative.

7.1.1

Problem Statement

The system consists of n virtual identifiers (IDs), and at most κn of which are bad IDs, for
some κ < 1/9. Every ID is mapped to a location in the in [0, 1). IDs can join or depart
from the system, but the number of IDs in the system always remains n. So, every time an ID
leaves, another ID joins at that instant. This is referred to as a rejoin. We make this simplifying
assumption similar to previous works [31, 34].
We define a round as duration for a single rejoin event to occur, which includes the time
required to execute the departure as well as the join protocol as defined by our protocol.
The bad IDs are under the control of a single adversary. The adversary can schedule the
rejoins for good IDs a priori i.e., before the execution of the protocol, but not the position at
which they get inserted. On the other hand, the adversary can inspect the system and decide
to rejoin a bad ID anywhere in [0, 1). In a given round, the adversary can:1) decide to rejoin a
bad ID; or 2) rejoin a good IDs; or 3) do nothing.
We define the neighborhood of an ID as the region of length (C log n)/n in the clockwise
direction in [0, 1), for some constant C > 0.
Our Goal: To design an efficient reconfiguration protocol such that for any adversarial strategy the following two conditions hold true for the neighborhood of any ID at any time over
polynomial number of rounds in n:
• Majority: I contains a majority of good IDs.
• Balanced: I consists of Θ(log n) IDs.
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7.1.2

Our Approach

The pseudocode for our algorithm in Figure 7.1.
Our execution proceeds in rounds, which are demarcated by a single rejoin event. We treat
each rejoin event as a fresh join to the system. The ID v joining the system generates a random
position xv ∈ [0, 1) at which it joins, announces its new position to all IDs in the system, and
learns its group members as all IDs in the region [xv , xv + L) ,where L is (C log n)/n for some
constant C (See Lemma 7.1).
Each group makes its decisions using State Machine Replication [5]. The group keeps track
of the number of IDs it consists of. If the number IDs in the group, N differs from the expected
group size, Ñ by more than Ñ /9 (where Ñ = C log n from Lemma7.2) then the group executes
a shuffle. This “lazy but intelligent” shuffle in comparison to the original cuckoo rule from [34]

L AZY C UCKOO RULE (LCR)
Key Variables:
L : group length
N : current group size
Ñ : expected group size
The following steps are executed in parallel over the lifetime of the system:
• Each new ID v joins at a random position, xv ∈ [0, 1), and learns its group, N as
all IDs in the region [xv , xv + L).
• Each group registers any new joins and departures, and makes decisions using
State Machine Replication. For a group, if |N − Ñ| ≥ Ñ9 :
a. Send out an intent to shuffle to Ñ closest clockwise IDs.
b. If no intent to shuffle is received from any other group, then shuffle all IDs in
2L region in clockwise direction: Relocate IDs to positions chosen independently and u.a.r. in [0, 1), and select 2Ñ IDs independently and u.a.r. from the
system and place them uniformly in this 2L region.
Figure 7.1: Pseudocode for Lazy Cuckoo Rule.
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is the motivation for our protocol name: L AZY C UCKOO R ULE (LCR).
Intuitively, if the adversary is targeting a subset of intervals, then these will see more number of joins than other groups in the system since the number of bad IDs in the system is at
most an κ. On detecting this, we can redistribute the members of the affected region uniformly
in the system and replace them with the required number of IDs chosen uniformly at random
from the system.
Initialization Initially, n IDs join the system and are shuffled sufficiently many times to guarantee the two properties. After this, the IDs are allowed to join/depart from the system using
the Lazy Cuckoo Rule.

7.1.3

Theoretical Results

In this section, we prove the correctness properties. We prove all our results with high probability in n i.e. with probability at least 1 − o(1), over nγ rejoin events.
First, we obtain bounds on the number of good IDs in the neighborhood of any ID.
, the number of good IDs in every
Lemma 7.1. For any constant κ < 1/9 and C ≥ 48(γ+2)
1−κ
i
h
log n, 5(1−κ)C
log n .
group is always in the range 3(1−κ)C
4
4
Proof. Fix any round t. Let ξt be the event that at end of round t the number of good IDs in
any group is outside the range [ 3(1−κ)C
log n, 5(1−κ)C
log n)].
4
4
Let Yi be the position in [0, 1) chosen by the ID joining at round 1 ≤ i ≤ t. There are
exactly (1 − κ)n of these random variables that are associated with the good IDs currently
in the system at end of round t. By the principle of deferred analysis [164], if we reveal
only the value of these (1 − κ)n random variables, these value will all be independent and
uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1) since good IDs choose their location independent
and uniformly at random in [0, 1).
Then, we can bound P r(ξt ) using Chernoff Bound [164] and Union bounds. Fix an ID p
in the system at end of round t and let X be the number of good IDs in p’s group at time step
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t. For all indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} associated with good IDs in the system at round t, let Xi be
an indicator random variable that is 1 if and only if Yi is located in the interval associated with
P
ID p’s group and ID i is a good ID. Let X = ni=1 Xi be the number of good IDs in p0 s group
at time t. Let G be the set of good IDs. So, ∀i ∈ G : P r(Xi = 1) = (C log n)/n. Then, by
Linearity of Expectation, we have:

E[X] =

n
X

E[Xi ] =

i=1

X C log n
i∈G

n

= (1 − κ)C log n

(7.1)

Using Chernoff bound, we can obtain concentration bound on X as:
(  
)
2
E[X]
1 E[X]
P r(|X − E[X]| ≥
) ≤ 2 exp −
4
4
3


C(1 − κ)
= 2 exp −
log n
48
Finally, taking union bound over all groups, we have:



C(1 − κ)
P r(ξt ) ≤ 2n exp −
log n
48


C(1 − κ)
= exp log 2n −
log n
48



C(1 − κ)
= exp
1−
log n + log 2
48
≤ n−(γ+1)

where the last step holds for C ≥ 48(γ + 2)/(1 − κ).
Finally, taking a union bound over all rounds t, 1 ≤ t ≤ nγ , we show that with high probability
the number of good IDs in every group is in the desired range.



Lemma 7.2. The expected number of IDs in any group given that all IDs occupy positions
chosen independently and uniformly at random, Ñ is C log n.
Proof. Fix an round t and an ID p. Suppose xp is the position of ID p in round t. We define the
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group corresponding to ID p to be all the IDs in the region [xp , xp + L), where L = C log n.
Let Yi be the position in [0, 1) chosen by the ID joining at round 1 ≤ i ≤ t. By the principle
of deferred analysis [164], if we reveal values for all n random variables associated with each
ID, these value will all be independent and uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1).
Let Zi be an indicator random variable corresponding to the ith ID in the system being a
P
member of p0 s group, and Z = ni=1 Zi be the number of IDs that are member’s of p0 s group.
Then:
E[Z] =

n
X

E[Zi ] =

i=1

n
X
C log n
i=1

n

= C log n

where the third step holds since the probability of an ID belonging to p0 s group is
IDs choose their position independently and uniformly at random.

C log n
n

since


Next, we bound the fraction of bad IDs in any good group at any time over the lifetime of
the system.
Lemma 7.3. The fraction of bad IDs in a group is always less always than 1/2.
Proof. Fix a round and some group. By Lemma 7.1, the number of good IDs in any group is
always at least

3(1−κ)C
4

log n. Also, recall from our algorithm that the number of IDs in a group

is always within the range [ 8C
log n, 10C
log n]. Thus, the total number of bad IDs in the group
9
9
is at most

10
C
9

log n −

3(1−κ)
C
4

log n =

13+27κ
C
36

log n. Hence, the fraction of bad IDs in the

group is at most:
((13 + 27κ)C log n) /36
1
<
(8C log n) /9
2
where the above holds for κ < 19 .



In the previous lemmas, we proved that the fraction of bad IDs is always less than a half
in any group even when the adversary can insert IDs at specific positions. But the adversary
can play a stealth attack through the use of shuffles to concentrate bad IDs in the group. We
describe this attack below.
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Figure 7.2: Illustration for stealth attack using shuffles. The adversary’s aim is to accumulate
t−fraction of bad IDs out of C log n IDs, represented by red boxes.
In order to accumulate t > 0-fraction of bad IDs in a given region of with C log n IDs, the
adversary makes use of partial shuffle. We refer to a shuffle of some group as a partial shuffle
for another group, if there is over lap in the membership of these two group. For example, the
adversary can insert a bad ID in the left most sub-region of length 1/n by inserting sufficiently
many bad IDs in the (C log n)/n region from this position to trigger a shuffle, and repeats this
until a bad ID occupies this sub-region. Then, the adversary slides over this sub-region and
targets the next 1/n sub-region. We illustrate this in Figure 7.2.
In the next lemma, we address this stealth attack and prove that the adversary cannot accumulate more the 1/4−fraction of bad IDs in a region using this strategy.
Lemma 7.4. To insert at least (C log n)/4 bad IDs in a single group via stealth attack, the
adversary requires at least O(log n) partial shuffles in the region overlapping the group.
Proof. We describe and analyze a game that captures the stealth attack - the Stealth Game.
Setup. Consider Figure 7.3. Levels are indexed starting with 1, and each level represents a
partial shuffle ordered in time, where blue box represents a good ID, and a red box represents
a bad ID occupying this slot. Each level contains C ln n slots. All configurations of the partial
shuffles at different levels are known to the adversary.
Initially, the adversary is positioned at a null symbol, denoted by Φ in Figure 7.3, and the
initial configuration of IDs is uniformly at random from all possible configurations. While
positioned at any symbol, the adversary may move rightwards one symbol at a time along the
current level, or downwards to a deeper level; no other directions of movement are allowed.
Goal. The goal of the adversary is to traverse from the left to the right (over any mix of levels),
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Figure 7.3: Illustration for the Stealth Game. The blue and red boxes represent the good and
bad IDs, respectively, in possible configurations of C log n IDs.

accumulating at least (C/4) ln n bad IDs, while minimizing the number of levels descended.
Analysis. Assume the adversary will be “happy” to obtain some threshold t-fraction of bad
IDs out of some k IDs, where t is a constant bounded above 1/8. In other words, the adversary
is willing to move rightwards by k steps at some level, so long as tk are bad IDs in these k
steps.
What is the probability that some level has this property? Recall that the symbols are
chosen independently. Let Y` for a level be an indicator random variable for the event that `th
P
ID is bad in a given set of k IDs. Let Y = k`=1 Y` be the number of bad IDs in the given set
of k IDs. Then:
E[Y ] =

k
X

E[Y` ] < k/8

`=1

where the last step holds since fraction of bad IDs in the system id at most 1/8. Next, using
Chernoff bound and for t > 1/8 and any 0 < δ < 1:

P r(X ≥ (1 + δ)(k/8)) ≤ P r(X > tk)
2 k/24

≤ e−(8t−1)

(7.2)
(7.3)

So, the adversary must descend eΘ(tk) levels in expectation before it finds the desired level.
In other words, the adversary needs to shuffle etk times in expectation to obtain the desired
configuration.
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Next, we define the notion of“level-epochs”, indexed by i. A level-epoch i ends when the
adversary has descended to the level with at least ti −fraction of bad IDs out of ki IDs, and
refer to the number of levels the adversary descended as the size of level-epoch i.
Let Zi be the geometric random variable for the size of the ith level-epoch and Z =

PL

i=1

Zi

for some value L ≥ 1 as the total number of levels descended in L level-epochs. Then:

E[Z] =

L
X

e(8ti −1)

2 k /24
i

≥

i=1

C
log n
4

and using Chernoff bound from [34], we get:
2 E[Z]/2

P r(Z < (1 − )E[Z]) ≤ e



2 C
log n
≤ exp −
2 4
 2

C
≤ exp −
log n
8


≤ n−γ+1

where the second step follows from 7.2 and the last step holds for  ≥

p
8(γ − 1)/C



Based on our preliminary analysis above, we propose the following:
Claim 7.1. At any round t > 0, for κ < 1/9 and sufficiently large constant C ≥

48(γ+1)
,
1−κ

the

following properties are always maintained:
log n, 10C
log n].
- Balancing Property: The number of IDs in any group is within the range [ 8C
9
9
- Majority Property: Any group consists of a majority of good IDs.
Additionally, suppose T is the total number of rejoins by the bad IDs, then the total number
of shuffles of good IDs is O(T ).
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7.1.4

Empirical Results

We implement the LCR algorithm and simulate it on two of the BitTorrent Networks - Debian
and FlatOut. We simulated our algorithm over the network in the absence of an attack as a
proof of concept.
Experimental Setup. We measured the maximum and minimum group size at each time
step over the entire simulation for different values of constant C = 55 and C = 60. We
initialized the system with 1000 IDs for both networks, placed them uniformly in [0, 1). For
each ID, we set the session time for the IDs by sampling the Weibull distribution using the
corresponding shape and scale parameters from [217]. Whenever an ID departed from the
system, we simulated a new join event to maintain the same number of IDs in the system at
every time step. We ran our simulation of 1000 time steps.
Figure 7.4 illustrates our results. It is easy to see from our plots that the group size is
log n, 10C
log n] for C = 55 and C = 60. Hence, there is no need to shuffle
always in [ 8C
9
9
IDs in the absence of an attack. Note that this scenario also illustrates the behavior of the
system in the case that the adversarial IDs join uniformly at random in [0, 1), which would be
indistinguishable from the behavior of good IDs.
As a next step, we propose to simulate an attack on the system where the adversary joins
bad IDs in specific groups. We predict that in such a scenario, the number of shuffles will be
dependent on the number of joins by the bad IDs to specific groups.

7.1.5

Future Work

Our preliminary result for LCR protocol claim to maintain a robust DHT, given that the number
of bad IDs in the system is always less than 1/8. This fraction of bad IDs can maintained in
any peer to peer system with the help of our Sybil defense algorithms from previous chapters.
As future work, we propose two major direction. First, to extend this approach to systems
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Figure 7.4: Variation in group size, N in the absence of an attack for BitTorrent Debian and
FlatOut Networks
with polynomially varying number of IDs. To this end, since our protocol depends on the
knowledge of the number of IDs in the system, a major sub-task would be to estimate the
system size over short periods of time. This is crucial to our protocol in order to differentiate a
join-leave attack from the varying system size. A number of protocols to estimate the system
size exist in literature [59, 205], but it remains to be seen if these can be used in conjunction
with our protocol.
Second, to adapt our Sybil defense algorithms to a obtain a Sybil-resistant DHT. Most of
the existing works either assume a constant fraction of bad IDs in the network [30, 31, 34] or
require continous resource burning to ensure this fraction [149]. With the use of our Sybil
defense techniques from Chapter 3 and 5, we can ensure a constant fraction of bad IDs in the
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system with resource cost to the good IDs that grows as a function of the cost to the attacker.
To this end, we need to designate a special subset of size Θ(log n) as the committee. One
approach would be to choose a group to serve as the committee. But with this, the adversary
can target the specific region associated with this group for bad ID insertion. An alternative
approach would be to elect a committee independent of the ID positions.

7.2

Lower Bound for Resource Burning based Sybil
Defenses

In chapter 5, we proved a lower bound of Ω(T + J) for the class of algorithms that require periodic system wide resource burning to maintain an honest majority. Note that this lower bound
matches the guarantees obtained for E RGO for constant α and β−smoothness parameters of
churn. Then, natural question that arises is that can we obtain such a lower bound that holds
for arbitrary algorithms and any values of α and β?

7.3

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC)

One of particular interest is: Can we adapt our technique to secure multi-party computation?
The problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC) involves designing an algorithm for
the purpose of computing the value of an n-ary function f over private inputs from n IDs
x1 , x2 , ..., xn , such that the IDs learn the value of f (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ), but learn nothing more
about the inputs than what can be inferred from this output of f . The problem is generally
complicated by the assumption that an adversary controls a hidden subset of the IDs. In recent
years, a number of attempts have been made to solve this problem for very large n manner [20,
39, 48, 71, 72, 75, 104]. We believe that our technique for forming committees in a dynamic
network could be helpful to solve a dynamic version of this problem, while ensuring that the
resource costs to the good IDs is commensurate with the resource costs to an adversary.
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7.4

Sybil Defense given Rational IDs

As another avenue of future work, there are scenarios where it may be unreasonable to assume that “good” IDs always blindly follow our algorithm. Instead, these IDs may be rational
but selfish, in that they seek to optimize some known utility function. The adversary still behaves in a worst-case manner, capturing the fact that the utility function of the adversary may
be completely unknown. This approach is similar to BAR (Byzantine, Altruistic, Rational)
games [64] in distributed computing, see also [2, 9, 150, 225, 226, 238]. Extending our result to
accommodate this model is of interest.
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[132] K ARAME , G. O., AND Č APKUN , S. Low-Cost Client Puzzles Based on Modular Exponentiation. In Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS) (2010), pp. 679–697.
[133] K ARAMI , A., AND Z HOU , B. Online review spam detection by new linguistic features.
iConference 2015 Proceedings (2015).
[134] K ASHOEK , M. F., AND K ARGER , D. R. Koorde: A simple degree-optimal distributed
hash table. In Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS) (Berkeley, CA, 2003).
[135] K ATZ , J., M ILLER , A., AND S HI , E. Pseudonymous secure computation from timelock puzzles. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2014 (2014), 857.

160

[136] K HAN , S. M., M ALLESH , N., NAMBIAR , A., AND W RIGHT, M. K. The dynamics
of salsa: A robust structured p2p system. Network Protocols and Algorithms 2 (2010),
40–60.
[137] K IAYIAS , A., RUSSELL , A., DAVID , B., AND O LIYNYKOV, R. Ouroboros: A provably
secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol. In Proceedings of the 37th Annual International Cryptology Conference (2017), vol. 10401 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, pp. 357–388.
[138] K IM , S. K., M A , Z., M URALI , S., M ASON , J., M ILLER , A., AND BAILEY, M. Measuring ethereum network peers. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference
2018 (2018), pp. 91–104.
[139] K ING , V., S AIA , J., S ANWALANI , V., AND V EE , E. Scalable Leader Election. In
Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithm (SODA)
(2006), pp. 990–999.
[140] K ING , V., S AIA , J., AND YOUNG , M. Conflict on a Communication Channel. In
Proceedings of the 30th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC)
(2011), pp. 277–286.
[141] K LONOWSKI , M., AND KOZA , M. Countermeasures Against Sybil Attacks in WSN
Based on Proofs-of-Work. In Proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Security and
Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (2013), WiSec ’13, pp. 179–184.
[142] K NOCKEL , J., S AAD , G., AND S AIA , J. Self-healing of byzantine faults. In Proceedings of the International Symposium on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed
Systems (SSS) (2013), pp. 98–112.
[143] KOBLITZ , N., AND M ENEZES , A. J. The Random Oracle Model: A Twenty-Year
Retrospective. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 77, 2-3 (2015), 587–610.
[144] KOTLA , R., A LVISI , L., DAHLIN , M., C LEMENT, A., AND W ONG , E. Zyzzyva:
Speculative Byzantine Fault Tolerance. In Proceedings of 21st Symposium on Operating
Systems Principles (2007), pp. 45–58.
[145] L AMPORT, L., S HOSTAK , R., AND P EASE , M. The Byzantine Generals Problem. ACM
Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems (TOPLAS) 4, 3 (1982), 382–401.
[146] L AURIE , B., AND C LAYTON , R. ”Proof-of-work” proves not to work. In Proceedings
of the 3rd Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS) (2004).
[147] L ESNIEWSKI -L AAS , C., AND K AASHOEK , M. F. Whanau: A Sybil-proof distributed
hash table. In Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems Design
and Implementation (2010), NSDI’10, pp. 8–8.
[148] L I , D., L U , X., AND W U , J. FISSIONE: A scalable constant degree and low congestion
DHT scheme based on Kautz graphs. In Proceedings IEEE 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies. (2005), vol. 3, pp. 1677–
1688.
161

[149] L I , F., M ITTAL , P., C AESAR , M., AND B ORISOV, N. SybilControl: Practical sybil
defense with computational puzzles. In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM Workshop on
Scalable Trusted Computing (2012), pp. 67–78.
[150] L I , H. C., C LEMENT, A., W ONG , E. L., NAPPER , J., ROY, I., A LVISI , L., AND
DAHLIN , M. BAR Gossip. In Proceedings of the 7th Symposium on Operating Systems
Design and Implementation (2006), OSDI ’06, pp. 191–204.
[151] L IN , I.-C., AND L IAO , T.-C. A survey of blockchain security issues and challenges. IJ
Network Security 19, 5 (2017), 653–659.
[152] L IU , D., AND C AMP, L. J. Proof of work can work. In Proceedings of the 5th Workshop
on the Economics of Information Security (WEIS) (2006).
[153] L IU , Y., B ILD , D. R., D ICK , R. P., M AO , Z. M., AND WALLACH , D. S. The Mason
test: A defense against Sybil attacks in wireless networks without trusted authorities.
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 14, 11 (2015), 2376–2391.
[154] L UU , L., NARAYANAN , V., Z HENG , C., BAWEJA , K., G ILBERT, S., AND S AXENA ,
P. A Secure Sharding Protocol For Open Blockchains. In Proceedings of the 2016
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (2016),
pp. 17–30.
[155] M ALBON , J. Taking fake online consumer reviews seriously. Journal of Consumer
Policy 36, 2 (2013), 139–157.
[156] M ALLIGA , S., TAMILARASI , A., AND JANANI , M. Filtering spoofed traffic at source
end for defending against dos/ddos attacks. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Computing, Communication and Networking (2008), IEEE, pp. 1–5.
[157] M ANKINS , D., K RISHNAN , R., B OYD , C., Z AO , J., AND F RENTZ , M. Mitigating
distributed denial of service attacks with dynamic resource pricing. In Proceedings
of the Seventeenth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (2001), IEEE,
pp. 411–421.
[158] M ARTINOVIC , I., Z DARSKY, F. A., W ILHELM , M., W EGMANN , C., AND S CHMITT,
J. B. Wireless Client Puzzles in IEEE 802.11 Networks: Security by Wireless. In
Proceedings of the First ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (2008), WiSec
’08, pp. 36–45.
[159] M AYMOUNKOV, P., AND M AZIERES , D. Kademlia: A peer-to-peer information system
based on the xor metric. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (2002), 53–65.
[160] M ILLER , A., AND L AV IOLA J R , J. J.
Anonymous Byzantine Consensus
from Moderately-Hard Puzzles: A Model for Bitcoin.
(2014). https://
socrates1024.s3.amazonaws.com/consensus.pdf.

162

[161] M ILLER , A., L ITTON , J., PACHULSKI , A., S PRING , N., G UPTA , N., L EVIN , D.,
AND B HATTACHARJEE , B. Discovering bitcoin’s public topology and influential nodes,
2015. http://cs.umd.edu/projects/coinscope/coinscope.pdf.
[162] M ILLER , G. Spent: Sex, evolution, and consumer behavior. Penguin, 2009.
[163] M ISRA , S., TAYEEN , A. S. M., AND X U , W. Sybilexposer: An effective scheme to
detect sybil communities in online social networks. In 2016 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) (2016), IEEE, pp. 1–6.
[164] M ITZENMACHER , M., AND U PFAL , E. Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
[165] M ITZENMACHER , M., AND U PFAL , E. Probability and Computing: Randomization
and Probabilistic Techniques in Algorithms and Data Analysis. Cambridge University
Press, 2017.
[166] M OHAISEN , A., AND H OLLENBECK , S. Improving social network-based Sybil defenses by rewiring and augmenting social graphs. In Proceedings of the 14th International Workshop on Information Security Applications (WISA) (2014), pp. 65–80.
[167] M OHAISEN , A., AND K IM , J. The Sybil attacks and defenses: A survey. Smart Computing Review 3, 6 (2013), 480–489.
[168] M OHAISEN , A., T RAN , H., C HANDRA , A., AND K IM , Y. Trustworthy distributed
computing on social networks. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM SIGSAC Symposium on
Information, Computer and Communications Security (2013), ASIA CCS ’13, pp. 155–
160.
[169] M OLINA , H. G., P ITTELLI , F., AND DAVIDSON , S. Applications of Byzantine Agreement in Database Systems. ACM Transactions on Database Systems (TODS) 11 (1986),
27–47.
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